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ABSTRACT 
This thesis tests the hypothesis of whether international 
control of atomic energy could have been achieved during the 
war years and immediately afterward and thus avoiding the 
current arms race. The main focus is upon Anglo-American 
' 
atomic relations. It is believed that an early approach to 
the Soviet Union by the trans-Atlantic partners to share the 
secrets of atomic energy could have avoided an arms race. 
This was not achieved for several reasons: Churchill's 
stubborn mistrust of Stalin; Roosevelt's preference to 
accept advice from Churchill rather than from his own staff; 
the rise of American bureaucratic politics under Truman, and 
Britain's failure to recognise this change; and contemporary 
attitudes towards atomic energy and postwar government. 
Ultimately the opportunity to control atomic energy 
internationally existed during the years 1943-45, but the· 
possibility of implementing them was slim owing to the 
aforementioned factors. This thesis tackles this issue from 
a decision making perspective. 
1 
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PREFACE 
The major obstacle confronting anyone conducting research in 
the field of atomic energy is the scarcity of official 
documents owing to the highly sensitive nature of the 
subject. To compound this difficulty there are differences 
of historical facts within the secondary sources. On the 
American side, the intense secrecy and compartmentalisation 
of atomic development from 1939-1945 has caused contemporary 
diaries and personal accounts to be ethnocentric by nature. 
Henry Stimson's fifty-two volume diary of the war years is 
no exception. However, within this academic desert such a 
wealth of information has been seized upon by researchers, 
possibly biasing their analysis. Martin Sherwin's A World 
Destroyed, although highly informative, does rely heavily 
upon these diaries. There are two main sources outside of 
the Washington Archives available to the student of American 
atomic energy concerning this period. One is Hewlett and 
Anderson's History of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission 1939-46. The authors were given access to 
American official documents on the subject. The second is a 
series of books published by the U.S. Department of State 
entitled Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 
These volumes constitute parts of official documents which 
have been reproduced, the originals still being classified. 
On the British side, many of the original documents are 
2 
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still classified. Those that have been declassified are 
available at the Public Records Office in Kew. 
Unfortunately even. some of these are kept from public view 
owing to "indefinite departmental use''· Professor Margaret 
Gowing's Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945 and 
Independence and Deterrence Volumes I and II represents the 
official British history of the atomic program from 1939-
52. She has had access to most British official documents 
on the subject. 
Thus, this paper is primarily based on secondary sources and 
official histories, which opens it to the criticism that it 
may be unbalanced in the treatment of the subject. I have 
tried to take this factor into consideration when drawing my 
conclusions. Primary sources are quoted wherever possible. 
3 
Prologue 
IN'rRODUCTION 
Method Of Approach 
Much has been written about the American-Soviet arms race, 
ranging from domestic explanations of military industrial 
complexes to explanations of international threats and 
stimuli. There too is a substantial volume of literature 
concerning the domestic development of atomic energy of 
these two countries, some partially concentrating on Anglo-
American relationships. A large body of the literature 
concerning Anglo-American relations has been written from a 
dependency theory perspective. This dissertation will 
~ 
utilise some of this information in order to shed light on a 
question not yet wholly addressed by the academia: was 
international control of atomic energy ever a genuine 
possibility? It is not the intention of this paper to 
assess the failure of the Baruch Plan nor the inability of 
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to 
prevent vertical nuclear proliferation of the super powers. 
Rather the question posed is whether or not international 
control was destined to failure; were its foundations built 
upon the quicksand of American and British foreign policy 
decision making? 
To answer this question it is necessary to comprehend the 
4 
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relationship that existed between the British and Americans 
in their atomic partnership. It was these two countries 
that together developed the first· atomic weapons and 
consequently held the fate of atomic energy in their hands. 
John Simpson (1983) tackles this issue form a dependency 
theory perspective. He viewed Anglo-American atomic 
relations as a "military trading relationship" with the 
"United States as the greater power, and the United Kingdom, 
as the lesser one".l This approach is from a state-centric 
level of analysis which allows the author to some extent to 
skirt the problems of attaining archival information. 
Although·this work is illuminating and highly informative it 
• 
avoids the decision making level of analysis and as such 
does not strike at the heart of the matter under study in 
this thesis - who formulated atomic energy policy on both 
sides of the Atlantic and why did these individuals select 
such policy choices? A decision making ~nalysis from the 
periods 1943 (Quebec Agreement) to November 1945 (Washington 
Conference) may elucidate this issue. 
The Birth of Atomic Energy 
Professor James Chadwick of Liverpool University, England 
~as the first to discover the neutron in 1932. It was not· 
until December 1938 that the fission process was discovered 
1 Simpson, John - The Independent Nuclear State (St. Martin's Press, 1983) p. 19. 
5 
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in Germany·by Otto Hahn, although he was unable to solve 
certain questions about the feasibility of atomic 
explosives. In Spring 1940 Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, 0 '· 
two emigre scientists working at the University of 
I 
Birmingham, explained how an atomic bomb could be 
practically constructed. They recognised natural uranium 
ore as the only economically available ore which contains a 
large enough portion of fissile atoms ·(u235 ) to supply free 
neutrons to initiate a reaction. Once a supply of u235 has 
been obtained it is possible to irradiate a fertile material 
such a Thorium which becomes Uranium233 which is fissile, 
but not found in nature.2 Sir Henry Tizard, then Chairman 
of the Committee of the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, 
was alerted by Professor George Thomson, then professor of 
physics at Imperial College, London, of the large amounts of 
uranium in the Belgian Congo. Tizard rejected Thomson's 
plan to secure all existing stocks of uranium in the Congo 
in order to prevent Germany access to th~m. He did however 
establish a uranium sub-committee of the Committee for the 
Scientific Survey of Air Warfare. This became known as the 
Maud Committee3 which as organized in April 1940 was 
2 Gowing, Margaret - Independence and Deterrence 
1945-1952, Vol I (Macmillan, 1974) pp. 451-464. 
3 The Maud Committee acquired its name under strange 
circumstances. Neils Bohr, who had done important 
research with uranium, sent Frisch a personal telegram 
as the Germans were invading Denmark which ended "Tell 
Cockcroft and Maud Ray Kent". Military intelligence 
interpreted the last three words as an anagram for "radium 
6 
essentially an "informal, academic group made up entirely of 
scientists and only loosely connected to the Whitehall 
apparatus".4 The Maud Committee addressed itself to two 
important questions: 
1. Can scientists produce a uranium bomb? 
2. If so, could Britain and her allies make one 
before Germany? 
It concluded that a bomb could be made within two to five 
years. Consequently, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
actini under the advice of his chief scientific advisor Lord 
Cherwell 5 and under the belief that the Germans were already 
developing atomic weapons, sent to the Chiefs of Staff on 30 
August, 1941, his famous minute in which he stated; 
"although personally I am quite content with the existing 
_explosives, I feel we must not stand in the path of 
improvement. 116 Thus, Britain was the first country to 
· decide to build an atomic bomb. Britain's unilateral 
decision to build the bomb was soon overshadowed by the 
latter decision to combine the effort into a joint 
taken". Only years later did it become known that the 
message was intended for Bohr's children's former governess, Maud Ray, living in Kent; see Clark, Ronald -The Birth of the Bomb (Horizon, 1961) pp. 76-77. 
4 Pierre, Andrew - Nuclear Politics (Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 15. 
5 Lord Cherwell, previously Professor Frederick Lindemann (physics at Christ Church). 
6 Gowing, Margaret - Britain and Atomic Energy 
1939-45 (Macmillan, 1964) p. 106. 
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Anglo-American project. 
Areas of Analysis 
Prior to the Quebec Agreement of 1943 there was a degree of 
equivocation by both the Brit~!!. and Americans concerning 
the amalgamation of their atomic projects. The United 
States initially approached the British with a proposal for 
a joint project, which was rejected. However, for what 
appeared to be mainly financial reasons the British 
reluctantly changed their minds, only to be rejected by the 
Americans. The British then reconsidered an independent 
project, which was abandoned upon the signing of the Quebec 
Agreement. Although this capricious period in Anglo-
American atomic relations is interesting in its own right, 
it does not pertain to this thesis because prior to the 
official assimilation of the projects no joint decisions 
regarding international control could have been made. 7 The 
Anglo-American development of the atomic bomb and subsequent 
international control of atomic energy appears to be marked 
by two distinct phases for the period 1943-45. 
7 For further treatment of this period see: 
Hewlett, R.G. and Anderson, -0.E. - A History of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commiss 1ion, Vol I,· The New World 
1939-46.(Pennsylvania State University Press,1962) 
chaps.,2,3,4,8; also Gowing, M. (1964) Op.Cit., pp.115-
157; also Pierre, Andrew (1972) Op.Cit., chaps. 1 and 2. 
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Phase One 
This period for the most part concentrates on the war years 
until the sudden death of Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. It 
.•. is characterized by the very close relationship between 
Churchill and Roosevelt. Although the Quebec Agreement was 
not signed until August 19, 1943 this study has to go back 
as far as 1939 in order ·to ~xplain the development of the 
American and British decision making infrastructures. It 
would be difficult to explain the decisions taken at Quebec 
and Hyde Park without an understanding of the formation and 
structure of the British and American atomic decision making 
machineries. For this reason their development will be 
described and explained. 
This first phase will concentrate upon the following central 
• issues: 
1) Who was influential in the development of the American 
and British atomic decision making machineries? 
2)a. What were the goals of the Americans and British 
at Quebec and were these achieved? 
b. Why were these goals selected? 
3) Who advocated international control of atomic energy 
and for what reasons were these unsuccessful? 
4) What were the aspirations of the scientists towards international control and were they successful? 
Phase Two 
This is concerned with the period of transition from 
9 
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Roosevelt to Truman and from Churchill to Attlee,. The new 
Prime Minister and President were both novice leaders. 
Attlee had 1 been kept out of Churchill's War Cabinet and 
Truman had met with Roosevelt only eight times during the 
latter's entire term. Consequently both were new to the 
world of atomic energy and were forced to rely upon advice 
" of those in "the know'' - the ''atomic bureaucrats''. Although 
the most remembered events during this period were the 
dropping of "Little Boy" on Hiroshima and ''Fat Man'' on 
Nagasaki, they will not be consid~red in depth. The 
decision to drop the bomb was not a considered decision at 
all; it was built to be used. The central issue during this 
period as far as this paper is concerned is what the British 
called the Washington Conference and what the Americans 
referred to as the Truman-Attlee Conference. This was the 
first meeting of the new administrations and its purposes 
were the Anglo-American atomic partnership and international 
control of atomic energy. 
The second phase will concentrate upon the following central 
• issues: 
1) How influential were the American and British bureaucracies in shaping domestic and international atomic policy in these countries? 
2) What were the goals of the Americans and British at Washington in November 1945 and were these achieved? 
3) Was international control of atomic energy a possibility and if so why was it not achieved? 
10 
It is hoped that by offering answers to the above 
questions it may be discovered who the actual, rather than 
official, decision makers were during this delicate time, 
and whether international control of atomic energy was 
ever a genuine possibility. 
' I I 
Analytical Framework 
It is essential for an analysis of Anglo-American atomic 
relations for the years 1943-45 to fully comprehend the 
.. I 
international atmosphere of the time as well as contemporary 
attitudes towards the new discovery of atomic fission. From 
a Wittgensteinian perspective, without this contemporary 
framework it would be very difficult to assess the attitudes 
and policy choices of the decision makers involved. Given 
Wittgenstein's ''language game theory" is transferable into 
the international arena, one can assume that the "language'' 
of the mid 1940's is very different from the "language" of 
the late 1980's. 8 To analyse the former within the 
framework of the latter would.be of dubious worth. For 
meaningful analysis, a common "language" should be found. 
The object of analysis in decision making theory is not the 
rarefied abstraction of the state, but the human decision 
makers that act on behalf of the state. In a study of a 
8 Danford, John - Wittgenstein and Political 
Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1976) Chap. 5. 
11 
state's technological policy, the extent to which the 
politicians, the administrators, the engineers and 
scientists are involved with determining such policy will be 
a major focal point. . ~- . The analytical framework is a means of 
organising such data for analysis. Decision making theory 
is basically a conceptual framework; it aims to set a 
.,. 
comprehensive and useful checklist of the factors that 
should be taken into account in any attempt to analyse 
policy making. The theory identifies a large number of 
relevant variables and suggests possible inter-relationships 
between these variables, but does not establish precise 
correlational links between them. Consequently, 
subjectivity will always be a factor in such analysis. 
There currently exists a large amount of literature on 
decision making which is applicable to the development of 
atomic policy. However, there is a tendency for this 
material to be too heavily biased towards the experienqe of 
the United States' political system from which most of it is 
derived and is thus not directly applicable to the British 
system. Within the context of Anglo-American atomic 
relations the most influential variables which aft·ected the 
policies of the two states, was the decision making process 
and what Jervis calls the psychological milieu.9 
9 Jervis, R. - Perceptions and Misperceptions in 
World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976) 
12 
United Kingdom Decision Making 
A useful approach to policy decisions in the United Kingdom 
is that developed by William Wallace to, assist his study of 
British foreign policy. Wallace argues that in Britain 
there are vertical departmental divisions whilst there are 
horizontal divisions between different levels of policy. He 
asserts that British foreign policy can be divided into 
three categories; high policy, sectorial policy and low 
policy. High policy issues are those that are seen by 
policy makers as affecting Britain's _fundamental standing in 
the .world as involving national security and national 
prestige as linked to values and symbols important to 
society as a whole. It is these that form the foundations 
upon which British foreign policy is constructed.lo 
Sectorial policy issues are those which are perceived as 
affecting only certain sections of society and only a 
limited number of interests. Sectorial interests are 
perceived to be at stake rather than those of society as a 
whole. Such policies may be described as departmental 
rather than governmental because the vertical divisions 
between the departments are clearly visible. Different 
levels of policy are handled at different levels of policy 
making. Strategic questions of high policy involve the 
Prime Minister and his closest advisors. Sectorial policies 
lO Wallace, w.- The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1976) p.11. 
13 
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I 
are handled by departments but follow lines laid down by the 
Prime Minister's high policy: ''Once the high policy ••. has 
been decided upon, the bureaucracy will have considerable 
freedom implementing what has now become sectorial 
policy. 11 11 Low policy does not concern this study. 
In the case of Anglo-American atomic relations sectorial 
I 
policies can be regarded as those carried out by the 
bureaucracy that evolved for the managing of atomic energy 
policy. Such policy formation and implementation took place 
within a "closed system", which was a separate machine from 
Whitehall. The "atomic bureaucracy" was unable to appeal to 
the larger Whitehall body nor was it influenced by external 
agencies, with the exception of America. Within this 
framework the responsibility for policy lay with the Prime 
Minister. He had the authority to create and dissolve 
committees as well µS set their terms of reference. The 
final decision on any matter of policy, whether high or 
sectorial, lay with the Prime Minister. However, the Prime 
Minister depends upon his subordinates for information upon 
which to base his decisions. This raises the questions of 
who does make policy decisions on detailed technical issues? 
This question will be fully addressed later in this section. 
United States Decision Making 
This is more complex than the British decision making 
11 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
14 
structure for the period 1943 to 1945 because the death of 
President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 is often seen as the 
transition point from presidential to bureaucratic politics. 
However, the bureaucratic machinery did not develop over 
night; its development may be traced as far back as the New 
Deal. A strong bureaucracy existed during the Roosevelt 
Administration which was prevented from fully surfacing by a ! 
dominant centralised presidency. The sudden death of 
Roosevelt and his replacement by a bewildered Vice President 
Truman saw the flimsy lock on the door of the bureaucratic 
government shattered. Dolbeare and Edelman are correct in 
their claim that; "the bureaucratic organisation Truman 
inherited from Roosevelt was full of agencies and 
departments with conflicting and overlapping 
jurisdictions. n12 Nevertheless, the adage ''where you stand 
depends upon where you sit" applies equally to the Roosevelt 
bureaucracy as to the Truman bureaucracy. Positions adopted 
and decisions taken· are to a large extent predictable by 
recognising the stance of a particular department on a 
particular issue. 
"In short, the American policy-making system is one 
characterised by multiple actors who are wedded to 
12 Dolbeare, K.M. and Edelman, M.J. -
Politics: Policies, Power and Change (D.C. 
1974) p. 326. 
15 
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Heath and Co, 
.. 
organisational routines and the protection of vested 
interests. 11 13 Although the number of officials involved in 
the American foreign atomic policy process was small, 
officials represented many different departments and 
agencies. This resulted in a large number of different 
policies being promoted by various officials. Taking all 
the aforementioned factors into consideration, the 
conceptual· framework best suited for analysing and 
explaining the outcome of the American policy process is 
Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model. 
' 
' Allison's model rejects the basic premise of the rational 
actor model. Instead Allison asserts that there are no 
unitary actors but many actors as players who focus on many 
diverse problems. Players chose policy not in terms of a 
consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according 
to various conceptions of national security, organisational, 
domestic and personal issues. The players make governmental 
policies not by a single rational choice, but by "pulling 
and hauling 11 .14 
13 Wheeler, N. and William, P.- "United States 
Foreign Policy-Making:Chaos of Design?", cited from 
Speigel S. (Ed), At Issue: Politics in the World Arena (St. Martins Press, 5th Ed, 1988) p. 466. 
14 Allison, G. T. - "Conceptual Models and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis" The American Political Science Review· 
Vol.63, No.3, September 1969, p. 707; see also, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little and 
Brown, 1971). 
16 
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A major feature of this model is that players will bargain 
to produce an outcome· favorable to the organisation whose 
interests they represent. Only with great difficulty can 
political leaders overcome the inertia and the self-serving 
interests of permanent government. Members of a government 
have competitive not homogeneous interests, their priorities 
and perceptions are molded by position. Straightforward 
strategic issues are far more complicated and complex than 
may first appear, and selecting a policy direction is less 
difficult than implementing it. The managerial skill is all I 
important; " ... the crucial questions seem to be matters of 
planning for managernent. 11 15 Owing to differing interests of 
players they tend to focus on different aspects of a 
I , 
particular issue. Consequently policy making activities of 
bureaucracies cannot be solely understood in terms of 
end/means relationships and the attainment of public goals. 
Rather a process of decision making and policy 
implementation is involved which may be non-purposive, 
especially if the promotion and future survival of the 
responsible organisations are the major objectives of the 
actors involved. 
Within this framework the role of the President and Congress 
in formulating and implementing policy must also be 
considered. The United States has one President but two 
15 Ibid., (1969) p.708. 
17 
presidencies; one concerned with domestic affairs, the other 
with defense and foreign policy. Domestic policy usually 
C-0 
changes incrementally, Presidents finding it difficult t9 
introduce radical new domestic policies. Presidents tend to 
be concerned with foreign policy owing to its dynamic and 
public nature, letting domestic politics for the most part 
"run its course". Although foreign policy needs some 
Congressional support, it is easier to obtain since foreign 
i 
policy enhances and protects the nation whilst domestic 
policy does not appear to. This perhaps is no longer the 
case in the 1980's, but is an accurate reflection of the 
Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. In fact Roosevelt was 
hardly accountable to Congress owing to the President's war 
powers; whilst Truman's dealings with Congress were 
considerably more intricate, especially during the passing 
of the Ktomic Energy Act (1946). This idea of a dual 
presidency is important for the understanding of American 
atomic policy, for atomic energy straddles both the domestic 
and foreign policy arenas. 
Common Themes 
(i) Secrecy 
Despite the different decision making systems there are 
similarities between them which distinguish atomic policy 
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formulation from most other policy decisions. In both 
states there was great secrecy over atomic energy and 
especially Anglo-American relations. Very few officials in 
both countries had access to all the information concerning 
atomic cooperation. Atomic relationships had developed 
during the war and thus the decision making process in both 
states was based upon wartime conditions. As a result there 
was no accountability to the electorate and information was 
disclosed on a need to know basis. Although this situation 
did not change in Britain after the war it did in America. 
Truman was accountable to Congress for spending $2 billion 
on the Manhattan Project and was forced to keep the public 
informed on American post-war atomic policy. Despite this 
accountability, American policy was still highly secretive 
owing to security reasons. 
(ii) Science and Politics 
Science and scientific investigation does not recognise 
national boundaries. It is practiced by people speaking with 
different tongues but sharing the same language -- science. 
Atomic fission was developed by many different nationals, 
often Marking in foreign countries~ Scientists and the 
military are-very closely related; for the latter depends 
upon the former for new weapons and defences. Zuckerman 
argues that this relationship was fruitful from the time of 
the Roman Empire until the beginning of the Industrial 
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Revolution when ''a kind of divorce seems to have taken place 
between the scientist and the soldier. ,,16 This separation 
lasted until the beginning of the World War I a century 
later. During this period, however, a real dichotomy of 
outlook developed between the military on the one hand and 
the scientists on the other.17 The scientist is constantly 
open to change. Nothing is rigid nor sacred in his world. 
" 
Conversely the military is founded upon discipline, 
convention and obedience, making scientists and the military 
I 
two unhappy bedfellows; " •.. until quite recent times the 
military man has been quite suspicious of the changes which 
are provoked by technological advance and correspondingly 
suspicious of scientists. ,,18 
In relation to atomic policy formulation on both sides of 
the Atlantic and in occupied Europe, scientists were 
struggling for recognition and admittance into the decision 
making machinery. This recognition was an international 
goal of all scientists and as such transcended national 
boundaries.19 As the notion of an atomic weapon became more 
l6 Sir Solly Zuckerman - Scientists and War (H~mish 
Hamilton, 1966) p. 6. 
17 Ibid., pp. 6-9; see also Daniel Kevles - The 
Physicists (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978). 
18 Ibid. , p. 13. 
19 Some authors draw a distinction between scientists 
and engineers arguing that the scientists (physicists) 
sought recognition for what essentially were engineering 
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of a reality scientists attempted to push for international 
control of atomic energy. A body of scientists familiar 
with atomic fission working at the Univ·ersity of Chicago was 
especially active in this respect at the end of the war. 
This body of scientists became known as the Chicago school. 
(iii) Perceptual Difficulties 
Pinpointing the exact moment a final decision is made is 
pr6blematic for a decision making analyst because decisions 
appear to be continually modified and adjusted to suit 
changing circumstances. Wallace highlights this problem by 
noting "that the process of policy-making is less one of a 
discrete and identifiable decisions than a continuous flow 
of policy.. . clear and final decisions are rare. ,,20 The 
decision maker's perceptions are dependent upon many 
psychological variables. The perceptions of the decision 
maker are the actor's view of the world. This might be a 
very different aspect to the world in which his policy has 
to operate. 21 The difference between the psychological 
milieu and the operational milieu could be the result of a 
number of ill-founded beliefs. Of particular importance is 
efforts; for example 
see Richard Hewlett, 
Nuclear Technology." 
1976, pp. 465-478. 
the construction of the atomic bomb; 
"Beginnings in the Development·of 
Technology and Culture Vol 17, July 
20 Wallace, Op. cit., p. 25. 
21 Jervis, Op. Cit., p.13. 
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the need for top decision makers to rely upon advice from 
subordinates. The information a decision maker receives may 
be subject to the prejudices of the person, group or agency 
presenting the information. A decision maker receiving 
information from more than one source will receive a wider 
range of information upon which to base his decision and 
will be in the position of umpire for the contending groups 
rather than the captive of one of them. It could also be 
said that such a situation would only serve to confuse the 
decision maker, giving him too much information to deal with 
adequately. Cybernetic feedback may also distort a decision 
maker's world view because "filtering" and interpreting 
information is subjective and thus open to forms of 
tampering and abuse. 
A common misperception is that of perceiving another state 
as a monolithic actor rather than one in which there are a 
number of competing groups, each putting forward a different 
policy. This could result in a situation where information 
about future policy is obtained from one faction within a 
government, but is perceived to be the views of a monolithic 
organisation. In actuality the policy output may be the 
result of bureaucratic "pulling and hauling" which may be 
very different from the policy expected and planned for.22 
22 Ibid., pp.24-28. 
22 
/ 
I ' 
By using the above analytical framework it is-1:he intention 
of the author to examine the development of internati,onal 
atomic energy policy in the light of Anglo-American 
cooperation for the years 1943-45. 
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CHAPTER I 
DECISION MAKING INFRUSTRUCTURES 
Prologue 
The decisions made and the agreements signed at Quebec on 
August 19, 1943 and Hyde Park on September 19, 1944 cannot 
be fully understood by solely focusing ·on the negotiations 
at these meetings. The framework within which these 
decisions were made must be comprehended. Every individual 
case study possesses some form of uniqueness that cannot be 
accounted for by explanatory models. Examples are the 
personalities of individuals and the nature .of the 
,contemporary environment, to name but two. These may be 
referred to as extraneous factors. Within the context of 
this analysis the extraneous factors of particular 
importance are the uniqueness of the British and American 
wartime decision making infrastructures. These will be 
explained within the context of the build up to the Quebec 
Agreement, for this will provide a useful background to the 
agreement itself and allow for a greater understanding of 
Anglo-American atomic cooperation during the war period. 
(i). The American ·Decision Making Infrastructure 
The Uranium Committee 
The committee that dealt with decisions concerning atomic 
energy was formed on June 19, 1942 and was titled the ''S-1 
Executive Committe·e". Atomic energy had been under 
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consideration in the U.S. since 1939 yet it did ·not attain 
high level status until nearly three years later. The 
powers and membership of the S-1 Executive Committee evolved 
during this "latent'' period. It was a small group that 
reported to President Roosevelt through his personal liaison 
to the committee, Vice-President Henry Wallace. An 
elucidation of the American atomic decision making 
infrastructure could be made by tracing the development of 
this committee, trying to discern who determined its form, 
powers, and membership. 
In 1939 the importance of atomic energy had not yet been 
recognised by politicians. The potential implications of 
nuclear fission were very isolated within the confines of 
the mystical and complex world of science, a world where 
politicians feared to tread. A link between these two alien 
bodies had to be made if the development of atomic energy 
was to occur because scientific development requires 
financing. This link came in the form of Leo Szilard, a 
scientific emigre of Hungarian origin and part of the 
Chicago School who was "not only a brilliant physicist, but 
a scientist with a penchant for political soothsaying and 
para-political activities. 11 1 Szilard was a rare breed of 
scientist that understood both the "language" of politics 
1 Sherwin, M. - A World Destroyed (Vintage Books Ed, 1977) p. 20. 
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and the ''language" of science and was able to converse 
freely in both . 
Szilard had worked for a period in Berlin before moving to 
the U.S. and whilst there was involved in atomic research. 
He believed that the Nazis were actively working on an 
atomic bomb and urged Roosevelt to set up a committee to 
investigate the possibility of the use of such a bomb by the 
United States. Szilard's appeal was effective and Roosevelt 
established the Uranium Committee. This achievement was for 
the main part made possible by Szilard's understanding of 
the American decision making structure. He realised that 
even political systems are subject to the laws of gravity. 
, 
As Sherwin notes "ideas inserted at the bottom were likely 
to remain there, inactive, while those inserted at the top 
stood a good chance of getting results on their way down. 11 2 
Szilard had originally contacted the Navy Department in 
March, 1939 but did not get any results until he went to the 
President. He understood that innovations were more likely 
to come from the top than from those responsible for 
developing them. 
At this stage of atomic development the scientists enjoyed 
relatiyely free access to the President's ear although this 
was to be short lived. Lyman Briggs, a government 
2 Ibid. , p. 2 6. 
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physicist, was appointed chairman by Roosevelt on the advice 
of Alexander Sachs, the "White House scientist''. Briggs and 
Sachs became very secretive and xenophobic, emotiohs 
probably fired by the nationalism of war. Brigg~ suggested 
to Sachs that Szilard and Enrico Fermi, an emigre scientist 
from Italy serving on the Uranium Committee, should not be 
invited to a meeting of the Committee ordered by Roosevelt 
because "these matters are secret".3 Thus far in the 
American development of atomic energy the scientists' 
influence was already starting to be curbed by the 
bureaucracy; ironically by White House scientists. It was 
departmental parochialism (Briggs and Sachs were both 
members of the Bureau of Standards) blended with mild 
wartime xenophobia that initially kept the knowledgeable 
emigre scientists distanced from the.decision making 
machinery. The speed with which the Uranium Committee was 
formed once the matter was brought to Roosevelt's attention 
demonstrates from the outset the centrality and importance 
of the President to the atomic decision making 
infrastructure.4 
3 Ibid. , p. 3 0. 
4 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., downplay the role 
of Roosevelt. They portray him as being detached and 
almost unconcerned with atomic matters. My perception of 
the situation is that Roosevelt was a strongly centralised but silent leader. 
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National Defence Research Committee 
The day after Nazi forces occupied Paris, President 
Roosevelt established by Executive Order the National 
Defence Research Committee(NDRC). Its function was to 
assist the workload ,of the service laboratories by enlarging 
their research base and enlisting the aid of scientists. It 
was also intended to search for new opportunities to apply 
science to the needs of war. Its funding came under the 
authority of the old .world War I Council of National 
Defence. The Committee on Uranium was brought under the 
jurisdiction of the NDRC, which could call on other agencies 
for advice and assistance. The design of the NDRC was that 
of Dr. Vannevar Bush who became its chairman. Bush was 
already chairman of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) which lay outside the jurisdiction of the 
new agency. 
Vannevar Bush was a shrewd administrator and organiser that 
inspired James Conant, the President of Harvard University, 
to label him a master of ''the art of management. n5 Bush was 
one of the few that really understood the United States' 
polit~cal bureaucracy as it existed in the 1940's. Stanley 
Goldberg at a Smithsonian Institution lecture commented that 
"throughout his career, Bush used oversight committees to 
5 Conant, J. - My Several Lives (Harper and Row, 1970) p. 246. 
28 
• 
advise him on the proper course of action. It was one of 
several administrative devices that allowed him to keep a 
low profile. ,,6 Goldberg went on to add that Bush appointed 
and structured committees to "come up'' with his ideas. This 
was a device used to cover his tracks. He was also very 
careful about what he committed to paper, knowing academics 
would later have access to them. He regarded memorandums as 
an occupational hazard. All these factors make it difficult 
to accurately assess Bush's role i-n the American development 
of atomic energy. However, if the available information is 
scrutinised at closer quarters, Bush's role emerges from the 
shadows and his influence becomes more evident.7 
By "creating" the NDRC Bush had effectively mobilised the 
scientific resources of America. Whilst it was designed to 
assist the services it was not subject solely to this task. 
The NDRC could conduct its own research and did not have to 
take the initiative from the Army or Navy. Moreover, the 
NDRC was not an ad hoc committee and was created by 
Executive Order which gave it full recognition within the 
bureaucratic framework. Bush was careful to keep the NACA 
6 Goldberg, Stanley -''Before The Manhattan Project: 
"The Decision to Build the Bomb." A Smithsonian 
Institution Lecture -The fifth lecture in a series 
entitled, "Historical Seminars on Modern American 
Technology and Science 1987-88"; (February 18, 1988). 
1 Goldberg's conclusions were hinted at in Richard 
Rhodes' The Making of the Atomic Bomb (Simon and Schuster, 
1986) • 
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autonomous from the NDRC for in this way he could operate in 
two distinct bureaucratic areas, making the scientific voice 
all the more powerful in the halls of Washington. He packed 
the NDRC with influential men of similar backgrounds and 
views to himself, they included: Conant; Karl Compton, 
President of MIT; Frank Jewett, President of Bell Telephone 
Labs; and himself·as chairman. 
The Office of Scientific Research and Development 
Bush's persistence in the area of atomic energy led to a 
White House meeting between himself, Wallace and Roosevelt. 
The result was the establishment of the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development (OSRD) by Executive Order on June 
28, 1941. This was an effort by Bush to better coordinate 
American atomic development. It was designed to serve as a 
centre for mobilising the scientific resources of America 
and applying the results of research to national defence. 
The OSRD was located within the Office of Emergency 
Management of the Executive Office of the President, under a 
director personally responsible to the President. Henry 
Wallace was given the task of personal liaison between the 
OSRD and Roosevelt. ~-. . The NDRC was not dissolved but 
continued within the OSRD. Its function was to make 
recommendations on research and development. The OSRD 
chairmanship went to Bush, and Conant replace~ him as 
-chairman of the NDRC. The Committee on Uranium became the 
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OSRD Section on Uranium - known as the S-1 section. 8 
The concept and design of the OSRD was an act of 
bureaucratic wizardry on Bush's behalf, conjuring up a 
powerful organ under the protection of the President's wing 
with himself at its head. Bush had successfully brought the 
work of atomic energy under the President. He could go 
directly to the President to accomplish tasks rather than 
going through the slow and inquisitive machinery of 
Congress. Close ties to the President increased Bush's 
prestige and power when dealing with other agencies of the 
executive arm, especially the military. 
Bush had the unique ability of being able to perceive 
·- I 
himself through the eyes of others. • He, as an engineer 
realised that "the engineer was a kind of second class 
citizen compared to the scientist. ,,9 In order to avoid 
being overruled and ignored by the army, the entire OSRD 
staff became scientists. Bush recalls Hartley Rose, chief 
engineer of the United Fruit Company, protesting against 
having to wear the label of scientist. Bush told him to 
relax and enjoy it, so he officially became Dr. Rowe and a 
scientist. 10 Bush was content to be active from behind the 
8 
"S-1" was the American code name for the atomic bomb. 
9 Bush v. - Pieces of the Action (William Morrow and Co, Inc., 1970) p.54. 
lO Ibid. 
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scenes, believing the true path to Roosevelt was through the 
Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. He was content as long as 
everyone stayed in their correct channels. 
As the program grew Bush became concerned that official 
ranks were being broken. There was, according to Bush, too 
much information for one man to bear and therefore suggested 
to Roosevelt that a Top Policy Committee (TPC) be formed. 
Its function was to act as a kind of board of directors for 
s-1.ll Its membership was small and reported directly to 
the President. Roosevelt emphasised the small nature of the 
group for security reasons and wanted it to be non-
bureaucratic and centered around himself. Its members 
included Bush, Conant, Stimson and the Chief of Staffs, 
General George Marshall. Bush had successfully brought the 
military into the project in the form of Marshall, a man far 
too busy to be unduly concerned with hypothetical weapons 
and scientists. Bush had also successfully lifted the 
burden of total responsibility from his shoulders and was 
able to retreat into the shadows of the TPC where he could 
work efficiently and relatively undisturbed. 
The Manhattan Engineering District 
Bush's bureaucratic juggling abruptly came to an end after 
11 b.d I 1 ., p.60. 
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the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The placid and 
''dormant" Marshall ·was no longer a silent voice on the TPC. 
With America fighting a world war, distribution of the key 
resources became a major issue. The Army was more concerned 
with preventing immediate defeat than pouring resources into 
an untested atomic weapon. Bush's ordered bureaucratic 
world had been turned upside down. He needed to take his 
claims to higher authority, but what higher authority: the 
, President, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, or the War 
Production Board? The chairman of the War Production Board, 
Donald Nelson, had conducted a volte-face of Roosevelt's 
laissez-faire approach to economic controls which made it 
difficult for S-1 to develope hastily. 
Bush, not knowing where to turn, made an impassioned plea to 
Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to Secretary of War 
Stimson, that the S-1 be given a top priority rating. Bundy 
must have been impressed by Bush, for he alerted Stimson and 
Marshall to the urgency of the situation. At the same time 
Bush complained to Under Secretary Robert Patterson and 
General Somervell of the obstacles to S-1. Under this 
barrage of pressure the Army gave way. General Marshall 
gave orders to Donald Nelson to give ample supplies to 
s-1.12 
12 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 78-81. 
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In his assault on the bureaucratic channels Bush was perhaps 
unaware of the true reasons for his success. It would take 
Bush many months to realise the way to Stimson's ear was 
through Bundy. The fact that Bush had captured Bundy's 
attention resulted in Stimson and Marshall giving the matter 
serious consideration. Stimson relied heavily on Bundy as a 
source of information input, consequently by-passing this 
channel was similar to talking into a tape recorder without 
the use of a microphone, all the machinery works but with no 
results. It is likely, although there is no documentary 
proof, that Roosevelt had a hand in S-1 acquisition of 
supplies. Just as Stimson listened to Bundy so Roosevelt 
listened to Stimson. If Stimson felt strongly about an 
issue and pleaded his case to the President it is likely the 
idea would be adopted as policy; although this was not 
always the case. Bush was eventually to understand and 
master the technique of reaching the President. He 
understood how to climb the hierarchical ladder--first 
Bundy, second Stimson and finally the President. 
Bush had successfully acquired supplies for S-1, his next 
task was to consolidate his own position, and that of S-1. 
His main concern was that of Army domination for their 
participation would be of little value if they were not 
subject to the direction of the scientists. He discussed 
with Bundy and Marshall the possibility of a high level 
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Military Policy Committee (MPC). Bush was most distraught 
that General Somervell without consultation had placed 
Colonel Leslie Groves as the man in charge of directing the 
Army Project; Bush had thought this would be a task for the 
MPC. The final outcome was a MPC compromising of Major 
General W.D. Styer, Rear Admiral W.R. Purnell, and Bush as 
chairman. Bush _rthought of the MPC as a board of directors 
with General-Groves as Vice President in charge of 
operations~ '1 3 
Bush had managed to stabilise the position of the scientists 
whilst still maintaining his own importance, although 
typically through collective responsibility. Bush had 
ensured that Groves' forceful ways were accountable to the 
MPC. He also guaranteed that the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board would not obstruct S-1 work by including a navy member 
on the MPC. Tl1is move was also probably intended to act as 
a balance between the Army and Navy, preventing either from 
devouring S-1. 
By the end of 1942 the American atomic decision making 
machinery had been settled. It saw, in the words of Bush; 
n •• the merging of efforts of science, engineering, 
technology, industry, labor, finance and the military. 11 14 
13 b'd I 1 ., p.82. 
14 h 't Bus, Op.Cl ., p.56. 
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It was characterized by a bureaucratic hierarchy with 
Roosevelt as its silent and centralised head. The form of 
this structure owed much to the work of Vannevar Bush, 
although some of its design was due to compromise rather 
than intention. The Manhattan Project, taking its name from 
Marshall's New York headquarters, titled the "Manhattan 
Engineering District", was orchestrated by a man whose only 
desire was to serve abroad. Groves was a man with an 
' 
oversized ego who wanted personal glory. For him the only 
way to achieve such greatness would be to win the war with 
the atomic bomb.15 The scientists were driven by the desire 
to beat Germany to the race for the bomb, a race that was 
perceived at the time to be very real. "Groves became as 
obsessed with winning the war with the atomic bomb as 
scientists were with winning the race for it. 11 16 On atomic 
matters, this was the America that the British were to deal 
with until Roosevelt's death. This was a far cry from the 
monolithic perception that Britain held of America. 
Nevertheless, the centralised leadership of Roosevelt did in 
I 
essence present Britain with a monolithic actor. The 
problem that the British faced, was to recognise when 
15 Comments made by Ed Reese of the Military 
Reference Branch of the National Archives, Washington DC, 
at an interview on February 17, 1988. Ed Reese was 
Groves' personal a~chivist whilst he was writing his 
autobiography- Now It Can Be Told (Harper and Brothers, 
19 62) • 
16 Sh ' 't erw1n, Op.Ci., p.58. 
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Roosevelt was pulling the strings, or when it was the 
bureaucracy that was pulling them. 
(ii). The British Decision Making Infrastructure 
The Maud Committee was housed within the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production (MAP) as a sub-committee with 
independent status after its original name, the Committee 
for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare (CSSAW), was 
changed in June 1940. How the Maud Committee came to be 
under the wing of MAP is not mysterious nor the result of 
bureaucratic juggling. Peierls and Frisch sent a memorandum 
to Professor Oliphant of Birmingham University outlining the 
possibilities of a fission bomb.17 It was then sent to Sir 
Henry Tizard and G.P. Thomson who were associated with the 
CSSAW which was soon to become fused into the MAP. What is 
interesting is the structure of the Maud Committee and its 
transition from sectorial to high policy making. 
The genesis of atomic energy in Britain did not come from 
policy makers but from scientists. Ironically, Peierls and 
Frisch whose paper had given rise to the Maud Committee, 
were themselves prevented from membership because the former 
had only just been naturalised and the latter was still 
classified as an enemy alien. Since it was government 
17 The Frisch-Peierls Memorandum appears in Gowing, 
Op.Cit., (1964) p.394, Appendix I. 
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policy to exclude refugees from scientific war work it was 
I 
not possible to include them on a highly secret policy 
committee. However, their exclusion from.the committee 
slowed down atomic research, a point conveyed by Oliphant to 
Thomson, who agreed they should be fully consulted. The 
presence of emigre scientists on the British team was 
I I I I ., essential to the sense of urgency and priority given to it. 
Scientists who had experienced the Nazi blitz in Europe and 
witnessed Hitler's tyrannical tendencies first hand were 
highly aware of what it would mean if Germany had atomic 
bombs at her disposal. 
The Maud Committee after approximately fifteen months of 
work produced a report claiming that an atomic bomb could be 
built.18 In the weeks following its submission the Report 
was discussed at several levels of government. Within the 
MAP it was considered by Sir Henry Tizard, by Dr. David Pye 
the Director of Scientific Research, and by Colonel Moore-
Brabazon the Minister of Aircraft Production. Next it was 
sent to the Defence Services Panel of the Scientific 
Advisory Committee of the War Cabinet, which had been 
established in October, 1940 under the guidance of Lord 
Hankey and which contained some of the most eminent 
18 The Maud Report was published for the first time 
in, ibid., Appendix II, pp. 394-437. In actual fact two 
reports were made a.t the same time, one on the ''Use of 
Uranium for a Bomb" and the other on the "Use of Uranium 
as a Source of Power". 
38 
'' 
scientists in Britain, including three Nobel prize winners. 
This committee submitted its report to Sir John Anderson, 
the Lord President.19 The panel's report, on the evidence 
of Dr. Guy, decided that production of a fission bomb should 
be conducted in North America (Canada) for reasons of 
security; Canada was not under the constant threat of attack 
from the Luftwaffe. However, by the time the Scientific 
Advisory Committee's Report was complete, the decision that 
the project must be urgently pursued had already been taken 
by Churchill under the advice of Cherwell. Lord Cherwell 
not only advised Churchill on policy direction but also 
suggested that Sir John Anderson take over the project at 
the ministerial level. This suggestion was possibly not 
based upon political nepotism but rather on the remarkable 
I 
coincidence that Sir John Anderson was a physical chemist 
who had done work on uranium. It was most unusual for 
British Cabinet Ministers or Permanent Secretaries to be men 
of science. Sir John was a former Permanent Secretary and 
in 1941 Lord President of the Council "who was recognised in 
Whitehall as one of the most effective members of the War 
Cabinet 11 • 20 Sir John's appointment was the most practical 
and obvious choice. 
However, there is evidence that points to a different 
19 Pierre, Op. Cit., p.17. 
20 Gowing, Op. Cit., 1964, p. 107. 
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conclusion. If an atomic bomb was genuinely constructed it 
would present to its owner the possibility of running an 
"international police force''. Anderson recognised the long 
term implications this could offer in terms of a joint 
Anglo-American world police force. Cherwell shared this 
view·, which perhaps may have been a decisive factor in 
nominating Sir John as ministerial head. By advising 
Churchill to place atomic energy under ministerial 
jurisdiction, Cherwell, a non government member, had reduced 
the possibility of it becoming a Cabinet concern. Indeed, 
the responsibility for the big decisions on the project were 
not taken by the War Cabinet. Although it is difficult to 
prove tha·t these were Cherwell's motivations, a brief 
analysis ·of his personality may lend credence to this 
argument. 
Cherwell - The Adviser 
Lord Cherwell, previously Professor Frederick Lindemann, had 
formed a very close relationship with Churchill during his 
wilderness years. When Churchill had been appointed First 
Lord of the Admiralty on the outbreak of the war, he had 
established Cherwell as his personal adviser. A month later 
he instructed Cherwell to set up a Statistical Branch which 
was a small group of brilliant scientists and economists 
dealing with a wide range of issues, giving the word 
''statistical'' its broadest possible meaning. Cherwell took 
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this position as a mandate covering the entire war program. 
Pierre claimed that this mandate excluded only military. 
operations and personnel appointments and promotions. In 
the latter respect Pierre is incorrect for Cherwell most 
definitely had a major role in Anderson's appointment and 
the subsequent restructuring of the Maud Committee. 
Cherwell was in closer and more continuous daily contact 
with Churchill than any other individual, having sent over 
two thousand private minutes to the Prime Minister during 
the war years. However Cherwell was not a minister nor was 
he a member of the War Cabinet. This caused animosity from 
those who accused him of obstructing the proper path of 
"court politics'' or who were jealous of his influence on the 
Prime Minister.21 
Cherwell's personality may be described as both mysterious 
and "off center". The Earl of Birkenhead's biography of 
Cherwell perhaps offers the best description of his 
personality: 
Like La Rochefoucauld, he enjoyed plucking out the tail 
feathers of a man's self-esteem, and he did so, secure and 
happy in the circle of those who dearly loved him, who 
recognised the constancy of his friendship and the almost 
canine loyalties which lay beneath an exterior which 
intimidated many, and repelled some.22 
21 p · · t 1erre, Op. Ci., pp. 18-19; 
The Birth of The Bomb (Pheonix House 
pp. 104-107. 
also Ronald Clark, 
Ltd, 1961) 
22 The Earl of Birkenhead - The Professor and the 
Prime Minister (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962) p. 113. 
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In many ways Cherwell's personality mirrored that of 
Churchill. His loyalty to Churchill was perhaps an 
essential component in securing his close advisory role. He 
too had a sarcastic wit and was a very able arguer and 
negotiator. These factors were to ensure his place on the 
British atomic team when they were eventually to meet the 
Americans at Quebec. Nevertheless, his unusual personality, 
his skepticism about the construction of an atomic bomb, and 
his non-political status caused him to be disliked by a 
great many. The scientists disliked him because he was 
skeptical of their work whilst the politicians disliked him 
because of his "unofficial'' influence. Weighed against 
this, there was one critical factor. He was, many 
scientists and analysts have said, "the only man who could 
have stopped the project." Yet in $pite of his skepticism 
he refrained from sowing the seeds of doubt in Churchill's 
mind which could have shelved or disbanded the project.23 
Charles Snow is very critical of Cherwell's role as advisor 
to Churchill. Although he does not write specifically about 
atomic energy he accuses Cherwell of having bad judgement: 
People have often wondered, with genuine puzzlement, why his judgement was so bad. After all, he was an exceptionally clever man. His scientific equipment was 
23 For Cherwell's position as the "man who could have stopped the bomb'', see Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) pp. 47, 82, 96. 
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wide and deep enough for anything he tackled. One 
explanation is of course, that he tackled too much. He 
·had the opportunity to intervene more than any other 
scientist in the world, and he took it. That in itself 
showed a defect in judgement. But I believe the real defect lay deeper. 
He believed, as much as any man of his time, that he could solve any problem by his own a priori thought. This is the commonest delusion of clever men with bad judgement.24 
Cherwell was truly an influential and complex man whose mark 
was to be deeply engraved upon the British development of 
atomic energy. His right wing views coupled with his access 
to Churchill was probably the single largest determinant in 
silencing the more moderate scientific views on the postwar 
use of the atomic bomb, most notably from Tizard and 
Blackett. 
Scientists Out - Politicians In 
Under the MAP th-e work on atomic energy had been conducted 
by a group of scientists only loosely connected to the 
Ministry. Sir John Anderson saw the need to set up a new 
organisation under firmer leadership and with greater 
structure. The MAP was considered unsuitable because it 
dealt already with power and bombs, and was therefore a high 
security risk. Sir John as Lord President of the Council, 
had ministerial responsibility for a number of scientific 
24 Charles P. Snow - Appendix to Science and Government (Harvard University Press, 1962) p.34; also Science and Government (Harvard University Press, 1961). 
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organisations including the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research {DSIR). After Sir John held a meeting 
with Cherwell, Hankey, Moore-Brabazon and Dr. Pye it was 
decided that the DSIR would be a suitable home for the 
project. They also decided to appoint Mr. W.A. Akers, 
Research Director of ICI, as chief executive of the project. 
This selection was made because Akers had a very vibrant 
personality as well as possessing valuable technical and 
industrial knowledge. 
Akers' new organisation was given the name Directorate of 
Tube Alloys, after Anderson and he hit on the code Tube 
Alloys. In fact, Tube Alloys or ''T.A." was to become the 
British code name for their project, much in the same way 
S-1 had become the American code name; the two were used 
interchangably in trans-Atlantic dealings. Anderson held a 
series of meetings in 1941 in which it was agreed that he 
should have available to him a small advisory council whose 
function would be to advise the Tube Alloys Consultative 
Council (TACC) on broad questions of policy. This body was 
comprised of "non-political'' ministers and scientists 
amongst whose five members were Hankey, Cherwell and Sir 
Henry Dale, who as a member of the Scientific Advisory 
Committee would represent those scientists outside 
government employment. There too was a Technical Committee 
under Aker's chairmanship whose role was to advise the TACC 
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on technical issues. In December 1941 the Maud Committees 
were finally disbanded and the MAP wrote to each scientist 
thanking him for his services.25 
Amidst the bureaucratic jungle of committees, sub-
committees, directorates, departments, ministries and so on, 
the British atomic decision making machinery is relatively 
simple to define. In essence, its final form centered 
around three men .. It was a closed system with no 
connections to the Whitehall apparatus. At its head was 
Churchill with whom final decisions ultimately lay. His two 
''right hand men" were Anderson and Cherwell, the fernier 
arguably owing his position to the latter. Akers whilst 
holding an important position fulfilled the role of what may 
be described as a grandiose coordinator rather than high 
level policy maker. 
Sir John Anderson was the architect behind the final 
structure of the British atomic decision making machinery; 
it was he who took these high policy decisions. He was 
careful to include the military, in the shape of Moore-
Brabazon, in order to prevent any supply acquisition 
problems. However, the military link was a "natural'' step 
because Britain was already at war with Nazi Germany and a 
spirit of nationalistic camaraderie guided the project. The 
25 Gowing, Op. cit., (1964) pp. 106-111. 
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scientific body which had started the whole project now 
found themselves in the decision making wilderness. 
Oliphant, who was conscious of his part in the Pieirls-
Frisch memorandum, was deeply upset and voiced his anger. 
The reaction of the majority of Maud scientists was strange 
to say the least, they appeared to resign themselves to 
their situation. Perhaps they felt that with the new 
industrial impetus of the ICI members they would have 
available a greater supply of technical equipment; Halban 
was one scientist who felt this way. 
The British project had started out as a scientific 
endeavour and had by the start of 1942 become an industrial 
and political one. The project had been removed from the 
hands of scientists and placed in the clasps of a very small 
and highly centralised political group. This change of 
organisational emphasis was to be sensed by the Americans. 
This coupled by the fact that a director of ICI was 
officially running the British team was to be a major 
stumbling block in Anglo-American negotiations. There was 
also a shift in the political outlook of the atomic decision 
making machinery during this period. Whilst under 
scientific organisation it had an internationalist and 
"moderate" or "centrist" political flavour, in its final 
form it was, however, decidedly right wing. Snow describes 
Cherwell as "a man far out on the right''. 26 There are some 
26 C.P. Snow, Ibid;-, (41fB62) p.15. 
r. 
who would claim that the scientists were not far from 
removed, but rather the contrary because both Cherwell and 
Anderson were scientists. On the face of it this is a 
plausible argum~nt, but by 1942 it would appear that these 
men had become politicians first and scientists second. 
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CHAPl'ER II 
QUEBEC - RESTORED INTERCHANGE 
Prologue 
The Quebec Agreement signed on August 19, 1943, was 
initiated by the British with the intent of restoring a 
rapidly fading Anglo-American atomic partnership. On 
February 27, 1943 Churchill sent two telegrams to Harry 
Hopkins, President Roosevelt's special assistant. The first 
of these brought to Hopkins' attention that when the 
President and himself met at Hyde Park in June, 1942, Anglo-
American atomic relations were to be "on the basis of fully 
sharing the results as equal partners". Even though there 
was no official record of this conversation Churchill said 
that he would: "be very much surprised if the President's 
recollection does not square with this 11 .l Churchill added; 
"I base my request to you to review the position and restore 
the original policy of joint work on my conviction that it 
is necessary if the joint resources of the two countries are 
to be used most efficiently. 112 The second telegram set out 
in detail a brief history of Anglo-American atomic 
cooperation up to 1943. Its emphasis was that the British 
had given their all whilst receiving very little in return; 
1 FRUS - Prime Minister Churchill to the President's 
Special Assistant (Hopkins), February 24, 1943, Vol: The 
Conference at Washington and Quebec 1943 (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1970) pp. 2-3. 
2 Ibid. 
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the Americans had not stuck to the rules of fair play. 3 
In order to assist answering the questions set out in the 
introduction regarding the Quebec Agreement, the following 
issues will be addressed: 
1) Why did the Americans limit interchange of information with the British? 
2) Why did the British so desperately want it restored? 
Snuffing the Candle of Interchange 
The impetus behind American limitations to the atomic 
partnership came from the Chairman of the National Defense 
Research Committee, James Conant. He sought a r~placement 
of an equal partnership with a limited partnership. Conant, 
with backing from the TPC, incorporated his recommendations 
into the "Report to the President by the Military Policy 
Committee", submitted on December 15, 1942. Conant and the 
TPC took the nationalistic view that the continuation of the 
partnership would be detrimental to American post-war 
commercial interests in atomic energy. By the end of 1942 a 
fission chain reaction had been proven and demonstrated, the 
Project had moved beyond the stage of basic scientific 
research. It had developed from a scientific enterprise 
into an engineering endeavour. The British did not have 
much to offer on the engineering front and thus a 
3 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
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continuation of a joint partnership appeared pointless. 
Conant wrote to Bush: 
Granting access [to the British] to our designs and 
operations at the manufacturing level, can only increase 
the risks of the enemy learning these secrets and can 
neither assist the war effort nor allow a more effect-ive 
use of the joint resources of the two countries.4 
Conant's concerns at this time were not with international 
control of atomic energy. Conant did not relish the thought 
of defending the Anglo-American partnership in Congress 
after the war. It would appear to the American public that 
they had simply given away to the British the technical 
secrets of the bomb; a secret which had been paid for by 
American tax dollars. Bush too was concerned with postwar 
Congressional accountability and aware of the American 
belief that when America and Britain negotiate, the latter 
always appeared to come out on top. In addition, Conant 
thought the partnership would tie the foreign policies of 
~America and Britain together for a perpetuity which would 
destroy American sovereignty. The force of these arguments 
were so overwhelming that Roosevelt approved limited 
interchange of information. The unfortunate coincidence 
that Mr. Akers was connected to !CI convinced the Americans Q 
4 OSRD Files (Bush - Conant Files), Washington 
National Archives - code RG227, (herein OSRD, RG227), 
Conant to Bush - "some thoughts concerning the 
correspondence between the President and the Prime 
Minister on S-1", March 25, 1943, Box 19, Folder 10, AEC #347. 
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that British interests were solely for postwar industrial 
use.5 
British Desperation 
The British Project was hampered by two factors - money and 
labour. Britain's budget was severely restricted by the 
daily running of her war machine. She could not afford the 
millions of pounds it would take to construct a bomb. The 
Minister of Labour would be troubled to find twenty thousand 
skilled men for construction purposes. Sir John Anderson 
knew only too well the manpower difficulties, for he was 
responsible for manpower budgeting at the War Cabinet level. 
Simply stated, the British did not have the resources 
~ 
available during the war to build an atomic bomb. 
Nevertheless it is impossible to know whether in the last 
analysis the Prime Minister would have authorised the 
launching of a full blown wartime atomic project. One 
conclusion that was clear was that it was essential to make 
an attempt at restoring full Anglo-American cooperation.6 
Anderson in a minute to the Prime Minister dated July 30, 
1942, outlined the importance and urgency with which 
interchange should be restored. Anderson had always been 
5 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 271; and 
Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) pp. 163-168. 
6 Gowing, Ibid., pp. 161-163. 
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reluctant about Anglo-American cooperation but saw this as 
Britain's only hope of atomic development. Firstly he 
argued that a joint venture would produce a bomb more 
quickly than would independent projects. Time was a crucial 
factor in the perceived race against a Nazi atomic bomb. 
Secondly Anderson argued that Britain must: 
face the fact that the pioneer work done in this country is a dwindling asset and that, unless we capitalise on it quickly, we shall be rapidly outstripped. We now have. a 
real contribution to make to a "merger''. Soon we shall have little or none.7 
Ironically, for Britain this "dwindling asset" did not only 
apply to atomic energy. Lyon Playfair, a Scottish MP and 
Professor of Chemistry at Edinburgh University, asked in 
1870: 
how is it that we [the British] find whole branches of 
manufacture, when they depend on scientific knowledge, passing away from this country in which they originated, in order to engraft themselves abroad, although their decaying roots remain at home?8 
Anderson and Cherwell were concerned that atomic energy 
would follow this general pattern. The final nail in the 
British atomic coffin was that the Americans had secured the 
entire output of the Canadian uranium mines and the Canadian 
heavy water plant. This meant that if the British went solo 
7 Ibid., Appendix 3, "Minute from Sir John Anderson to Prime Minister", July 30, 1942, pp. 437-38. 
8 Lyon Playfair - Subjects of Social Welfare (London, Cassell, 1889) p. 307; quoted from James Cable; 
"Interdependence: a drug or addiction?" International Affairs Vol. 59, No.3, Summer 1983, p. 366. 
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on Tube Alloys they would be deprived of their only source 
of uranium.9 
Tube Alloys was a high priority for Churchill when he met 
Roosevelt in Washington in May, 1943, for what was called 
the Trident Conference. Towards the end of the Conference, 
Roosevelt agreed that full interchange should be resumed for 
~ it was possible that the bomb would be developed before the 
end of the war. Thus it fell within the general agreement 
covering the inter~hange of research and invention secrets 
for wartime use. The British were relieved, but relief soon 
turned to anguish. The Americans remained inactive with 
regard to interchange. 
Why Washington did not resume interchange is somewhat 
unclear. Gowing believes that Harry Hopkins was the root 
cause of the blockage. She notes that Churchill sent a 
telegram to Hopkins confirming his discussions with the 
President expressing the necessity for the quick renewal of 
interchange. Hopkins' reply was greeted with skepticism in 
London. He stated that he had the Tube Alloys affair well 
in hand and hoped to have it settled definitely within a 
week.lo 
9 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) p. 164. 
lO Ibid. 
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Why did Hopkins take no action? One reason may be that he 
was acting upon the advise of Bush. Bush advised Hopkins, 
in essence, that postwar strategic interests were vitally 
linked to the wartime military requirement to develop the 
bomb with speed and secrecy. To jeopardise this with or 
without a binding Anglo-American agreement made no sense. h 
He agreed with Conant that the atomic bomb if realised would 
be, "a military secret which is a totally different class 
from anything the world has ever seen". He shared Conant's 
view that; "the major considerations must be that of 
national security and postwar strategic significance 11 .ll 
Meigs believed that Bush's argument seems to have convinced 
Hopkins, who made no reply to Churchill.12 
Another possibility was that Hopkins' inactivity and the 
resultant Anglo-American stagnation was a direct result of 
Roosevelt's action. Roosevelt did not give Hopkins specific 
instructions as to how he should proceed with the 
restoration of cooperation. Admittedly Hopkins may have 
used this as an excuse for his silence. However, it was not 
11 OSRD, RG227, J.B. Conant, Memorandum for Dr. Vannevar Bush, re:"Some Thoughts Concerning the Correspondence Between the President and Prime Minister", March 23, 1943, Box 19, Folder 10, AEC #344; also, Montgomery Meigs, Managing Uncertainty: Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant and the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945. Unpublished Phd thesis at University of Wisconsin, 1982, p. 155 (University Microfilms International -#82-15951). 
12 M. Meigs, Ibid p.156 
54 
,-. 
until one month later that Roosevelt informed Bush of the 
agreement. Bush and Stimson were in London on business 
unrelated to atomic energy when the former received a 
telegram from Roosevelt stating: 
·While the Prime Minister was here [Washington, May, 1943] 
we discussed the whole question of exchange of information 
... I wish, therefore, that you renew ..• the full exchange 
of information with the British Government regarding tube 
alloys.13 
Fate was not on the side of the British because during the 
decoding of the telegram the word "renew" was translated as 
"review", consequently Bush took no action. Stimson told 
Churchill that the President had not informed him of the 
agreement and that he was disturbed to hear that the British 
thought they had been treated unfairly by the Americans. 
Ultimately the Anglo-American breakdown was caused by two 
factors: Hopkins' silence and Roosevelt's silence. The 
latter's silence almost certainly had an effect on the 
farmer's. Roosevelt's reasoning behind such a course of 
action can only be guessed at. Perhaps he was acting under 
the belief that an American atomic monopoly would prevent an 
invasion of her international sovereignty. Perhaps he made 
a mistake and simply forgot to inform his advisors. Perhaps 
it was his inability to say "no" to Churchill's face and 
made the agreement with no intention of keeping it. 
13 OSRD, RG227, Roosevelt to Bush, July 20, 1943, Box 
19, Folder 10, AEC #166. 
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Whatever the reason, this was by no means the last time that 
Roosevelt would say one thing and do another. 
Whilst Bush and Stimson were in London Churchill seized the 
opportunity to bring up the issue of Tube Alloys. Churchill 
met privately with Bush; Anderson was present. Bush, 
expecting a high level friendly discussion with the Prime 
Minister, found a very different person. Bush recalls of 
this first encounter with Churchill; "Churchill spent ten 
or fifteen minutes bawling me out on the interchange affair; 
it was unfair, it was unreasonable it did not make sense, he 
did not like the agreement, and he damned well did not like 
me. 11 14 This perception of Churchill was to live with Bush 
forever and was later to affect his reasoning with regard to 
the close relationship between Roosevelt and the Prime 
Minister. Despite Churchill's uncouth display of manners he 
managed to allay, ·albeit quite forcefully, American fears of 
British industrial postwar use of atomic energy. Churchill 
made it clear that his prime concern was the current war, 
beyond which everything was secondary. Thus the stage had 
been set for a reopening of the Anglo-American atomic 
partnership. 
Churchill's protestations that Britain had no concern for 
postwar development of atomic energy were false. 
14 V. Bush, Op. Cit., p.282. 
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Churchill's primary concern was not the use of the bomb on 
, 
Germany but its use as a postwar bargaining chip against the 
Soviet Union. Churchill, Anderson and Cherwell all 
recognised the diplomatic potential of being a postwar 
nuclear country. Anderson stated "that while the war might 
be over before the development [of the bomb] came, it would 
be a terrific factor in the post-war world as giving an 
absolute control to whatever country possessed the 
" 
secret. 1115 Churchill echoed Anderson; "It would never do to 
have Germany or Russia win the race for something which 
might be used for international blackrnai1. 11 l6 
Cherwell had confirmed the American postwar suspicions of 
the British. He inadvertently blurted out at a meeting with 
Bush that Britain intended to use the bomb as a means of 
checking Soviet dominance in a postwar Europe.17 Although 
the British had through Churchill's bulldog diplomacy, 
convinced the Americans that the postwar diplomatic uses of 
atomic energy were not their concern, this was in fact the 
very foundations of British atomic policy. 
carrot of p~ar commercial possibilities 
"It was not the 
that drove 
15 J.W. Pickersgill - The Mackenzie King Record Vol I 
1939-44. (University of Chicago Press, 1960) p.532. 
16 Sherwin, Op. Cit., p.83. 
17 OSRD, RG227, Bush, Memorandum of Conference with 
Mr. Harry Hopkins and Lord Cherwell at the White House, 
May 25, 1943. 
'· 
Churchill, Anderson and Cherwell on but the stick of postwar 
military possibilities. 11 18 
The Candle Rekindled 
In a final meeting before Bush and Stimson'is return to 
Washington at the end of May, 1943, Churchill took the 
initiative and suggested that the British should draft an 
agreement on the terms of collaboration which he and the 
President could sign. Churchill probably believed that by 
giving a draft to Stimson and Bush no bureaucratic obstacles 
stood in the way of them receiving it intact and in its 
original form. Sir John Anderson quickly drafted the 
agreem~nt which Churchill reworded to make it less 
unilateral and to clothe it in more eloquent language. The 
Anderson-Churchill draft was not amended by the Americans 
and was before long to constitute the first four articles of 
the Quebec Agreement.19 
On August 1, 1943, Anderson under instruction from Churchill 
flew to Washington in order to try to clinch the Tube Alloys 
issue before Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec. Sir 
John's main dealings were with Bush and Conant. They agreed 
that a Combined Policy Committee (CPC) should be formed to 
18 · · t Gowing, Op. Ci., (1964) p.168. 
19 See Appendix I for final copy of the Quebec Agreement. 
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settl·e programmes; there should be a full interchange of 
information between members of the CPC but only between 
those working within the same sectiori of the field; that 
interchange about the design and construction of large scale 
plants should be regulated by ad hoc arrangements approved 
by the MPC; and that the MPC should allocate materials, 
apparatus and plants. Anderson drew up a second memorandum 
setting out with greater detail the arrangements which 
should govern the direct interchange of information between 
each group working within a particular section of the 
project. However Conant found too many objections and it 
was agreed to leave the new CPC to sort out the details of 
exchange of information.20 
The success of Sir John in getting interchange back on the 
road was mainly due to a sudden and remarkable U-turn in 
Conant's thinking on the matter. Conant was very much 
against a joint operation. He did not waver even though 
Bush and Stimson were beginning to lean toward Anglo-
American cooperation. In fact at that time Conant was 
considering joining the staff of the Chicago "Tribune", well 
known for its anti-British views. On July 30, 1943, Conant 
wrote in a memorandum to Bush; "the reopening of the 
exchange with the British without reservation ... cannot in 
20 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) pp.169-171; and Hewlett 
and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 278-280. 
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any way assist the war effort and will greatly diminish our 
security provisions here in the United States. 11 21 Yet 
before a week had elapsed Conant sent a second memorandum to 
Bush; "right now we are in a position where we would like 
all the help we can get on the diffusion process, and, 
therefore, the renewal of interchange comes at a moment 
which will make the interchange of special value to the 
American effort. 11 22 
Conant's sudden change of attitude is difficult to explain. 
It is clear that both Bush and Stimson did not instigate it. 
The only definite fact that could be stated was that 
Conant's change of heart occurred during the week of 
Anderson's visit. Until that time Conant had not met 
Churchill nor Anderson. His only dealings thus far had been 
with Cherwell who possibly did not create a good impression 
of himself or of British interests upon Conant, especially 
after, as previously mentioned, he blurted out comments 
,.-· "i.-4 
concerning British postwar intentions of "bomb diplomacy". 
Perhaps after talking to Anderson, Conant's fears were 
soothed for he felt that Sir John's proposals were fair. In 
addition, interchange had been given clear boundaries and 
21 OSRD, RG227, Conant to Bush "Exchange 
information on S-1 project with the British'', 
1943, Box 19, Folder 10, AEC #167. 
of 
July 30, 
22 OSRD, RG227, Conant to Bush "Exchange of 
information on S-1 with the British", August 6, 1943, Box 19, Folder 10, AEC #170. 
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w~re to follow Grove's policy of compartmentalisation. 
Anderson went from Washington to Quebec and handed Churchill 
on August 10th the Tube Alloys agreement for signature 
between him and Roosevelt. Canada was included in the 
Agreement for their part in the Montreal project. 
Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, nominated 
Mr. Howe as the Canadian member of the CPC. All was agreed 
upon and Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill signed the Quebec 
Agreement on August 19th. Canada was not a signatory. 
For Bush the whole Quebec affair had given him a new and 
disturbing perception of his Chief. He could never really 
understand why in the first place Roosevelt had agreed to 
interchange with Churchill at their meeting in May. Bush 
had always been under the impression that the President had 
given him his full trust and his silence over Quebec was due 
to the embarrassment of being bullied into the Agreement by 
Churchill. Had Bush acted upon Roosevelt's order to "renew 
full and effective interchange", perhaps clause four of the 
Agreement disclaiming British interests in industrial and 
commercial aspects of atomic energy may never had been 
included. Major. General K.D. Nichols recently commented 
that Bush and Stimson thought that any agreement should 
cover only wartime cooperation. They believed that an 
agreement regarding postwar problems "was beyond the 
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President's war powers authority11 .23 Bush believed: 
that he [Roosevelt] just did not care to bring up the fact that he had been persuaded by Churchill to take a stand that would have been very unfortunate •.. for him after the war, had he lived ... So FDR accepted what happened at the meeting, and said nothing.24 
Bush was mistaken in this belief and was to realise so after 
the Hyde Park Agreement of 1944, although he was never to 
admit it on paper. Prior to the discussions between 
Churchill and Bush in London, Roosevelt had already, under 
the advice of Harry Hopkins, decided to restore interchange. 
Hopkins advised Roosevelt that having made a firm commitment 
to Churchill there was no alternative but to go through with 
it. Roosevelt's silence was not due to embarrassment but 
rather because he drew a distinction between technical and 
diplomatic advice. On technical matters Roosevelt almost 
always accepted recommendations. On matters of broad 
policy, however, he never allowed control to slip from his 
grasp; all policy revolved around him. Although his power 
was strong and centralised it often lacked direction, which 
made him difficult to predict. Perhaps Roosevelt's greatest 
direction came not from within his own ranks but from 
Winston Churchill. Bush simply could not, or would not, 
accept that Roosevelt would take advice from a man who had 
23 Maj. Gen. K.D. Nichols U.S.A. (Ret.) - The Road to Trinity (William Morrow and Co., 1987) p.112. 
24 Eush, Op. Cit., p.284. 
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the audacity to ''bawl him out''. Bush was never to fully 
grasp that Roosevelt's silence was due to his distinction 
between diplomatic and scientific advice; the former· was 
Roosevelt's private domain. He simply felt no obligation to 
keep Bush, Conant, Groves or anyone else informed of his 
actions. 
Whilst Bush was waiting for results to come back from Quebec 
another matter arose. Akers, in anticipation of the signing 
of the Agreement, had already wired Oliphant, Chadwick, 
Peierls and Simon to come to the United States. Bush 
thought this a poor show of diplomacy and was angry because 
he had not yet received instructions on how interchange 
should be conducted. Akers said the scientists had plenty 
to do and pushed to have Oliphant see E.O. Lawrence. Bush 
flatly rejected Aker's proposa1.25 The longer he pondered 
the issue the angrier he grew. He finally concluded that to 
avoid future difficulties, Akers had to be removed from the 
picture.26 Bush prepared a memo for Bundy to give to 
Marshall who would give it to Roosevelt in Quebec. One of 
the issues in the memo was a request that Akers be replaced 
by a top British scientist. Bush said that he was a capable 
25 OSRD, RG227, v. Bush, Memorandum for Dr. Conant, August 20, 1943; also M. Meigs, Op. Cit., pp. 171-172. 
26 OSRD, RG227, v. Bush, Memorandum for Dr. Conant, August 23, 1943; also M. Meigs, Ibid. 
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man ''but not the one to handle this matter''. 27 
Bush had not liked Aker's outgoing personality and bullish 
ways. His desire for his replacement ran deeper than mere 
dislike. Bush saw an opportunity to replace an 
industrialist with a scientist. In this way Bush's opposite 
number on the British team would be a man who shared his own 
professional view of the uniqueness of atomic energy. Bush 
was beginning to realise the importance of atomic energy in 
controlling a postwar world and wanted the scientific 
community, which had conceived of such technology, to have a 
voice in how it should be used. Akers was relieved by 
Anderson, against sounds of British indignation. His 
replacement was Professor Chadwick, whose shy and retiring 
ways were most welcome by the Americans, surprisingly, 
. 
especially by Groves, who formed a friendly solid 
relationship with him. 
The Significance of Quebec 
The Quebec Agreement had given rise to two important Anglo-
American organizations: the CPC; and the Combined 
Development Trust (CDT). The CDT's main function was to 
organise jointly the acquisition and allocation of raw 
27 OSRD, RG227, v. Bush, Memorandum for the President, Re: "Tube alloy - Interchange with the British", August 23, 1943; also M. Meigs, Ibid.; also Gowing Op. Cit., pp. 172-73; also Hewlett and anderson Op. Cit., pp. 280-81. 
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materials. Groves was most concerned that North American 
. 
. 
.supplies of uranium would be exhausted soon after the end of 
the war. He recognised British control over Belgian foreign 
policy and sought to secure, with British assistance, the 
uranium supplies of the Belgian Congo.28 The British agreed 
to the CDT not because it in any way directly benefited them 
but because they did not want to disturb the delicate 
cooperation restored at Quebec. They were especially 
sensitive to American sensibilitj_es after the Akers 
incident. The development of the CDT typified the British 
attitude towards the Americans; smooth collaboration was to 
be maintained even if at a sacrifice. On matters of nuclear 
development the British were aware, as Sir Ronald Cambell of 
' \ 
the British Embassy in Washington wrote, that "the salad is 
heaped in a bowl permanently smeared with the garlic of 
suspicion11 • 29 The Prime Minister and President signed the 
Trust Agreement in early June 1944. Before signing, the 
Prime Minister had asked for assurances that the CDT did not 
conflict with the Quebec Agreement. "Nothing must be done", 
he said, "which in the slightest degree detracts from the 
joint document signed by us".30 The "sanctity" of the 
Quebec Agreement was to dominate Churchill's atomic policy 
until his departure from office. The Quebec Agreement had 
28 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 286-287. _ 
29 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) p.235. 
30 Ibid., p. 301. 
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renewed the Anglo-American atomic partnership, albeit with 
Britain as the junior partner. Churchill's.concern in 1941 
over whether a bomb would be ready for use in the current 
war was no longer prevalent by 1943. He desired nuclear 
capability for two reasons: to maintain Britain as a primary 
world power; and to use it as a bargaining chip against 
Soviet designs on Europe. The British had done remarkably 
well in the deal because by mid 1943 America was 
considerably further ahead of the British in the actual 
construction of a bomb. Without the Agreement America stood 
to lose some time in the construction of their bomb whereas 
the British stood to lose the bomb. 
Whilst the British had fallen behind in the development of 
nuclear technology they were considerably further ahead of 
the Americans in their thinking about its implications for 
world politics. The main focuses of the Americans over the 
Quebec Agreement were upon speed in the development of the 
bomb, secrecy, accountability to Congress and the commercial 
aspects of atomic energy. They appeared unconcerned with 
the possibilities of allowing a second nuclear power to 
coexist with them in the international arena. At no stage 
throughout the entire Quebec negotiations was there any 
attempt made by the Americans to limit Britain's military 
capabilities after the war. At this stage the Americans had 
no conception that atomic energy should be internationally 
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controlled. Conversely the British had planned to enter the 
postwar world a nuclear power, as Gowing comments of British 
policy: "The idea of an independent deterrent was already 
well entrenched".31 
' 
Roosevelt's role and influence in guiding American policy 
should not be underestimated. Since as early as 1941 the 
President had thoughts of an Anglo-American international 
police force as a means of controlling the postwar world. 
Roosevelt found the entire notion of an international 
organization quite repugnant. At a meeting between himself 
and Churchill in August 1941 on board the ''Augusta'', 
Roosevelt replied to the Prime Minister's question 
concerning American support for some kind of "effective 
international organization" that: 
he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new 
Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a 
period of time had transpired and during which an 
international police force composed of the United States 
and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning.32 
How much bullying Churchill had to do to convince Roosevelt 
to reinstate interchange is a matter of debate. It is clear 
that the latter shared the farmer's views about postwar 
international relations. Churchill's desires to use the 
bomb as a tool of postwar diplomacy did not offend 
31 Gowing, Ibid., p. 168. 
32 FRUS 1941, Vol I, "Memorandum of Conversation, by 
the Under Secretary of State (Welles).'' At Sea, August 
11, 1941, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958) -p.363. 
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Roosevelt's sensibilities nor was this way of thinking alien 
to him. The President was also willing to use the renewal 
~ 
of atomic collaboration as a trade off against other Anglo-
American ventures: Far Eastern strategy and the war against 
Japan; the invasion of France which Britain was not in 
favour of; and Britain's claim to the command of Operation 
Overlord, to name but three. 
The Quebec Agreement signalled the birth of the concept of 
nuclear deterrence. Both Roosevelt and Churchill planned to 
use the threat of the bomb as a means of maintaining postwar 
international peace, rather than using it to maintain 
postwar peace through international cooperation. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
WARTIME PLANNING FOR A POSTWAR NUCLEAR WORLD 
Prologue 
The post-Quebec period saw a notable swing away from 
concerns of immediate wartime applications of atomic energy 
to thinking associated with its postwar control. Much 
attention had been brought to this subject on both sides of 
the Atlantic in the latter part Qf 1943 by Danish physicist 
Niels Bohr. He alerted Anderson and Cherwell on the British 
side and Sup·reme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter on the 
American side. Both camps were to inform the Prime Minister 
and President respectively. Although Conant and Bush were 
unaware of Bohr's thoughts they were themselves 
independently considering the problems of postwar control. 
All thoughts and proposals' concerning postwar control of 
atomic energy during this period revolved around one central 
issue -- the Soviet Union. Essentially two broad schools of 
thought developed: the "international" school which sought 
some form of Soviet involvement in postwar control; and the 
"monopolist" school which sought to prevent Soviet 
participation in the elitist Anglo-American atomic club.1 
As a means of answering the question posed in the 
1 The terms "internationalist" and "monopolist" are 
my own. 
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introduction (Who advocated international control of atomic 
energy and for what reasons were they unsuccessful?), the 
struggle between the two aforementioned groups will be 
analysed. Close attention will be given to the Hyde Park 
aide-memoire which was to dash the hopes of the 
internationalists. 
Niels Bohr - Sounding The Alarm 
In 1943 Niels Bohr escaped from Nazi occupied Denmark with 
the aid of the British. He was subsequently sent to join 
the British team working in the United States under the 
terms of the Quebec Agreement. He was astounded to learn 
how far the Americans had reached in the production of a 
fission bomb. The laboratories and factories of the 
Manhattan Project were a revelation to him. "What until a 
few years ago might have been considered a fantastic dream'', 
he wrote, "is at the moment being realised in the great 
laboratories erected in secrecy in some of the most solitary 
regions of the Sta.tes. n2 Amidst Bohr's admiration and 
excitement over the near fruition of the project lay a deep 
concern for the terrifying implications of atomic energy 
upon the world. 
Bohr believed that the advent of atomic energy would require 
a restructuring of the international political arena in 
2 G I • t owing, Op.Ci., (1964) p.347. 
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' order to stave off disaster. He proposed that a new 
international order be created as a means of accommodating 
the atomic bomb within the framework of postwar 
international relations. Bohr's main argument was that 
atomic energy could not pe monopolised. As a way of 
preventing a postwar secret nuclear arms race Bohr advocated 
that the Soviet Union should be invited to participate in 
postwar atomic energy planning before the bomb was a 
certainty and before the war was over. He claimed that 
Stalin had to be officially informed of the bomb's existence 
in order to make it clear that the Anglo-American atomic 
monopoly was not an anti-Soviet "alliance". Bohr understood 
the risks involved in conducting such a bold policy and 
therefore proposed initially only giving scientific 
knowledge to the Soviets as a means of registering their 
response. If they were to react "f,avourabI'y then perhaps 
technical information could also be shared.3 Bohr was the 
first person to draw attention to the difference between 
scientific and technical information as separate spheres of 
atomic diplomacye This was later to plague the British in 
future Anglo-American atomic negotiations • 
• Before leaving for America in 1943 Bohr had a chance to talk 
3 Ibid, pp. 245-48, 347-55; also Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 326, 344; also Sherwin, Op. Cit., pp. 90-108; also Rud Nielson, "Niels Bohr", Physics Today vol. 16, November 1963. 
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to Sir John Anderson and Lord Cherwell about his concerns of 
international control. Sir John had arranged that whilst 
Bohr was in America he should have direct access to Lord 
Halifax, the British Ambassador, if he needed assistance on 
any problem. Bohr conveyed his ideas to Halifax who 
although a member of the CPC knew little of the project. 
Halifax did not fully comprehend what Bohr was talking about 
but did understand the sense of his main proposal --
approaching Stalin. Halifax took two courses of 
action: he contacted Sir John and Churchill and called for 
"very urgent and deep consideration" of the matter by them; 
and he told Bohr that owing to the preponderant American 
share in the project "any initiative would almost certainly 
have to come from President Roosevelt. 11 4 This was perhaps 
Bohr's first folly. Halifax was unaware of the inordinate 
influence Churchill had over Roosevelt. The initiative, if 
/ 
any, was to come from Churchill not Roosevelt. 
Bohr quickly revived a prewar friendship with Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter who was a close friend of the President. The 
Supreme Court Justice was aware through talking to some 
distinguished American scientists of the existence of the 
atomic project, or "X" as Frankfurter referred to it. He 
communicated Bohr's ideas and hopes to Roosevelt. The 
President, Frankfurter was to vividly recall, was ''worried 
4 I It Gowing, Op. C1 ., (1964) pp. 348-49. 
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to death'' over the whole affair.5 Roosevelt authorised 
Frankfurter to tell Bohr that upon his scheduled return to 
England he might inform "our friends in London that the 
President was most eager to explore the proper safeguards in 
relation to x. 11 6 This decision by the President was not 
actually an endorsement of Bohr's ideas; rather it was only 
a gesture of positive interest. Roosevelt did not wish to 
commit himself to specific postwar policy. It is likely 
' ' 
that his mind was still not made up as to American postwar 
atomic policy. His interested but non committed statement 
to Bohr, and the ushering of Bohr over to the British may 
have been a method of assessing Churchill's opinion before 
he made up his own mind. In April, 1944, Bohr returned to 
London at the request of Halifax and Anderson. There 
awaited Bohr's greatest hurdle -- Churchill. 
One month prior to Bohr's arrival in England, Anderson, in 
consultation with Cherwell, had sent a long minute to 
Churchill on the subject of international control. Anderson 
made two suggestions to the Prime Minister. First he 
advised Churchill that the British atomic decision making 
machinery should be widened owing to the vast military 
implications of the project. It should now include the War 
5 Ibid., p. 350; also Sherwin, Op. Cit., p. 100, 
Frankfurter to Halifax, April 16, 1945; also Hewlett and Anderson.Op. Cit., p. 326. 
6 Sherwin, Ibid. 
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Cabinet, the Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff. 
Secondly he said it would be foolish to assume that after 
the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union would not make an all 
out attempt to produce their own atomic weapons. Anderson 
told Churchill there were two alternatives. There could be 
a nuclear armaments race in which Britain and America would 
enjoy only a temporary advantage. Alternatively some form 
of international control must be devised. Anderson admitted 
that this would be a difficult task but urged: 
no plans for world organisation which ignore the potentialities of Tube Alloys can be worth the paper on which they are written. Indeed it may well be that our thinking on these matters must now be on an entirely new plane. I am myself convinced that we must work for effective international control.7 
Churchill littered the minute with disapproving comments. 
On the section concerning sharing information with the 
Soviets he penned in the margin, "on no accounts".s He 
wrote at the end of the minute a curt, 11.r do not agree''. 9 
Anderson thought it necessary to try once more and upon 
Bohr's arrival in April he wrote again to the Prime 
Minister. This time he asked him to take the initiative and 
~mention to Roosevelt that he had given this matter 
consideration. Anderson even presented Churchill with a 
rough draft of a telegram to send to the President. 
7 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) p.351. 
8 Prem 3/139, Sept. 21, 1944. 
g Ibid. 
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Churchill returned a brusque reply; ''I do not think any such 
telegram is necessary nor do I wish to widen the circle who 
are informed. 1110 
Why should Churchill be so avidly opposed to international 
control? The most striking reason was Churchill's strong 
commitment to the Quebec Agreement. He was most anxious 
that nothing in any way should violate or contradict what 
for him had become the bedrock of British atomic policy. 
Coupled with this was Churchill's deep set mistrust of the 
Soviet Union. He thought it would be nothing but foolish to 
trust the Soviets with Britain's greatest military secret. 
Churchill was aJ .. so late in his years and he was very set in 
his ways. He perceived international relations from a 
Realist perspective and, perhaps, was incapable of 
changing.11 It may be that he at that time did not fully 
understand the international implications of atomic weapons. 
At that time nuclear bombs were nothing more than very big 
bombs; not one had yet been fully constructed. How could 
Churchill conceive of a nuclear arms race when no such 
weapons yet existed, and limited natural resources 
restricted their production anyway? He concerned himself 
only with joint Anglo-American cooperation and the 
10 Ibid.; also Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) p.351. 
11 For Realist view, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Random House, 1985). 
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maintenance of the Quebec Agreement. Confined by security 
and secrecy and by a centralised and forceful leader, 
Anderson and Cherwell found themselves paralysed to act. 
Despite Anderson's skepticism he and Cherwell arranged a 
meeting between Bohr and Churchill in a final desperate bid 
to sway the Prime Minister. 
On May 16th the state~man and scientist met. The meeting 
was a failure. Bohr's inarticulate mumbling whisper did 
nothing but serve to grate on the Prime Minister's nerves. 
The invasion of Europe was imminent and Churchill's mind was 
elsewhere. He viewed the meeting as a criticism of the 
Quebec Agreement and an attack on the Americans. Churchill 
was also distrustful of Bohr as a messenger from Roosevelt. 
Why did the President not use more usual and established 
routes of contact? Cherwell, the only other person present 
at the meeting, found himself at the end of a barrage of 
irrelevant questions concerning the Quebec Agreement. 
The scheduled half an hour soon elapsed amid Churchill's 
verbal assault upon Cherwell. Bohr never got to make his 
main point concerning internationalism. In the dying embers 
of the meeting Bohr asked if he could send the Prime 
Minister a memo on the subject, to which he replied that it 
would be an honour to receive a letter from Professor Bohr 
but he hoped it would concern a subject other than 
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politics.12 Bohr was later to write of the meeting, ''we did 
not speak the same language 11 .13 Whilst Churchill wrote to 
Cherwell; ''I did not like the man when you showed him to me, 
with his hair all over his head .... It seems to me Bohr 
ought to be confined. 11 14 
Bohr returned to the United States where he once again 
contacted Frankfurter. An interview was arranged by the 
Supreme Court Justice between the President and Bohr for 
August 26, 1944. This meeting was in sharp contrast to that 
experienced in London. Roosevelt and Bohr discussed the 
issue for over an hour and a half. Bohr was convinced that 
the President was to act upon his proposals. The latter 
said that he saw the importance of informing Stalin and that 
Stalin was enough of a realist to understand the importance 
of such a development. Roosevelt told Bohr that he could 
bring Churchill round to his way of thinking, and that he 
should await another meeting after he had met with 
Churchill. Bohr was to have a very long wait, for Roosevelt 
was never to meet him again. His sense of accomplishment 
soon turned to despair.15 
12 · "t Gowing, Op. C1 ., (1964) pp. 354-55; also Sherwin, Op. Cit., pp. 106-107. 
13 Gowing, Ibid., p. 355; see also Bohr to Churchill, May 22, 1944, Oppenheimer mss, box 34, Frankfurter-Bohr folder, cited from Sherwin, Ibid., p.107. 
14Prem 3/139, September 20, 1944. 
15 Sh . . t erw1n, Op. Ci., p.108. 
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Hyde Park 
In September, 1944, Churchill flew to North America to meet 
with Roosevelt. Cherwell and Anderson brought up the issue 
of Tube Alloys before he left. They asked him to discover 
American intentions towards postwar atomic cooperation.< 
Churchill needed no prompting on this matter for he was most 
anxious to secure the future of Anglo-American relations. 
On September 18, following a private meeting between the two 
heads of state an aide-memoire was initialled, ensuring 
indefinite collaboration of Tube Alloys in the postwar 
period subject to termination by joint agreement. This 
agreement constituted the Hyde Park aide-memoire.16 
In its opening sentence it rejected international control 
and advocated secrecy. It was agreed that after ''mature 
consideration" the bomb might be used against Japan. Point 
two of the aide-memoire stated that "full collaboration 
between the United States and the British Government in 
developing tube alloys [Sic.] for military and commercial 
purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless 
and until terminated by joint agreement." The third and 
final point is perhaps the most difficult to explain. It 
stated that ''enquiries should be made regarding the 
activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that 
he is responsible for no leakage of information, 
16 See Appendix II. 
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particularly to the Russians." It is most intriguing why 
Roosevelt should change his mind over Bohr, to the extent of 
authorising an investigation into his activities. This 
issue will be considered first. 
It is most likely that Churchill was the architect of this 
point. His distrust of Bohr and Stalin coupled with Bohr's 
' friendship with a Soviet scientist, Peter Kapitsa, make it 
easy to comprehend why he should include it in the aide-
memoire. Behind Roosevelt's turnabout lay many factors, 
none of which could be conclusively proved. Perhaps 
Roosevelt was genuinely sympathetic to Bohr's ideas but was 
converted by Churchill's bulldog-like persuasive manner, as 
James MacGregor Burns comments; "It was a lugubrious 
example of what happened when Roosevelt's idealistic 
impulses and amorphous policy collided with Churchill's 
narrower, Atlantic orientated outlook. 11 17 Alternatively it 
could be explained by Roosevelt's apparent habit of wanting 
to please people at the time that he was talking to them, 
even if this entailed deceiving them.18 This was not the 
first occasion Roosevelt was to say one thing and do 
another. Gowing believes that the President, "tired and ill 
17James Macgregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970) p.458. 
18see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-46." Journal of American History, 
vol. LX, March 1974, esp. pp. 1003-1007. 
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as he was, felt conscious of his political difficulties and 
the forthcoming election and quailed at the opposition which 
there would certainly be to any spreading of America's· 
secret. 11 19 A combination of these factors probably caused 
Roosevelt's volte-face. Emphasis should however be given to 
the explanation of the President's habit of wanting to 
please people at the time of talking to them because this 
appeared to be a trait of his personality. But as Gowing 
points out, ''we do not know and never will. 11 20 
Roosevelt was never to inform any of his advisors about the 
aide-memoire. This was a classic example of the President's 
division between technical and diplomatic policy. He simply 
felt no obligation to inform any of his staff on matters of 
broad policy. Conant and Bush were to conduct their entire 
campaign of international control ignorant of the fact that 
America had obligated itself to Britain at the highest 
level. In fact, when the British were to bring up the 
matter of the aide-memoire after Roosevelt's death the 
Americans did not know what the British were talking about 
nor could find a copy of the agreement; embarrassed, they 
had to ask for a photocopy of it. In June, 1945, the 
American copy turned up in the file of Admiral Wilson Brown, 
Roosevelt's naval aide. Apparently the person who had filed 
19Gowing, Op. Cit., (1964) p.359. 
2orbid. 
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it thought the heading "Tube Alloys'' was a reference to 
naval supplies.21 In contrast, Anderson and Cherwell were 
jubilant of the agreement and in no way viewed it as a blow· 
to international control as did their counterparts in 
America upon its discovery. 
The aide-memoire marked a definite direction and fusion 
between several strands of Roosevelt's foreign policy. The 
President had been concerned with moving away from an 
isolationist position. An alliance with the United Kingdom 
would be one method of assuring this because the U.K. would 
establish a power base for the U.S. in Europe with the aid 
of atomic weapons. Britain's role would be much the same as 
it had been in the past when the Royal Navy dominated the 
seas. Roosevelt's perceptions of Stalin became more 
definite. His attitude after Hyde Park was one of distrust. 
Why should the United States suddenly wish to trust a long 
standing adversary? This perception was almost definitely 
!}_) 
shaped by Churchill. The President's concern over American 
isolationism and distrust of the Soviet Union, especially 
after their overtures towards Poland, led him to a policy of 
wishing to maintain a strong postwar British Empire. He was 
also concerned over the possible rearmament of postwar 
Germany. A strong British Empire could be achieved in two 
ways: through economic assistance; or through atomic energy. 
21Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 458. 
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As Roosevelt saw it: 
the real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the 
war •... I just cannot go along with the idea of 
seeing the British Empire collapse financially, and Germany at the same time building up a potential 
rearmament machine to make another war possible in twenty years. ,,22 
J,. · The President decided, aided by Churchill's advice, to 
pursue a dual policy of strengthening Britain's position in 
Europe through financial assistance and atomic energy. 
The aide-memoire had bound the U.S. and Britain together on 
atomic policy. It ensured that these two countries would 
enter a postwar world donned with policemen hats. World 
peace was to be guaranteed through force, not through an 
international organisation. Roosevelt believed that America 
could become an overwhelming military power with Britain as 
a nuclear ally. Burns stated that a "strange combination of 
idealism and narrow realism was being brought to bear on s-
1.1123 The President macabrely joked that the only thing 
that could interrupt the execution of the aide-memoire would 
be a railway accident in which he, Churchill, Cherwell and 
Bush were killed since they all saw eye to eye.24 Although 
22FRUS: "Roosevelt to Sec. of State (Stettinius)" Vol: Conferences at Malta and Yalta, (Washington Printing Office, 1970) p.155. 
23J. Burns, Op. Cit., p. 459. 
24Gowing, Op. Cit., (19·64) p.341. Roosevelt must have assumed that if Bush would have known of the aide-
memoire he would have supported it. 
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such an accident never occurred events were to create a 
situation as if one had occurred. Roosevelt was to die 
whilst in office, shortly before Churchill was to lose 
office. The "train crash" had occurred albeit with a 
"political train"; the aide-memoire hung in the balance. 
Cherwell and Bush were to become two of the key players; the 
latter had his own designs for a postwar atomic world. 
Bush and Conant - Postwar aspirations. 
Conant and Bush, unaware of the President's thoughts on 
international control nor of his meeting with Niels Bohr, 
were themselves pondering the issue of international 
control. The scientists of the Chicago school were 
concerned about their own fate in the postwar period, should 
the military break from the scientists. They became anxious 
for Bush and Conant to impress their views upon the central 
decision makers. Bush and Conant did not require goading 
from Chicago but their impatience required immediate ,., 
satisfaction. On August 10, 1944, Bush alerted Compton that 
the MPC had authorised Richard C. Tolman to head a study of 
postwar needs. The Tolman Committee on Postwar Policy made 
suggestions over postwar domestic control of atomic energy 
but did not venture an opinion on international control. 
The Chicago rank and file were disturbed by this and set up 
their own committee under Zay Jeffries, a General Electric 
executive. A report was ready by November 18, entitled 
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''Prospectus on Nucleonics. '' This in essence called for a 
world wide organisation to prevent the atom from becoming a 
destroyer of nations. Both reports were to have little 
impact because Bush thought they had been completed before 
they could be effectively utilised. Bush had misread the 
situation howerer, for the time was right. Roosevelt had 
given the issue some consideration, especially after his 
meeting with Bohr.25 Perhaps if the President had been 
aware of Bush's thoughts, the Hyde Park aide-memoire may 
have taken a more internationalist form. 
Bush and Conant differed from Bohr in their approach to 
international control. Conant in a handwritten note 
' 
commented; ''of course for the very long run I'm inclined to 
think the only way for humanity is an international 
commission on atomic energy with full access to all 
information. 11 26 Whilst Bohr believed in approaching the 
Soviet Union and the establishment of an international 
commission before the bomb was used and before the war was 
over, Bush and Conant thought it best to wait until the bomb 
had officially been tested, demonstrated and proven. 
Bush and Conant wanted to avoid precipitating a nuclear arms 
25Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 324-325. 
26osRD, RG227, Handwritten comments by Conant 
attached to Bush to Conant, April 17, 1944, Box 19, 
Folder 19, AEC #180. 
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race before the United States had made a reasonable approach 
to international control on a multilateral basis. This was 
the point at which the administrators and President parted 
ways. In blue ink Conant had scribbled on a piece of paper 
''some thoughts on International Control" of Atomic Energy." 
He said there were two alternatives: "a race between 
nations and in the next war destruction of civilisation; or 
a scheme to remove atomic energy from the field of 
conflict." He numbered fourteen points, number two calling 
for an international commission on atomic energy comprising 
of Britain, the United States and Russia. Most of the other 
points dealt with problems of verification.27 Whilst Bush 
and Conant favoured including the Soviet Union, Roosevelt 
and Churchill did not. 
On September 19, 1944, Bush and Conant addressed a letter to 
Stimson warning him of the dangers of the United States 
assuming that security lay in holding the secrets of the 
bomb. They also said that; "it seems equally important to 
have a treaty entered into with Canada and the United 
Kingdom ... to put on a permanent basis the interchange 
provided for in the Quebec Agreement. 11 28 This letter was 
27osRD, RG227, Conant, handwritten note; ''Some Thoughts on International Control of Atomic Energy, '' May 4, 1944, Box 9, Folder 97. 
28osRD, RG227, Memorandum from Bush/Conant to Stimson, September 19, 1944, Box 9, Folder 97. 
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written on the same day the aide-memoire was initialled. 
Bush and Conant wanted precise clarity as to where the 
United States stood with Britain on the issue of 
interchange. This wa~ not for reasons of strengthening the 
Anglo~American partnership but rather as a show of trust or 
good faith towards the Soviets. They felt that the Soviets 
may be distrustful of American motives on collaboration if 
the U.S. and U.K. were too closely tied because Stalin was 
only too well aware of Churchill's dislike for him. 
Three days after the letter to Stimson, Roosevelt called 
Bush into his office; it had been a few months since the 
two of them had discussed S-1. Neither was aware that the 
other had been considering international control. Present 
at this meeting of September 22nd was Lord Cherwell. Bush 
said he "was much embarrassed to find [himself] discussing 
this subject [international control] in the presence of a 
British representative before having had an opportunity to 
advise with the President on it privately. 11 29 He went on to 
add that he was in no position to state what was actually on 
his mind, "namely that too close collaboration with the 
British. • • might lead to a very undesirable relationship 
indeed on the subject with Russia. 11 30 The President made no 
29osRD, RG 227, Memorandum of Conference by Bush, 
September 22, 1944, Box 19, Folder 19, AEC #185. 
30ibid. 
86 
, 
-· mention of the aide-memoire although he did make it clear 
that he had discussed .international control with Churchill. 
Roosevelt's only mention of Bohr was that he was disturbed 
that Frankfurter had gained knowledge of S-1 and that there 
may have been a security leak.31 The President then turned 
to postwar matters and he ''stated his belief of the 
necessity for maintaining the British Empire strong. 11 32 He 
said there should be complete interchange on all phases of 
atomic energy after the defeat of Japan. Bush's perception 
was that this was something the President would like in the 
future, not something he had already agreed upon with 
Churchill. Nevertheless Bush was suspicious that Roosevelt 
may have been dealing privately with Churchill. He wrote; 
• • .I was much disturbed that the President had apparently '' 
been talking postwar relations with Britain. 
• • without 
having obtained the opinions of the Secretary of War and 
others concerned with this matter in private beforehand. 11 33 
Bush was most upset after the meeting with Roosevelt for it 
became quite clear to him just how isolated he had become 
from atomic energy policy over the last year. It was time 
for Bush to change strategy. From that point onwards he was 
31Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 327. 
32osRD, RG227, Memorandum of Conference by Bush, September 22, 1944, Box 19, Folder 19, AEC #185. 
33 rbid. 
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to adopt a more ''aggressive'' posture as his role as advisor; 
''the time has come", he wrote, ''.when th~se who are his 
normal advisors •.. should insist upon giving their advice 
even if it is not called for. 11 34 Bush recognised the 
importance of alerting\stimson to the situation and 
contacted Bundy telling him that he felt the President's 
solitude was a highly dangerous situation. He urged Bundy 
to alert Stimson, to which he agreed.35 
On September 25th, Bundy had arranged for Bush to meet 
Stimson. He explained to the Secretary of War that the 
President contemplated an Anglo-American agreement as a 
method of guarding S-1 technology after the war, as well as 
contemplating controlling the peace of the world through 
"secret keeping. " Bush ,told Stimson that he thought this 
policy may cause the Soviets to develop their own bomb under 
a cloak of secrecy which could lead to catastrophic results 
- some twenty years hence. Bush argued that complete 
scientific interchange would decrease the danger of a 
nuclear ar1ns race and that he thought an international 
organisation should be created that would allow all nations 
to share control. He suggested that these possibilities 
should be analysed carefully. Stimson listened attentively 
34osRD, RG227, Memorandum from Bush to Conant, September 23, 1944, Box 19, Folder 19, AEC #186. 
35rbid. 
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to Bush but only specifically agreed to the suggestion c;:,f an .. 
international organisation.36 
Bush got the impression that Stimson was sympathetic to his 
views and that at last Bush was going through proper 
channels. However, Stimson was seventy eight years old and 
had been directing the u. s. war machine for three yea.rs. He 
was a tired man, as too was Roosevelt. Stimson wrote after 
his meeting with Bush that he was most pessimistic about 
holding the President's attention long enough to get to the 
bottom of the subject. He had been trying in vain to 
discuss a number of issues with his chief.· However, he 
thought that "the S-1 leadership ought to make an effort, if 
only for the record. 11 3 7 Stimson was content to merely raise 
the issue; he did not have the vitality of a fresh younger 
man to chase it. Bush, perhaps sensing this in Stimson, 
sent him, with Conant's assistance, two papers on the 
international control of atomic energy, one of which was 
succinctly written and would be easy for him to grasp. 
Bush and Conant outlined their fears and suggestions over 
S-1. They said that the United States has a temporary 
, 
advantage which may disappear or even reverse, if there 
should be a secret arms race on this subject. They argued 
36Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 328. 
37rbid. 
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that basic scientific knowledge of the matter was widespread 
and it would be foolhardy to attempt to maintain U.S. 
,, 
security through secrecy. With talk of a hydrogen bomb on 
the horizon they did not believe that controlling raw 
materials could prevent nuclear proliferation because 
supplies of "heavy water" were potentially limitless. Their 
final point was a reiteration of their hope that an arms 
race could be prevented, ''by complete scientific and 
technical interchange on the subject, backed up by an 
international commission acting under [an] association of 
nations and having the authority to inspect. 11 38 
Stimson was still mulling over the Bush/Conant proposals 
when an issue arose which was to divert his attention away 
from the subject of international control. A storm quickly 
erupted over Franco-British S-1 cooperation. The Americans 
accused the British of being in direct violation of the 
Quebec Agreement, which stated that neither partner should 
pass on S-1 information to third parties without obtaining 
the consent of the other. The British had failed to mention 
at Quebec their obligations to the French over atomic 
energy, for French scientists were working with the British 
team in Montreal. Stimson perceived the situation as a loss 
of information developed by American scientists and American 
38osRD, RG227, Bush and Conant to Stimson, September 30, 1944, Box 19, Folder 19, AEC #289. 
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money; ''such were the fruits of interchange, ,,39 he wrote. 
Groves sprang into action as the chief bastion of S-1 
security, which served to stiffen Stimson's monopolistic 
feelings. The Secretary of War's immediate concern was not 
internation~l control but that the Soviets may be brought 
into the picture by France. Bush's plea for international 
control became drowned by the monopolistic fervour that 
gripped the S-1 bureaucracy in the storm over atomic energy 
and the French. 
On Saturday, December 30th, Stimson summoned Bundy and 
Groves to the White House at very short notice to meet with 
the President about S-1. Stimson wanted to bring Roosevelt 
up to date on the project for he was unaware of the 
President's knowledge of events. Groves and Stimson 
complained about British leaks to the French and concluded 
that this was Anderson's doing, not Churchill's. Stimson 
the day before had written in his diary, "Anderson, a man 
dominated by "imperial instinct", seemed to be running the 
show. 11 40 Roosevelt listened with curiosity, never 
contradicting Stimson's assessment. He was only too well 
aware that Churchill ran the show and that nothing would be 
done by Anderson without the Prime Minister's consent. 
39 Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, vol. 49, December 15, 1944. 
40 Ibid., September 29, 1944. 
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Perhaps the Pr~sid.ent did not think it important for his 
staff to know of such matters. Stimson advised that 
Roosevelt admit to the S-1 group Secretary of State, 
Stettinius, to allow for the smooth expansion of the 
project. The President agreed, and upon Stimson's request 
asked him to return the following day at noon.41 
When Stimson arrived on Sunday morning for his appointment 
he found the President still in bed·. Stimson informed the 
President that the Soviets were spying on S-1 and that they 
would probably eventually obtain the technical secrets. 
Stimson ''believed· that it was essential not to take them 
into our confidence until we were sure to get a real quid 
pro quo for our frankness." He added that he "had no 
illusions as to the possibility of keeping permanent such a 
secret but did not think it was yet time to share it with 
Russia. Roosevelt said he thought he agreed. 11 42 
The President at Hyde Park had already taken this line of 
policy proposed by Stimson, but still played ignorant. 
Bush's impact on Stimson's attitude toward international 
control had faded in the wake of the French affair. Stimson 
was pursuing the reverse policy of that suggested by Bush. 
Bush's line to the President was blocked by the Secretary of 
41 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 334. 
42 Stimson Diaries vol. 49, December 31, 1944. 
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War. ais ideas were not getting through. Stimson's change. 
of attitude towards the Soviets may be in part explained by 
Groves' influence, but also by increased tensions in 
American-Soviet relations. Roosevelt had just written to 
Stalin protesting Soviet recognition of the Lublin Committee 
as the provisional government of Poland. Stalin was 
standing fast to his position causing tensions to rise. 
Bush "had long since become an experienced bureaucrat, not 
easily discouraged by the frustrations of Washington. ,,43 He 
was to have to change his strategy if he was to reach the 
President. 
Bush took the initiative at the end of January, 1945, when 
the postwar issue arose again. He seized the opportunity to 
·,r···· push for a high level advisory committee. Bush contacted 
Bundy on February 1st and suggested the establishment of 
such a committee that would be concerned entirely with 
postwar matters.44 At this time Groves was seeking advice 
from the MPC as to the fate of the Chicago scientists. Bush 
told Bundy that Groves should receive advice on this issue 
from Stimson. 45 Before Stimson could give advice on such a 
43 Hewlett and Anderson Op. Cit., p. 335. 
44 OSRD, RG 227, Bush to Bundy, February 1, 1945, Box 19, Folder 19, AEC #196. 
45 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.337. 
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matter he would need counseling, and this should come from 
the new high level advisory committee. Bush had envisaged a 
bureaucratic structure that would directly reflect his views 
yet would not be directly tied to him. The committee would 
be staffed by men like Toleman who held no departmental 
responsibility. Bush, Conant, Compton and Lawrence were to 
be excluded. Stimson approved such a committee on February 
13th but took no further action on the matter. Perhaps 
Groves managed to talk him out of it. 
Bush realised that he had not made a sufficient impression 
on Bundy who had consequently failed to convince Stimson. 
Bush and Conant met Bundy on March 5th to further discuss 
the issue. This time they struck a nerve. Sacred to Bundy 
was the War Department's control over S-1. Bush and Conant 
told him that "unless something were done, confusion would 
fill the vacuum when the bomb became public knowledge. The 
various executive departments would fight for control. 
Something akin to mass hysteria was a possibility. 11 46 The 
issue of postwar international control for Bundy was less 
one of altruism than one of departmental prestige and 
influence. His motives would easily be explainable by 
Graham Allison's bureaucratic model. 
If Bush and Conant knew how to get through to Bundy then 
46 Ibid., p.339. 
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Bundy certainly knew how to get through to his boss. He 
approached the issue couching it in terms of morality and 
Christian values. Stimson was convinced. He took the issue 
to the President on March 15, this time with the courage of 
his convictions. Stimson thought the talk was successful 
although nothing concrete was actually accomplished.47 
Bush's mastery of the bureaucracy had brought him so close, 
but this .was to be Stimson's last meeting with the 
President. On April 12th news came from Warm Springs that 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had died. 
The Scientists 
The scientists, whose child was the bomb, were constantly 
seeking an entrance to the corridors of power. Their 
greatest obstacle were the emotions of xenophobic 
nationalism that swept the countries at war. They were for 
the most part emigres and could not be trusted. At the 
start of the war the emigre scientists were prevented from 
working on important projects like radar. In fact in 1940 
the Radar Lab was named the Radiation Lab as a security 
precaution to make the Germans think that the Allied 
scientists were wasting their time on fruitless projects 
such as fission bombs. At the start of the war the nuclear 
scientists were politically inept. 
47. b'd I 1 ., p.340. 
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After Groves was brought into the project the scientists 
were to find their task of gaining political power even more 
difficult. The General had imposed upon them a system of 
compartmentalisation. The idea behind compartmentalisation 
was simple, Groves explained: "Just as outfielders should 
not think about the manager's job of changing the pitchers, 
and a blocker should not be worrying about a ball-carrier 
fumbling, each scientist had to be made to do his own 
work. 11 48 Compartmentalisation restricted scientists from 
contacting other scientists that were not wo~king on the 
same section of the project. From a security standpoint 
this policy was effective but it undermined the very essence 
of scientific enquiry - communication. Groves felt that the 
scientists, unless restricted, may go off on a tangent 
rather than studying what they had been assigned. 
Scientists felt this policy would slow down the project 
whereas Groves thought it would speed it up. After the war 
some scientists were to recognise the effectiveness of 
Groves' policy. I. I. Rabi referred to him as an ''eccentric 
administrative genius. 11 49 Whichever view is adopted the 
fact remained that compartmentalisation had effectively kept 
the scientists politically weak by preventing them from 
uniting into one cohesive group behind a single leader. The 
48 h . . t s erw1n, Op. Ci., p.59. 
49 b'd I 1 . , p. 58. 
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scientists fo.und themselves fighting a two front war: ''on 
the one hand, there were the enemies of the United States; 
and on the other, the potential enemies of science - men and 
institutions seeking to control research. 11 50 
There existed a division into two camps of those scientists 
' 
that did have contact with each other; many secretly 
violated Groves' rules. The industrial camp were cautious 
of overspending on the project. The academic camp which 
looked to academic distinction for their rewards accused the 
industrial camp for being too cautious and jeopardising the 
security of America. Men such as Fermi, Szilard, Wigner and 
Franck were the emigres that led the academic membership of 
the Chicago staff. ''This group", commented Sherwin, 
''comprised a politically volatile combination ... they were 
out to win the war ... they were gung-ho and very impatient 
with anyone who failed to share their elan. 11 51 This may 
indeed have been the case, but as emigre scientists they 
were prevented from reaching the top S-1 decision makers. 
Their only mouthpiece within the S-1 decision making 
structure came from Bush and Conant, both of whom were 
having difficulty in reaching the President. Nevertheless 
they held the pivotal position between the scientists and 
policy makers. Groves was also a link between the 
50 Ibid., p.41. 
51 Ibid. pp. 49-50 
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scientists and policy makers although he did not concern 
himself with the promotion of science; he was more concerned 
with secrecy and winning the war with ''his" atomic bomb. 
In February, 1945, after the Yalta Conference, the Chicago 
scientists called for the creation of a strong international 
research center with full access to the scientific 
activities of all nations. This they argued was the best 
method of assuring peace in a postwar atomic world. Was 
world peace the motivating force behind the Chicago school 
or did they have an ulterior motive? Men like Sir Solly 
Zuckerman and Daniel Kevles would probably argue that an 
"international research center" would be created not so much 
to promote world peace but rather as a grandiose ''play 
thing" where scientists of the world could study together 
whilst being globally funded. It would be a fantastic 
chance for scientists to gain their long overdue 
international recognition for services rendered to mankind. 
Such an organisation would allow scientists to bath in their 
own self importance. 
This view may in part be an accurate reflection of the 
scientists' motives. However, it should not be overlooked 
that it was they who recognised that atomic weapons could 
not be defended against and thus required international 
control. Alice Smith succinctly summarised the situation: 
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''statesmen who did not realise that the atom had changed the 
world were laying futile plans for peace while scientists 
who knew the facts stood helplessly by. 11 52 
But what of the British scientists? Practically all of the 
top British scientists and emigres working in Britain had 
joined the American project. Following the Quebec Agreement 
and the replacement of Akers by Chadwick most of the British 
team moved over to the Manhattan Project. Chadwick believed 
that any information the British scientists could obtain 
would be invaluable to them should they decide to go ahead 
with their own project, or should the Americans decide to 
terminate the partnership. He recognised that the vast 
amounts of money and effort put into the American project 
were unavailable to the British and were unlikely to become 
available in the near future. Chadwick sought to get as 
much from the Americans as he possibly could. This policy 
affected the British scientists in two ways. They were no 
longer close to Anderson and Cherwell and therefore stood 
little chance of affecting the British Tube Alloys decision 
makers. In America the British team had been split up and 
subjected to Groves' co~partmentalisation policy. They were 
all treated as emigres, which in fact most of them were. 
52 Alice K. Smith "Behind the decision to use the atomic bomb" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. XIV, October 1958, pp.294-5. 
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Disunified and'distrusted the British scientists held very 
little, if any, political power. 
Hewlett and Anderson concluded of the scientist~ that "when 
Roosevelt died, their hopes sank. 11 53 This was not 
necessarily the case. If anything their hopes should have 
been lifted. Roosevelt was not in the business of taking 
advice from his staff. He tended to turn to Churchill on 
such matters. His death must have given Bush new hope. He 
now had Truman as his new chief who was susceptible to new 
ideas and direction. Bush and Conant were given the 
opportunity of becoming advisors in the true meaning of the 
word. Admittedly, they had to compete with others for the 
President's ear. But with Bush at the helm, and as a master 
of bureaucratic politics, he and the scientists stood a 
better chance than most. 
53 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.342. 
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Prologue 
PART II -- THE NEW WORI,D 
CHAPl'ER IV 
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES 
A very different international atmosphere reigned over a 
postwar world than had existed five years previously. 
Attention had shifted from war and destruction to peace and 
construction. Yet this new world had still not catered for 
the lethal and untamed power of the atomic energy. In 
Britain, Churchill's strong and dominant leadership had been 
replaced by the novice and less forceful leadership of 
Labour's Clement Attlee. Whilst in America the centralized 
leadership of Roosevelt had fallen suddenly upon an 
unprepared Vice President, Harry s. Truman. With regard to 
atomic energy both countries showed one similarity, they 
both maintained their atomic bureaucracies. Truman had no 
choice in the matter for he simply inherited the atomic 
bureaucracy left behind by the late president. In Britain, 
Attlee too had little choice, for the civil service is non 
partisan and permanent; it does not change from one 
administration to the next. For the new Prime Minister 
those civil servants involved with atomic energy were his 
only information source about a subject which neither he, 
nor his Administration, knew much about. The heads of 
state had had their chance -- it was now the turn of the 
bureaucracies. 
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United States - Decision Making Revisted 
Following Roosevelt's death Bush wasted no time in pushing 
for a committee to consider the matter of international 
control. Bohr had met with Bush within days of the 
President's passing and alerted him to the necessity of 
approaching the Soviet Union before the bomb had been 
internationally demonstrated. Bush was sympathetic to his 
ideas and acted upon them immediately. He was only too 
well aware that time was running out. The project was only 
three months from completion, at which time public opinion 
would become a factor in shaping American-Soviet atomic 
relations. Bundy and Harrison received Bohr's proposals 
with a strong letter of endorsement from Bush. In his 
letter he argued that in order to create the correct 
international atmosphere in which atomic energy could be 
controlled, the Soviet Union had to be approached before 
knowledge of the bomb became public. He suggested that the 
country's best minds be put to work on the issue in the 
form of an advisory committee. This should be formed with 
haste in order to deal with this matter in time.1 
Stimson never saw Bohr's memorandum nor Bush's endorsement. 
They were replaced by a watered down version drawn up by 
Harrison and Bundy. It had the same international flavour 
of Bohr's and Bush's proposals but made no mention of an 
1 Hewlett and Anderson Op. Cit., p.344. 
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early approach to the Soviet Union, which was their most 
central point. Harrison and Bundy's memorandum to Stimson 
· · t t · 1 It stated that '' 1· f was very vague 1n 1 s ermine Q1gy. 
properly controlled by the peace loving nations of the world 
this energy should insure the peace of the world for 
generations. 11 2 Which exactly were the "peace loving nations 
of the world"? Was the Soviet Union one of them? What was 
meant by "properly controlled"? This was not made explicit 
by Harrison and Bundy. Perhaps these men were driven by 
motives of departmental benefit rather than a deep felt 
internationalist spirit that had gripped both Bohr and Bush. 
Perhaps the memorandum to Stimson was intentionally vague 
with the purpose of allowing the advisory committee to sort 
out such details. It is likely that both these factors 
affected their decision, although the former was probably 
the greater influence. 
Bundy and Harrision had convinced Stimson. He reacted to 
their memorandum with "warm approval".3 He notified Conant, 
on May 6th, that he was "with the approval of the President 
••• appointing an Interim Committee on S-1 to study and 
report on the whole problem of temporary war controls ... and 
to survey and make recommendations on postwar research. 11 
2 Memorandum by 
of War, May 1, 1945. 
pp. 296-95 (Appendix 
Bundy and Harrison for the Secretary 
Quoted from Sherwin, Op. Cit., 
K) • 
3 Ibid, pp.168-69. 
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Stimson was concerned that such a committee would be viewed 
by Congress as usurping their legislative power and thus 
concluded his memorandum; "I suggest calling the Committee 
an ''Interim Committee" because ••. when secrecy is no longer 
required, Congress might wish to appoint a permanent Post-
war Commission. 11 4 
Bush had been actively moving for international control for 
approximately one year with no results. Within three weeks 
of Roosevelt's death an Interim Committee had been 
established to consider the issue. It is too coincidental 
that these two events occurred within such a short time of 
each other. With the old President gone, Bush and Conant 
had a short while to impress their views upon the new 
incumbent before he could find his feet. The Interim 
Committee had seven members: Stimson, as chairman; Ralf 
Bard, an Under Secretary, representing the Navy Department; 
William Clayton, an Assistant Secretary, the State 
Department; Bush; Conant; Karl T. Compton; and a 
representative of the President. Upon Conant's request an 
advisory "Scientific Panel" was appointed consisting of 
Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Arthur Compton and Enrico Fermi. The 
,·. 
final outcome was an Interim Committee which closely 
reflected Bush and Conant's opinions rather than those of 
4 OSRD, RG · 227, Stimson to Conant May 6, 1965, Box 19, Folder 19B, AEC #287. 
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( 
' Bundy and Harrison. Stimson requested that another member 
be included. He suggested James Byrnes, who according to 
Washington rumors, had already been chosen by Truman to 
replace Stettinius as Secretary of State; Truman approved.5 
Bush and Conant were to have to prod the Committee to act 
quickly before the bomb became public knowledge or before 
the new President decid~d against taking advice from the 
committee. 
The New President 
On April 13th, after meeting with the Congressional leaders 
in the Senate Office at the Capital, President Truman met 
with reporters on his first day in the office. 
Boys, he said, if you ever pray, pray for me now. I don't know whether you fellows ever had a load of hay fall on you, but when they told me yesterday what happened, I felt like the moon, the stars and all the planets had fallen on me. I've got the most terribly 
responsible job a man ever had. 
Good luck, Mr. President, said one of the 
reporters. 
I wish you didn't have to call me that, he told him.6 
Truman had anticipated Roosevelt's death but had always 
blocked it from his mind. Now that it had become a reality 
he confessed, ''I was unprepared for it. n7 When he became 
5 Sherwin, Op. Cit., pp.168-170; also Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 344-45. 
6 Harry s. Truman - Year of Decision 1945 (Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1955) pp.19-20. 
7 Ibid. 
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President, Truman did not have a single ally amongst 
Roosevelt's old advisory staff. He did not know who he 
coulp trust or who to turn to, but advice he needed. He 
lacked self confidence and the adequate training needed for 
the job. Sherwin succinctly summarizes Truman's position 
upon becoming President; "He was an outsider in his own 
administration, an intruder with little if any standing in 
the eyes of those who were officially his subordinates. 11 8 
The image of Truman as a strong willed, tough minded 
President who had a sign on his desk which read "The Buck 
Stops Here", was cultivated after the war. In his first few 
weeks in office he was malleable and susceptible to the 
advice of those around him. 
Truman had no choice but to follow Roosevelt's policies. He 
had made no plans of his own owing to the sudden and 
untimely death of Roosevelt. "It was my intention,'' he 
wrote, ''to continue both the foreign and domestic policies 
of the Roosevelt Administration."9 Stimson wrote in his 
diary on April 13, 1945, that "Roosevelt had such an immense 
prestige politically arising from his four successful 
campaigns for President that he carried a weight with the 
Congress and with general politicians of the country which 
8 
9 
Sherwin, Op. cit., p.148. 
Truman, Op. Cit., p. 9. 
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Truman could not possibly have.'' lO Truman's hands were 
tied as far as policy initiative was concerned. A 
combination of his predecessor's greatness and his own 
unpreparedness forced him to continue existing policy. 
Whilst Bush and Conant enjoyed contact with the new 
President so did the others. Bush, Conant, and Stimson all 
tried to guide Truman towards favorable communications with 
the Soviet Union. Those involved with S-1 and who favored 
an international approach to control, tried to guide the 
President down this path. However, after two weeks in 
office Soviet-American relations had reached an all time 
low. Tension mounted over Stalin's continued 
procrastination of implementing the Yalta Agreement 2 .-· .. 
concerning the fate of Poland. The State Department and the 
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averall Harriman, were 
stiffening Truman's resistance to Soviet-American accord. 
Harriman had informed the President that Vishinsky, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov's deputy, had informed him that 
there was "great public demand" for the conclusion of the 
Soviet-Polish treaty of mutual assistance and that one was 
being prepared. "I was disturbed," reacted Truman. He was 
not prepared for the Soviets ~o get their way in Poland and 
directed the State Department to register a protest in 
· Moscow.11 The controversy over Bulgaria only served to 
10 Stimson Diaries, Vol.50, April 13, 1965. 
11 Truman, Op. Cit., p. 51. 
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confirm Truman's suspicious of the Soviets. Britain and 
America had called for tripartite supervision of elections 
in Bulgaria in order to ensure that they would be 
democratically conducted in accordance with the Yalta 
Agreement. The Soviet Government protested that "foreign 
interference'' with these elections was not necessary. They 
argued that tripartite supervision was not given to the 
recent Finnish elections and that there was no reason why 
Bulgaria should be treated any differently to Finland. For 
Bush, Conant, Stimson and other internationalists; control 
of atomic energy was quickly slipping from their grasp as 
the new President's perceptual mindset was being constructed 
upon anti-Soviet foundations. 
Despite American anti-Soviet sentiments, international 
control of atomic energy was more of a possibility than may 
have appeared. Truman was isolated within his own 
administration and had to turn to tSomeone whom he could 
confide in and whom he could trust. Luckily for Conant and 
Bush, this man was Stimson. Whilst Chairman of the 
Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, 
Truman was making enquiries into the vast expenditures being 
made in Tennessee and the State of Washington. · Stimson, who 
through the eyes of Truman was "a great American patriot 
and statesman," 12 persuaded him to abandon the 
12 Ibid, p. 11. 
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• investigation. Clearly Stimson was respected by Truman and 
held influence over him. When he briefed the new President 
about the atomic bomb, Truman listened with absorbed 
interest to Stimson, who ''was a man of great wisdom and 
foresight." The President reported in his memoirs that he 
felt "fortunate the country was to have so able and so wise 
a man in its service. 11 13 Although Stimson was a convert to 
·-
the internationalist school he was unaware, owing to 
Harrison and Bundy's interjection, that an early approqch to 
the Soviets was a necessary component of Bush's and Conant's 
plans for international control. 
Truman had entered a new world. Roosevelt had managed to 
stave off the emergence of the American bureaucratic 
machine through his silent centralized leadership. 
Bureaucratic politics was evident during his term of office 
but had not yet fully dominated the American decision making 
process. The transition from Roosevelt to Truman allowed 
the bureaucracy to stake its claim as the official decision 
making process of the United States. 14 Truman did not 
instigate this change, it was unavoidable. ''From the first 
time I sat down in the President's chair", he observed, ''I 
found myself part of an immense administrative operation. 
There had been a change of executives, but the machinery 
13 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
14 See Allison OP. Cit., (1961), (1971). 
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kept going in, its customary routine manner. 1115 
The Last Chance 
When the Interim Committee met on July 19, 1945, an 
atmosphere of urgency filled the air. The implosion device 
had been successfully tested at Alamogordo the previous day. 
Stimson, already at Potsdam, received a report from 
I Harrison: 
Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident 
that the little boy is as husky as his big brother. The 1 light in his eyes is discernible from here to Highhold 
and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm. 16 
These cryptic sentences meant that the Trinity device was 
far more powerful than anticipated. The light omitted at 
Alamogordo was visible for two hundred and fifty miles, and 
its thunder audible for fifty miles.17 Whatever the 
Interim Committee were to decide upon had to be done with 
haste. They proposed the setting up of an organization 
within the confines of the United Nations Organization. 
All countries would have access to scientific information, 
but America would withhold technical knowledge for at least 
five years. However time was to be their enemy. By the 
15 Truman, Op. Cit., P.91. 
1 6 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 386. 
17 The reference inade to the "doctor" and "little boy" was the code for the success of the project. If it 
was a failure the doctor would have delivered a "little 
girl". "Little Boy" was also the name given to the device dropped on Hiroshima. Oral interview with Ed. Reese, Op. Cit .. 
110 
time the Committee had finally agreed upon their policy 
towards Russia, there was insufficient time to achieve an 
international understanding of the bomb before the end of 
the war. In any event, Truman and Churchill had decided 
after Alamogordo to.do nothing more than inform Stalin of 
the bomb and that they intended to use it.18 
Truman gives the following account of his conversation with 
Stalin: 
On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a 
· new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and ho~ed we would make "good use 
of it against the Japanese." 9 
Churchill, also an eye-witness to the conversation gives the 
-following account: 
Next day, July 24, after our plenary meeting had ended and 
we all got up from the round table and stood around in 
two's and three's before dispersing, I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only 
their interpreters. I was perhaps five yards away, and I 
watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital 
was to measure its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted .... As we 
were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. 
"How did it go?" I asked. "He never asked a question, 11 he 
replied. 20 
18 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 386-87. 
19 Truman, Op. Cit., p. 416. 
20 Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Bantam Books, 1962) pp. 669-70; for other accounts of this 
meeting see Robert Williams and Philip Cantelon (Eds), The American Atom (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984) 
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It was unclear whether or not news of the atomic bomb took 
Stalin by surprise. It is however most probable that he 
knew what Truman was talking about. Soviet spies had 
penetrated the Manhattan Project and Soviet scientists were 
investigating the possibilities of an atomic bomb. If 
indeed Stalin had known about the bomb for some time, then 
how much benefit would actually have been derived from an 
early approach to the Soviets? It must be assumed that his 
actions in Poland1and Bulgaria were conducted in the 
knowledge that America possessed this powerful weapon. 
Perhaps an official and direct approach to Stalin may have 
given him cause for trust in the United States and may have 
prevented the Soviet quest for a bomb. However this is 
doubtful. It is unlikely that Stalin would wish to exist in 
an international arena in which the United States alone 
possessed the atomic capability. Nevertheless, an early 
approach may have yielded some form of international 
understanding and cooperation over atomic weapons rather 
than a secret arms race. Bohr's self-appointed wartime 
mission had ended in failure. On August 6, 1945, "Little 
Boy" destroyed Hiroshima, there had been no consultation 
with Russia over international control before it was 
dropped. 
pp.55-56. 
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Postwar Britain 
When Japan agreed in principle to surrender on 10 August, 
1945 this not only ended the Second World War but also 
signalled a radical change in Anglo-American Relations. In 
the same month that Japan surrendered, the United States 
abruptly terminated the Lend Lease Agreement. There was 
great disappointment amongst the British population at the 
ending of this agreement. The largest of the daily tabloids 
told its readers: 
Americans may now be reminded that we stood alone a whole 
year before Lend-Lease came into operation, and that 
during that period we spent every penny we had fighting 
America's bpttle as well as our own. Our money was spent 
mainly in ,_America which thereby became richer as we became pqbrer. 21 
The British government were surprised and resented the 
sudden ending of the wartime '' special relationship. '' James 
Cable captures the indignation felt by Britain: 
By 1945 the British had come to take Lend-Lease so much 
for granted that they were genuinely shocked at its 
termination, resented the "strings'' attached to the 
subsequent American loan and accepted Marshall Aid as no 
more than their due.22 
Although Attlee did not share Churchill's natural love for 
the Americans he was disappointed at the termination of many 
joint Anglo-American ex~rcises and organizations. 
~
1 ,Daily Mirror, September 14, 1945, p. 2, quoted 
from Leon Epstein, Britain - Uneasy Ally (University of 
Chicago Press, 1954), p. 38. 
22 Cable, Op. Cit., p. 369. 
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The mood in America was one of disengagement from all 
alliances and all the abnormalities of war. There was ill 
feeling in the United States over specific aspects of 
British foreign policy, most notably in Palestine. The 
electoral defeat of Churchill had come as a surprise to most 
Americans and many did not trust the ''socialist" Labour 
Government of Clement Attlee. They perceived socialism as 
being contrary to the values upon which their society was 
based. Nevertheless, despite the weakened positions of the 
special wartime relationship, Britain and America still 
became closer to each other than to any other nations. 
However, with regard to atomic relations this air of 
''harmony'' did not exist, atomic relations did not follow the 
general pattern of Anglo-American relations. The general 
pattern of the atomic relationship when viewed from the 
British perspective was one of unfulfilled obligations and 
broken agreements by the Americans. 
In 1852 Pamestone told his successor, "You have no idea 
till you know more of your office what a power of prestige 
England possesses abroad ... ,,.23 By 1945, Britain's position 
as a primary power had diminished. She entered the ''New 
World" relegated to the position of secondary power. John 
Strachey wrote; "Nations which have known empires may simply 
23 Margaret Sprout, "Retreat from World Power" World Politics vol. 15, no. 4, July 1963, p. 662. 
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break their hearts'' if they should not find another ideal. 24 
It was probably during the Second World war that Britain and 
the United States ''switched roles". 25 Prior to the war, 
Britain and America were on an equal footing in the 
international arena, but after it they were not. "Britain 
' , 
had become a client of the United States. ,,26 
Although this was the condition in which Britain was to face 
a postwar world, several factors helped to disguise this 
fact. Attlee's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, whom he 
considered as "a first-class negotiator and 
administrator, 11 27 skillfully depicted Britain's membership 
of the "Big Three" as a sign of her continued international 
strength and prestige. In the House of Commons two years 
later he was still projecting this image; ''His Majesty's 
Government do not accept the view ... that we have ceased to 
be a Great Power, or the contention that we have ceased to 
play that role. 11 28 At the end of the war Britain may be 
said to have been suffering from delusions of grandure. In 
24 John Strachey, The End of Empire,. (Gallancz, 1959) 
1 P• 229. 
25 Pierre, Op. Cit., p. 67. 
26 Cable, Op. Cit., p. 369. 
27 Clement R. Attlee, As it Happened, (The Viking 
Press, 1954) p. 238. 
28 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, 
House of Commons, vol. 437, col. 1965 (16 May 1947); 
quoted from Pierre, Op. Cit., p~ 68. 
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addition, the vast power of the Soviet Union was still 
unrealized and within a war-torn Europe, Britain was still 
the strongest of these ruined countries. 
Great Britain - Decision Making Revisted 
When Attlee formed his Lab9ur Government on 26 July, 1945, 
not a single member of his Cabinet had any knowledge of Tube 
Alloys, nor had any partaken in any Anglo-American 
negotiations conducted by Churchill's coalition government. 
As Deputy Prime Minister during the war years, Attlee was 
not consulted nor informed about any aspect of the project. 
Consequently the new government had to formulate policy for 
the control and development of atomic energy, a subject 
about which it knew very little. With_the exception of a 
few civil servants, Attlee's government had no information 
on the subject. He was unable to review Churchill's files 
on the matter, because it is illegal in Britain for the 
government to inspect a previous government's files. 
Attlee followed Churchill's precedent of excluding the 
Cabinet from discussions on atomic energy. Within the six 
years of Attlee's term atomic energy appeared less than ten 
times on the Cabinet agenda. This .is not to say that he 
took decisions single handed. For the first eighteen months 
there existed no standi!:!9 committee on atomic energy --
there was only "Gen 75". Specific "ad hoc'' Committees of 
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Ministers are given ''Gen" numbers;: Gen standing for 
"General". This ad hoc committee was the decision making 
center for atomic issues. Although it had a formal 
secretariat and circulation of papers, its existence was 
highly secret, known only to its seven members. 29 
Decisions on atomic energy were taken by an "inner-circle'' 
in the Cabinet whilst the outer circle were excluded from 
all forms of knowledge and contact with this issue. 
At the first meeting of the Gen 75 Committee, on the same 
day Japan surrendered, the Prime Minister suggested that an 
Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE) should be set up. 
Its function would be to make recommendations on the use of 
atomic energy and its international control. The ACAE would 
consist partly of Service and official representatives and 
partly of scientists associated with the work. Attlee 
proposed that Sir John Anderson should be chairman of this 
Committee.30 The ACAE was central to British atomic policy 
as Professor Gowing asserts;" the committee was indeed 
responsible for making the recommendations which led to the 
first decisions on the shape of Britain's atomic programme 
and the attitude to international control. 11 31 
29 Membership of Gen 75: Attlee (chairman); Herbert 
Morrison (Ld. President of the Council); Ernest Bevin 
(Foreign Secretary); Stafford Cripps (Pres. of Board of 
Trade); Arthur Greenwood (Ld. Privy Seal); Hugh Dalton 
(Chancellor of Exchequer); John Wilmot (Minister of 
Supply). 
30 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 1st meeting, August 10, 1945. 
31 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974), pp. 24-25. 
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Sir John was an independent M.P. who sat on the. Opposition 
Front Bench after the July election. Although he was not a 
Conservative, he was "in most affairs an implacable enemy of 
the Labour Government. '' 3 2 However, Mr. Attlee and Sir John 
had worked closely together on home affairs during the war 
and they had a high regard for each other. Attlee needed 
someone to assist his government in deciding atomic policy 
owing to the collective ignorance on the subject of his 
colleagues. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, 
suggested that the Prime Minister employ the services of Sir 
John for this task. Cherwell was never a consideration 
owing to Attlees's dislike for the man. It was also Sir 
Edward Bridges that suggested that the Prime Minister should 
be the central figure, as opposed to giving the 
responsibility to a full time Minister. The significance of 
the origins of these decisions are far greater than 
initially appear. 
Sir Edward Bridges, as Cabinet Secretary, was a permanent 
Civil Servant and as such could not lose his position as 
administrations changed. His role was to keep the Prime 
Minister informed of his daily business, act as an 
'' information sieve" by editing and vetting information 
~-~1, 
marked for the Prime Minister into a manageable form, and to 
keep the minutes of Cabinet and special meetings. Bridges, 
32 Ibid., p. 24. 
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al though suppose-dly politically neutral, worked very closely 
with, and was very loyal to Mr. Churchill. It was Bridges 
that suggested that Sir John should chair the ACAE, thus 
drawing a Labour Government's atomic policy away from the 
left. Skeptics of such an argument may claim that Sir John 
was an obvious choice for he was one of a very few who could 
offer expertise and continuity to Labour's atomic policy. 
Yet it was Bridges, a man who,held the confidence of the 
novice Prime Minister, who suggested that atomic energy be 
centered around him. Perhaps this suggestion was designed 
to ensure that Bridges could have access and "control" of 
the key figures on atomic energy policy. Attlee chaired the 
Cabinet committee at the ministerial level (Gen 75) whilst 
Anderson chaired the Advisory Committee. Both these 
v· 
positions were created as a result of Bridges' suggestions, 
and both positions to some degree, were under his influence. 
Lord Sherfield writes that Attlee's ''habit of working 
quietly - swiftly, without the slightest fuss, and with a 
minimum of written decision, masks for a latter generation 
his powers of decision and control. 11 33 If this indeed was 
the case it certainly did not apply to his early decisions 
concerning atomic energy. In fact, on matters of foreign 
affairs, Attlee believed it was" a mistake for a Prime 
Minister -- save in exceptional circumstances -- to 
33 R.T. Hon. Lord Sherfield -"Britain's Nuclear Story 
1945-52" The Round Table vol. 65, No. 258, April 1975, 
p. 199. 
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intervene personally," this he considered to be '' the 
province of the Foreign Secretary." 34 
The DSIR had during the war taken responsibility for atomic 
matters, essentially for the reason that the amount of money 
involved was small and most of the work was conducted in the 
universities. Bridges suggested that the responsibility 
should be placed with the Ministry of Supply, "which has the 
experience and organization for such affairs. 11 35 Sherfield 
states, "it was a perfectly sensible decision to entrust the 
departmental responsibility to the Ministry of Supply, since 
so much would depend on the provision of works services." 36 
However, was it a coincidence that the Minister of Supply, 
John Wilmot, was recognised as a weak minister? As a weak 
minister he would be the easiest for Bridges to "guide" and 
''suggest" policy choices. Attlee was undoubtly the novice 
amongst the veterans -- Anderson and Bridges. On matters of 
morality or issues that personally moved him he would 
attempt to guide policy. However, on issues of a technical 
nature or concerning general administrative---)'.rolicy he did 
not question his advisors. Gowing concurs: 
... a great deal of paper about atomic affairs was put 
before him (Attlee) and he took the necessary decisions 
quickly, but there is little sign in the documents of 
·34 Atlee, Op. Cit., p. 237. 
35 Gowing, Op. Cit. , (1976) p. 26-27. 
36 Sherfield, Op. Cit., p. 199. 
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close· personal involvement, nor did Mr. Attlee himself 
write minutes suggesting or questioning policy. His normal 
comment was" l approve", "I agree", or simply his 
initials.37 . 
The British atomic decision making machinery constructed to 
operate within the "New World'' was highly unu.sual. The 
Prime Minister was central to all issues of atomic policy 
and no decision could be taken without his approval, yet he 
was initially ignorant of most of the issues. A member of 
the Opposition Front Bench was chairman of the ACAE which 
reported to the Prime Minister. Anderson was not a Labour 
Minister and therefore was unable to attend Cabinet 
Meetings, including Gen 75. The Ministry of Supply housed 
the project for reasons which are not entirely clear. 
Finally, the entire structure appeared to have been 
engineered by the Cabinet Secretary with apparent right wing 
sympathies, who as a civil servant was supposed to be 
politically neutral. 
37 · · t Gowing, Op. C1 ., {1976) p. 28. 
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CHAPrER V 
BRITAIN CATJS FOR A CONFERENCE 
Prologue 
. With the British atomic decision making machinery in place a 
policy direction had to be decided .. Attlee's Labour 
Government had been elected on a "socialist'' ticket, which 
encompassed issues ranging from the welfare state to 
international peace and cooperation. Under the new British 
and American administrations the position of the Quebec 
Agreement was unclear, whilst the validity of the Hyde Park 
aide-memoire was highly dubious. British atomic policy thus 
had two objectives: clarify the partnership arrangements 
with the Americans; and develop a socialist oriented atomic 
policy of their own. 
Towards a Policy 
From the outset Attlee and Bevin sought to move British 
foreign policy away from the state centricity of power 
politics, towards a new system of international relations to 
meet the needs of the atomic era. The pictures of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki burned themselves on the world's consciousness 
forcing the question of international control to the fore of 
Attlee's mind. No attempt had been made during the war to 
involve Stalin in the development of the bomb nor postwar 
atomic policy. Even the United Nations had been planned in 
total ignorance of atomic energy. Attlee felt so strongly 
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about the entire question of international control that he 
wrote down his thoughts in August.1 His thoughts formed the 
basis of a memorandum discussed at the end of August.~ The 
Gen 75 Committee concluded that: "··· present ideas of 
security were obsolete due to the atomic bomb and the 
development of bombers .•. that every aspect of defence and 
foreign policy needed to be re-examined in the light of this 
new discovery. 113 
Attlee outlined two policy proposals which Britain could 
pursue. One, America and Britain could attempt to maintain 
their present lead and regard it as a factor in the balance 
of power. However this option, claimed Attlee, would be 
temporary because it would raise suspicion and stimulate the 
efforts of other countries to produce atomic weapons. The 
alternative would be to give full information about the 
process, provided this could be done as part of an effort by 
every government to make the world security organisation 
(United Nations) an effective reality. 
Bevin was in favour of the latter proposal and suggested 
that atomic energy be kept separate from other issues that 
Britain, America and the Soviet Union were considering. He 
1 PREM 8/117. 
2 CAB 130/3, Memorandum Gen 75/1. 
3 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 2nd meeting, August 29, 1945. 
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thou~ht it best that Britain should first discuss the issue 
' . 
with the United States and take joint action rather than an 
independent line. Bevin ralsed another key issue; that the 
future industrial use of atomic energy could not totally be 
divorced from its military applications. The second meeting 
of the Gen 75 Committee concluded that they would draft a 
message from the Prime Minister to President Truman 
concerning international control, and that Sir John's 
Advisory Committee would look into the setting up of a 
national research establishment.4 
It took almost one month to draft Attlee's letter to Truman 
which was sent on 25th September. Before the letter was 
sent it was shown to Churchill who sympathised deeply with 
the general tone. The ex-Prime Minister emphasised the 
special relationship between Britain and America and stated; 
I should greatly regret if we seemed not to value this~ 
' [special relationship] and pressed them to melt our dual 
agreement down into a general international agreement 
consisting, I fear; of pious empty phrases and 
undertakings which will not be carried out.5 
The special relationship however no longer existed as it had 
done during the war. The flow of information on atomic 
energy had slowed down to a trickle at the end of the war, 
and the sudden termination of Lend-Lease certainly soured 
the air of such a relationship. 
4 Ibid. 
5 PREM 8/117. 
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Attlee's Labour Government with aspirations··of 
internationalism were seeking advice from perhaps one of the 
greatest bastions of power politics - Winston Churchill. 
Upon the advice of the latter, Attlee toned down the 
internationalist flavour of the letter, making no direct 
reference to the Soviet Union. "I think it may be essential 
that you and I should discuss this momentous problem,'' he 
wrote to Truman, "··· before the fears and suspicions which 
may be developing elsewhere have got such a firm hold as to 
make even more difficult any solution we may decide to aim 
at. 116 Attlee did not attempt to disguise his feelings on 
what an atomic war would mean for mankind. He wrote that if 
such an international atmosphere was to prevail he would 
"direct all our people to live like troglodytes underground 
as being the only hope of surviva1. 11 7 
On 3rd October, Gen 75 met for the third time. Attlee 
informed the Committee that he had not yet received a reply 
from Truman. 8 The same day Truman had sent a message to 
Congress asking for the establishment of a domestic Atomic 
Energy Commission. A few days later when questioned by 
reporters at Reelfoot Lake, Tennessee, Truman said that the 
6 PREM 8/117; also for co~i· 1of letter from Attlee to Truman see Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) pp. 78-81. 
7 Ibid. 
8 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 3rd meeting, October 3, 1945. 
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Unit~d States was the only nation possessing the resources 
and practical ability to manufacture the atomic bomb at that 
time. Pressed further, he declared he had no intention of 
giving the bomb's secrets away to any other country -- ''not 
the know-how of putting it together. n9 ''The following 
morning," reports Steinberg, "headlines read: TRUMAN SAYS 
U.S. TO KEEP ATOMIC BOMB SECRET. Editorials denounced him 
for having created confusion because his remarks did not 
, jibe with his October 3 message to Congress. '' 10 These 
remarks fuelled Attlee's anxieties for a meeting with Truman 
to discuss the future of atomic energy. However, by 11th 
October, Attlee had still taken no action and informed his 
colleagues that he would wait for a reply before deciding 
upon his next step.11 
By the time Gen 75 met again Truman had sent his reply. At 
the meeting of 16th October, Truman's reply to Attlee's 
letter was discussed. Although its tone was friendly, it 
showed no sign of wanting to arrange talks. At this meeting 
Attlee was alerted to the fact that there was considerable 
public pressure on the Government to make a statement on 
atomic energy policy. This factor, coupled with Truman's 
9 Alfred Steinberg - The Man From Missouri (van Rees Press, 1962) p.169. 
10 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
11 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 4th meeting, October 11, 1945. 
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comments at Reelfoot Lake coaxed Attlee into sending Truman 
a telegram urging a meeting between the two of them and 
Mackenzie King.12 
Two days la~er the Gen 75 Committee agreed the best time for 
a conference would be at the beginning of November. Fears 
were being voiced that if the issue was delayed much longer ~ 
then the Soviets may feel they have nothing to gain from 
cooperation with Britain and America. No policy direction 
had yet been agreed upon. The only firm conclusion reached 
was that Sir John Anderson would accompany the Prime 
Minister to Washington.13 A meeting was agreed upon for 
11th November in Washington. 
Before Attlee could leave for America three issues had to be 
settled. First, what methods of international control were 
available and which was the most suitable? Second, what 
exactly was the British attitude towards the Soviet Union? 
Finally, what was Britain's own policy on atomic energy? 
A report was produced by the ACAE under the direction of Sir 
John. This report however was dismissed by the Gen 75 
Committee owing to too many problems arising in all the 
methods of control advocated. A committee under the 
12 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 5th meeting, October 16, 1945. 
13 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 6th meeting, October 18, 1945. 
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chairmanship of Sir Edward Bridges was asked to consider the 
problem yet again. Within ten days a report was produced. 
It considered three possible forms of control agreement: 
prohibition of the manufacture of bombs by all; restriction 
of the production of bombs to one international 
.,_,,. 
organisation; the restriction of the production of bombs to 
the Big Three or Big Five (including France and China). 
Attlee dismissed this report because he believed it to be 
"dangerously illusory and unrealistic." Although the 
concern of the report was intended to be international 
control, Bridges recommended that the United Kingdom should 
start producing bombs as soon as practically possible in the 
event of failure to obtain an agreement on international 
contro1.14 
Although Attlee and Bevin initially sought total cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, their attitude had changed by 
November. At the end of the war the Soviets were still an 
ally, and Germany was still regarded as the major threat. 
This posture was ·beginning to change by November, with the 
Soviets viewed by some as aggressive and expansionistic. 
The Red Army occupied half of Europe, and the Western 
Allies, particularly the United States, viewed communism as 
something to be feared and not trusted. This change of 
attitude was especially noticeable in the Foreign Minister, 
14 Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) pp. 71-72. 
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Bevin. on 11th October, Bevin told the Gen 75 Committee 
that he thought the hostility shown by Molotov at the 
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers the previous 
month was the result of their exclusion from the development 
of the atomic bomb. Bevin argued, ''we should taJce the risk 
of giving this information to the Russians in the interests 
of our foreign policy. 11 15 Yet five days later he was to 
tell the next meeting of Gen 75, "··· the Soviet Union is 
aggressive and we must get some return for giving the bomb 
away.1116 
Gowing argues that Bevin's change in attitude could be 
attributed to the general feeling of Soviet mistrust 
emanating from his own department, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). Bevin's perceptions were shaped 
by those who supplied him with information. The FCO took 
• 
the view that Soviet policy was strictly realist and not 
influenced by motives of gratitude. She contends that Bevin 
rejected the opinions of Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, who advocated Soviet trust, in 
favour of the opinions of the FCo.17 Whilst this is 
technically correct it is misleading because Bevin had 
15 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 4th meeting, October 11, 1945; 
also Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) p. 67. 
16 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 5th meeting, October 16, 1945. 
17 Gowing, Op.Cit., (1974) pp. 67-68. 
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already opted for a "hard line'' Soviet policy before 
Clark-Kerr had contacted him. Gowing makes no mention of 
the fact that Lt. General Martell, the head of the No. 30 
Mission in Moscow, thought that the Russians ''with their 
worship of power'' would probably look upon an off er to share 
knowledge about the bomb with suspicion, and had conveyed 
these thoughts to Bevin.18 Although Gowing would probably 
argue that Bevin had knowledge of this information for one 
week without a change of attitude, it may be that he was 
mulling over the information before coming to a conclusion; 
we will never know for sure. 
However, it is curious that a socialist government should 
turn its back on the mother of socialism -- the Soviet 
Union. Attlee was converted to a tougher line although he 
was not entirely comfortable with such a position. Attlee's 
change of heart was almost certainly the result of Bevin's 
influence upon him. In the arena of foreign affairs Attlee 
commented, "if you have a good dog, don't bark yourself ... 
and in Ernest Bevin I had an exceptionally good dog. 11 19 
Bevin's sudden change of attitude was probably caused by 
the influence of those around him, the FCO, and of Martell. 
Bevin's change of attitude towards the Soviet Union was 
bound also to change Attlee's attitude. The Prime 
18 CAB 80/97, cos 45, No. 597, October 3, 1945. 
19 Attlee, Op. Cit., p.237. 
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Minister's rejection of the Soviets was not necessarily a 
rejection of socialism. Attlee was a patriot and only too 
well aware of the intense feelings of nationalism in Britain 
and the world; after all, the two previous world wars had 
been nationalist wars. He was thus able to reconcile 
Britain's attitude towards the Soviets because his brand of 
socialism ''owed more to the Bible than Das Kapital. n20 
Although Bevin and Attlee believed a real attempt should be 
made to build a world organisation based upon the 
abandonment of power politics, the British atomic decision 
making machinery was geared towards this very aspect they 
tried to avoid. It is strange that Attlee should refer to 
Gen 75 as ''my atomic bomb committee 11 21 when the objective of 
British policy was international control, with a definite 
emphasis on civil rather than military atomic development. 
Attlee was forced back to an elementary truth: there was no 
hope of controlling the use of atomic weapons unless the 
world laid aside nationalist ideas, and strove without 
reservation, to bring about an international understanding 
in which war was entirely ruled out. 
20 Pringle P. and Spigelman J. - The Nuclear Barons (Michael Joseph Ltd., 1982) p.78. 
21 In fact the decision that Britain should develop 
its own independent nuclear arsenal was not taken by 
Gen 75. Another ad hoc committee titled Gen 163 was set 
up especially to consider this decision which was taken on 
January 8, 1947. 
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Attlee proposed that when he met with Truman he would simply 
endorse the twelfth point in the President's recent 
statement on foreign policy -- that peace required a United 
Nations Organisation composed of all the peace loving 
nations willing jointly to use force if necessary to ensure 
peace. He would suggest that no attempt should be made to 
restrict the development of atomic energy by any country in 
view of the impossibility of effective control, and that 
there should be no special convention to govern the use of 
atomic weapons to restrain aggression,· but simply the 
determination to stick to the United Nations Charter and 
reinforce its authority by using atomic weapons against an 
aggressor if the necessity arose.22 This was virtually 
identical to the suggestion proposed by Bridges which Attlee 
had dismissed as "dangerously illusory and unrealistic." 
When Attlee and Bevin were elected in July, they were done 
so on an idealistic ticket. They formed a new government 
that had little experience of the office held. Attlee, 
although previously part of the Coalition Government, was 
never admitted into Churchill's select few. Both Attlee and 
Bevin were internationalist socialists when they took office 
but applying such ideals were perhaps more difficult than 
first envisaged. They began to see the true postwar Britain 
-- a country dependent on American aid, ruined industries 
22 · · t ( Gowing, Op. Ci., 1974) pp. 71-72. 
132 
and a crumbling Empire; this vision was not publicly 
shared. After approximately ten weeks in office they may 
have realised that their manifesto visions were not possible 
and that pragmatism was the order of the day. Consequently 
their shift from internationalism towards power politics 
appeared to be the result of external influences, the nature 
of the decision making machinery, and a sad resignation to 
'' 
the practicalities of office. 
The Prime Minister's view on international control had moved 
away from advocating some type of control regime to a 
_, 
position where the control of atomic energy could only be 
exercised through the control of the necessary raw 
materials -- uranium ore. It was believed that there was a 
finite supply of uranium and therefore a finite number of 
atomic bombs could be built. Raw materials represented 
potential power. The CDT was attempting to secure all known 
sources of uranium ore in the belief that there were no 
substantial deposits in the Soviet Union. Attlee believed 
that by controlling the supply of uranium ore, Britain and 
America ,could exercise control over global atomic 
development. He assumed that raw material supply was the 
crucial element of control and not the transfer of 
technology. This was in direct contrast to Bush and 
Conant's perceptions of the situation, especially with their 
knowledge of "heavy water". The two British scientists with 
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this same knowledge, Blackett and Tizard, were prevented 
from entering the atomic decision making machinery by the 
manipulative "suggestions'' of Bridges to Attlee; not 
surprisingly they were internationalists and pacifists. 
Attlee's Government had by November determined their policy 
direction on international control of atomic energy and had 
classified its attitude towards the Soviet Union. Yet its 
policy on atomic energy could most suitably thus far be 
described as one of non-decision; not to commit itself 
until the situation was clearer. This non-decision is 
exemplified in the brief given to the Advisory Committee on 
2nd November by Gen 75, to submit a report on the technical 
factors which might make it necessary to lay down an order 
of priority between: 
a) the production of bombs in this country as quickly as possible; 
b) the development of atomic energy for industrial purposes; 
c) research and development of new and more powerful bombs.23 
Since the United Kingdom at this stage did not have any 
atomic bombs nor the necessary blue prints to produce one, 
the third option could only be seen in the context of future 
Anglo-American atomic cooperation, under which Britain would 
receive all the necessary information to build a bomb. The 
23 CAB 130/2, Gen 75, 7th Meeting, November 2, 1945. 
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second qption would be viewed as viable only if there was an 
international control agreement. The first option might be 
the only available option should the forthcoming talks prove 
fruitless. Once again Attlee found himself pursuing 
Bridges' policy which he initially had dismissed on moral 
grounds. 
Attlee's perceptions were drifting further away from 
internationalism as the conference grew nearer. On 5th 
November, Attlee in a paper to the Cabinet, came down 
against the idea of an international agreement on the 
control of atomic energy in favour of a bilateral Anglo-
American agreement. He argued that "the U.S. is likely to 
accept this [bilateral agreement] in present conditions when 
power politics seem to be in full vigour. 11 24 Attlee added 
that the Americans would oppose sharing scientific knowledge 
and practical know-how with the Russians, and he himself 
thought that sharing would not change the Soviet attitude 
and if anything would be seen as a confession of weakness. 
Significantly this was the same conclusion reached by 
Martell a few weeks earlier. Nevertheless, Attlee clung 
desperately to his socialist ideals by arguing that although 
international control was not imminently possible it should 
be the objective before the Soviets actually produced their 
24 CAB 129/3, CP (45), No. 272, November 5, 1945. 
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own bomb. 25 
On 8th November the full Cabinet met to discuss Attlee's 
paper. This was the only time the full Cabinet was to meet 
to discuss the atomic bomb until December 1950. Some 
ministers were still prepared to argue for the position from 
which Attlee and Bevin had started; "if it was our policy to 
building world peace on moral foundations, we should be 
prepared to apply the principal at once to the A-bomb. 11 26 
It is ironic that Attlee was forced to defend against such 
criticism, criticism which he would probably would have 
himself voiced three months earlier. Attlee's socialist 
stance had experienced a complete turn around. He was now 
pursuing a policy more akin to that of Churchill's 
conservatism. It was Bevin that was to rescue Attlee from 
the criticism of those ministers still out of touch with the 
realities of office and give atomic policy a direction more 
suited to socialist views. Bevin suggested that Attlee 
should explore the possibility of putting in the hands of 
the United Nations, when formed, the task of devising a 
suitable machinery for full disclosure and exchange of the 
results of all scientific research between members. Attlee 
welcomed this suggestion and accepted it along with the rest 
25 Elizabeth Barker - The British Between the 
Superpowers 1945-50 (Macmillan, 1983) p.30. 
26 CAB 128/4, CM 45, 51st Conds, Min 4, CA, 
November 8, 1945; also Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) p.69. 
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of the cabinet.27 
British atomic energy policy going into the Washington 
Conference had two incompatible strands. On the one hand 
Attlee was pushing for some kind of international agreement 
on atomic energy, but on the other he sought a bilateral 
,, 
agreement with America. Although it was the British who 
proposed the conference, they had not prepared an agenda. 
British atomic policy now required an external stimulus to 
guide it into a particular direction. Attlee's atomic 
policy had become reactive, dependent upon the actions of 
the Soviet Union and the United States, rather than active, 
which was the case when Attlee pressed Truman for a 
conference. 
American Policy - Towards a Monopoly 
Bush and Conant faced a new obstacle in their quest for 
international control in the shape of Secretary of State, 
James Byrnes. He had long recognised the value of the bomb, 
both strategically and diplomatically, and did not wish to 
surrender such American advantages to international control. 
Byrnes was a hard line anti-Soviet who told Stimson that "we 
could not rely on anything in the way of promises from 
them. 11 28 When Byrnes left for London for the Conference of 
27 Ibid. 
28 Stimson Diaries, September 4, 1945. 
137 
Foreign Ministers he wished ''to have the implied threat of 
the bomb in .his pocket. 11 29 In contrast Stimson was a devout 
convert to the internationalist school; Bush and Conant had 
worked their magic. The Secretary of War was concerned by 
Byrnes' attitude and pleaded his case with Truman on 
5th September: 
I told him that both my plan and Byrnes' plan contained 
chances ... and I said that I thought in my method there 
was less danger than in his and also we would be on the 
right path towards establishment of an international 
world, while in his plan we would be on the wrong path ... and would be tending to revert to power politics. 30 
On the 11th September, Stimson presented Truman with a 
letter containing some loosely formulated proposals 
concerning American policy on interchange. He told the 
President, "I have become convinced that any demand by us· 
for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing 
in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make 
the objective we have in view less probable. 11 31 In a 
memorandum attached to the letter, Stimson called for a 
direct approach to the Soviet Union with a joint development 
of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. 
29 Hewlett and Anderson, Op.Cit., p. 417. 
30 Stimson Diaries, September 5, 1945. 
31 FRUS: The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman, September 11, 1945, vol:II, 1945. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) pp. 40-41. 
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Although a distinction was drawn between scientific and 
technical knowledge, the latter was not to be surrendered. 
He felt that unless the Soviets were invited into the Anglo-
American partnership they would feel threatened by a hos~ile 
alliance against them. Stimson had no qualms about the 
continued Anglo-American partnership and in fact suggested 
only approaching the Soviets after consultation with 
Britain.32 In contrast Bush and Conant did not favour 
continued Anglo-American relations for fear that it may be 
detrimental to an American approach to the Soviets. 
Truman approved each paragraph of Stimson's memorandum and 
agreed that "we must take Russia into our confidence. 11 33 
Bernstein commented on Truman's reaction to the memorandum; 
"that Truman actually agreed is unlikely, but the President, 
who admired and felt uncomfortable with his distinguished 
Secretary of War, almost never openly disa.greed with him. n34 
Stimson always received a respectful heari~g from the 
President, and within the first few weeks of Truman's term 
his advice would probably have been heeded. However, after 
five months in the President's chair Truman no longer relied 
so heavily upon Stimson's advice and perhaps privately 
32 Ibid., Memorandum by the Secretary of War {Stimson) to President Truman, September 11, 1945, pp. 41-44. 
33 Stimson Diaries, September 12, 1945. 
34 Barton Bernstein, Op. Cit., p. 1017. 
139 
disregarded it. Truman did not even press Stimson on the 
details of his proposals. Ultimately the Secretary of War 
came away from his discussion with the President with the 
false impression that the latter was in agreement. 
Whilst Byrnes was in London, Stimson gathered support for 
his position. Dean Acheson, acting Secretary of State in 
Byrnes' absence was, according to Stimson, was "strongly on 
our side in the treatment of Russia. 11 35 Acheson's position 
indicated a division of opinion within the State Department 
over the treatment of the Soviet Union. Whether he was 
merely placating Stimson is a matter of speculation, but it 
was unusual that there should be departmental disunity upon 
such a fundamental policy issue, although not an 
impossibility. Stimson definitely found support within his 
own ranks from his undersecretary, Robert Patterson. He 
told Stimson that the atomic secret "evidently cannot be 
0 kept" and that "being so it is better to recognise it 
promptly and to try to get on terms of confidence with the 
Russians. 11 3 6 
September 21, 1945, marked Stimson's farewell cabinet 
meeting before his retirement. The entire discussion was 
devoted to the question of how to approach the Soviets on 
35 Stimson Diaries, September 13, 1945. 
36 Ibid., also Bernstein, Op. Cit., pp. 1017-1018. 
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atomic energy. Stimson 'outlined his proposals: 
(1) that we should approach Russia at once 
with an opportunity to share on a proper quid 
pro quo the bomb, (2) that this approach to 
Russia should be to her directly and not 
through the United Nations ... or any similar 
conference of a number of lesser states.37 
The meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of heated 
discussion with considerable attention devoted to the 
distinction between scientific and technical knowledge. 
According to Truman's account of the meeting there was no 
consideration of sharing the bomb with the Soviets. However 
Stimson's Diaries, James Forrestal's Papers (Secretary of 
the Navy)., and archival material paint a different picture. 
' 
Forrestal spearheaded the attack on Stimson's proposals, 
arguing that the Russians were like the Orientals who did 
not live up to their agreements. The United States should 
not try "to buy understanding and sympathy," he concluded, 
"We tried that once with Hitler. There are no returns on 
appeasement. 11 38 Bush supported Stimson, trying to point out 
that giving scientific information to the Soviets was not 
giving them the technical ability to build a bomb. The 
stance adopted by those like Forrestal may be explained by 
the idea that analogies of previous events often provide 
37 Stimson Diaries, September 21, 1945. 
38 Bernstein, Op. Cit., pp. 1018-1019; for further 
details of who sided with Stimson and who did not see this 
citation, pp. 1018-1020. 
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decision makers with a ''useful shortcut to rationality. n39 
However, analogies also obscure aspects of a present case 
that may be different from the past one. For this reason, 
an important experience often hinders later decision 
makers' perceptions by providing an analogy that will be 
applied too quickly, easily and widely. Often decision 
makers would perceive more accurately had they not undergone 
the earlier experience. Indeed, the fresh recollections of 
Hitler's attempt at world domination no doubt persuaded 
Forrestal and others that security and monopolistic secrecy 
went hand in hand. 
At the end of the meeting Truman invited the participants to 
submit memoranda on international control of atomic energy. 
Acheson, going against the grain of the State Department 
claimed: 
that a policy of secrecy is both futile and dangerous 
and that the real issues involve the methods and 
conditions which should govern interchange of scientific 
knowledge and the international controls which should be 
sought to prevent a race toward mutual destruction.40 
Bush, in his memorandum, emphasised that an approach to the 
Soviets should not be a bilateral Anglo-American one but 
rather made by the United States alone. He reiterated his 
contention that ''the move does not involve giving away the 
39 I It Jervis, Op. Ci., p. 220. 
4° FRUS: Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State 
to President Truman, September 25, 1945, vol.II Op. Cit., 
pp. 48-50. 
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secret of the atomic bomb ••. what is given and what is 
received is scientific knowledge.'' He further pointed out 
that ''we cannot keep scientific secrets from Russia without 
also keeping them from the major portion of American 
scientists. 11 41 Bush, no doubt with Bohr in mind, pleaded 
that: 
it is important to make this move at once. If 
Russia becomes fully embarked on an extensive 
program, it would be hard to deflect her 
effort. Moreover we wish her to choose the 
path of international understanding, and first 
impressions are important. From this 
standpoint we lost something when we could not 
make the move until the bomb actually 
exploded.42 
Bush recognised the role of public opinion in deciding a 
-policy towards the Soviets, but thought this was a risk well 
worth taking. His desire for scientific information sharing 
could be linked to motives of scientific unification on a 
global scale. Whether this was the case or not Bush 
summarised the options, "Down one path lies a secret arms 
race on atomic energy; down the other international 
collaboration and possibly ultimate control. Both paths 
are thorny, but we live in a new world and have to 
choose. 11 43 
41 OSRD, RG 227 - Memorandum Bush to President 
''Scientific Interchange of Atomic Energy'', September 25, 
1945, Box 19, Folder 5, AEC #217. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately for Bush the greatest force on this issue was 
against him -- public opinion. Seventy-three per cent of 
those citizens polled opposed putting the bomb under a 
United States international air force, and the same number 
also objected to placing the secret under the control of the 
Security Council. A survey of congressmen revealed even 
stronger opposition to disclosing the secre·t of the bomb. 
The day after the Cabinet discussion, Senator Tom Conally, 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, declared 
b1untly, "complete secrecy should be maintained. ,,44 Against 
such national feelings and in the wake of Roosevelt's hard 
line Soviet policies, Truman felt his hand had been forced 
towards a monopolistic position. This decision was very 
similar to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Truman's 
choice was probably based more on concerns of his own 
political office than on concerns for the fate of an atomic 
world. This is to a certain extent understandable in that a 
new President is more likely to tread cautiously than stir 
up a hornet's nest of anti presidential public opinion. 
44 B t I 't erns e1n, Op. Ci., p. 1020. 
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Prologue 
CHAPl'ER VI 
THE.WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
On 31st October it was announced that talks on atomic energy 
between Canada, America and Britain would begin on 11th 
November. Although Attlee was to arrive in America in ten 
days, no policy had been formulated by the Americans on 
international control nor on future Anglo-American 
cooperation. The British were to arrive without an agenda, 
unbeknownst to the Americans, whilst they themselves were 
unprepared. This was the atmosphere that was to prevail 
over a conference that was initially called to determine the 
international fate of atomic energy. 
The British Are Coming! 
The first to sense the urgency of the situation was Under 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. He was concerned that the 
Americans would be unprepared for the arrival of the 
British. However, Acheson's chief, Byrnes, was uninterested 
in the matter and was unmotivated to act. Perhaps he felt 
that as long as the Soviet Union was not approached then 
nothing agreed upon with the British would really matter. 
More likely though, was that Byrnes knew little of the 
intricacies involved with the previous five years of Angl°fl 
American atomic relations. He did not possess the necessary 
information to draw up an American agenda for the 
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conference. ·Acheson, who held the same vi.ews as Secretary 
of War, Patterson, asked him ·to alert Byrnes to the 
necessity of examining the subject. Bush too was alarmed at 
the lack of planning. On Saturday, 3rd November, he called 
on Byrnes and stressed the need for some sort of policy. 
Byrnes welcomed Bush's advances as way of deflecting the 
responsibility of preparing the American agenda away from 
himself and onto Bush. The Secretary of State asked him to 
set out his views in writing.I 
Bush busied himself with the task all weekend and presented 
Byrnes with a seven page statement on Monday morning. Bush 
thought the British would bring up two issues: the Quebec 
Agreement; and the approach to the Soviet Union on the 
future of atomic energy. He perceived the Quebec Agreement 
as no longer binding in the postwar period and suggested; 
• 
"personally I would supersede the [Quebec] Agreement by a 
simple one with the British providing merely for the sharing 
of materials, leaving political clauses and the 
dissemination of information to be worked out on a more 
general international basis. 11 2 Bush was not in favour of a 
continued Anglo-American partnership other than for American 
1 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.459. 
2 OSRD, RG227, Bush to Byrnes (Sec. of 
"Memorandum on U.S. position at Washington 
due 11 November", November 5, 1945, Box 19, 
AEC #218. 
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raw ma~l gains. His, reasoning for this was closely 
tied to his approach to the Soviets. 
Bush believed that "Russia should be approached before the 
whole subject comes [sic.] up in the U.N.0. 11 3 He emphasised 
the difference between scientific and technical information, 
contending that the latter should remain American property. 
He proposed a three step plan with which to approach the 
Soviets. Step one would be an invitation for them to join 
Britain and the U.S. in establishing a scientific body under 
the auspices of the U.N .. If the Soviets displayed a 
genuine willingness to cooperate and could demonstrate that 
they could be trusted, then scientific sharing would be 
expanded to include industrial uses - step two. Step three 
would be an expansion of step two, although Bush does not 
clarify if this would include the sharing of technical 
information necessary to construct a bomb. 
Bush's main objective was to bring atomic energy under the 
control of the U.N. and include the Soviet Union in the 
plans for international control. Bush did not want any 
bilateral agreements between the British and Americans to 
cause alarm amongst the Soviets that an "atomic alliance" 
had been formed against them, for this may scare them into a 
secret arms race. For this reason he had proposed a final 
3 Ibid. 
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termination of the Quebec Agreement in favour of a less 
intricate agreement involving raw materials, combined with 
an approach to the Soviets. Whether Bush was still trying 
to promote an international scientific haven by proposing 
''step one'' is a matter of opinion. Although this was 
probably on his mind his primary concern and motivation was 
international control of atomic energy. 
This was to be a major stumbling block for the British 
during their negotiations in Washington. Whilst Bush 
perceived Anglo-American collaboration as detrimental to 
international control, the British perceived it as 
beneficial. Attlee and Anderson (the latter it should be 
remembered has served with Churchill for six years) believed 
~ that a close Anglo-American partnership would convince the 
Soviet Union of the necessity to cooperate with them because 
the balance of power would not be in her favour. Attlee, 
under Anderson's advice, was working from a power political 
perspective. They were to negotiate on the assumption that 
the worse Soviet-American relations became, the closer 
Anglo-American relations would become. The Americans were 
to hold the exact opposite view. 
In the same memorandum to Byrnes, Bush stated: 
For a thoroughly sound approach to this conference it 
seems to me essential-that the President, as soon as he decides on the general policy and objectives, should 
constitute a small group to prepare for the 
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conversations in a very definite manner. This should 
not be the Interim Committee, as the President will 
probably wish new membership, specifically from the · 
Senate. The Interim Committee should be dissolved. 4 
It is evident from these suggestions that the Americans were 
in complete disarray over drawing up their agenda. Brish had 
made these suggestions in the belief that the President was 
deciding ''the general policy and objectives'' and that he was 
merely making suggestive additions to the already considered 
policy direction. Truman had not considered the issue and 
was himself awaiting policy directives from his staff. 
Byrnes had no ideas of his own on the matter and was relying 
on Bush to draft the proposals. It was ironic that for the 
first time Bush had become the official American decision 
maker on atomic policy, a position achieved without 
bureaucratic juggling and without his knowledge. 
In offering his advice to Byrnes, Bush was mindful of his 
bureaucratic environment. He believed that unless all 
influential sections of the bureaucracy were not informed, 
or in some way involved in the proposals and outcome of the 
Conference, then any agreement reached with the British and 
Canadians would probably fall foul to bureaucratic 
"foot-dragging'' upon its implementation. Consequently he 
proposed the dissolution of the Interim Committee so as not 
0 - • to alienate Congressional support, and encouraged Senate 
4 Ibid. 
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participation to ensure the support of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. He was aware that Acheson and 
Coun~ellor Benjamin Cohen were considering the issue in the 
State Department and that Patterson was doing the same in 
the War Department. With these two bureaucratic bases 
covered and with the involvement of Congress, especially 
from the Senate, any agreement reached would almost 
definitely be whole-hartedly implemented. 
Byrnes met with Truman on Wednesday, 5th November, to 
consider the American position for when they were to meet 
with the British. Byrnes had no concrete ideas of his own 
and was armed only with Bush's proposals. Why should 
Byrnes, who had been such an avid anti-Soviet five weeks 
earlier, be willing to adopt Bush's pro-Soviet approach? No 
documentary or secondary sources exist that may elucidate 
this question. An explanation may be that he had become 
increasingly conscious of the possibilities of the Soviets 
producing their own atomic bomb and the possible resultant 
secret arnts race. His Under Secretary, with whom he had 
considerable contact, held the same views as Bush, which 
could have begun to rub off on Byrnes. If the Secretary of 
State and the President were in any doubt about a prompt 
approach to the Soviet Union, a Molotov speech on the same 
day of their meeting almost certainly laid such thoughts to 
rest. Molotov warned the West against the setting up of 
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anti-Soviet blocks and using the bomb as an instrument of 
power politics. I ' He claimed the weapon could not remain the 
possession of one country or narrow circle of countries • 
. "In a fiery peroration that brought the audience cheering to 
it feet, Molotov shouted; "we will have atomic energy and 
many other things, too! 1111 5 
As Attlee's visit drew nearer, Byrnes pondered Bush's plan. 
On 8th November he summoned Bush and Groves to his office. 
Byrnes asked, assuming the three step proposal was adopted, 
''what would we do with our bombs in the meantime? 11 6 Bush 
had not previously considered this question and returned the 
next day with an answer. He proposed the continuation of 
the production of fissionable material until such point that 
the Soviets appeared trustworthy. The President would then 
announce that the material would not be made into bombs and 
would allow an international commission to verify this 
statement. Such an announcement, Bush and Groves argued, 
"would show that Americans did not wish to hold an atomic 
sword over the world."7 
By the time the British arrived in Washington on Saturday 
morning, November 10, tl1e Americans still had not yet drawn 
5 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.461. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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up an agenda. Both parties were to conduct talks on the 
international control of atomic energy and the fate of 
future Anglo-American atomic relations without any definite 
preconceived plans or goals. 
The Conference 
The Conference began on 11th November and concentrated upon 
two issues: international control; and the Anglo-American 
partnership. The British team worked as a single unit, 
Anderson negotiating for the British on both issues. The 
American team operated within a true bureaucratic 
atmosphere; Bush and Byrnes negotiated on international 
control, whilst Patterson and Groves dealt with Anglo-
American interchange. Anderson's last visit to the United 
States had been with Churchill, and had consequently not 
encountered the new bureaucratic American system. Whilst 
negotiating he did not understand the necessity of dealing 
with the "correct" people on a particular issue. His 
perception of the United States a monolithic actor, under a 
centralised leadership was outdated and was to eventually 
cause the British great disappointment. 
International Control 
Bush was in his P Street office on Monday 12th November, 
when he received a call from Byrnes asking him to come over 
to the State Department. On arrival, Bush met briefly with 
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Benjamin Cohen on his way to the Secretary of State. Bush 
told him that, ''it appears that there are supposed to be 
conferences with the British this afternoon to agree on a 
communique, •.• [and that] we ought not to appear for such a 
purpose until there was good American agreement. 118 Moments 
later Bush met Byrnes, who as Bush wrote in a memorandum, 
''startled me by telling me that the conference had already 
come to an agreement. 119 Bush enquired into the nature of 
the agreement only to discover that it was exactly along the 
lines of the proposals which he had given to Byrnes, ''which 
of course", Bush recalled, "follows closely the memorandum 
Secretary Stimson gave to the President some time ago. 11 lO 
Perhaps Stimson had made a greater impact upon Truman's 
thinking than Bush had realised, or perhaps, and more 
likely, Bush's proposals were adopted for lack of an 
alternative. Bush asked what proposals the British had made 
and was informed by Byrnes that "they made none. 11 11 This 
was a clear indication that the British were seeking 
external stimulus to guide their policy. Anxiously Bush 
asked what had been done about the Quebec Agreement. Byrnes 
replied, ''it did not even come up." "This is 
8 OSRD, RG227, Bush: Memorandum·· for the File, 
November 13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #158. 
9 OSRD, RG 227, Bush: Memorandum for the File, 
November 13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #159. 
lO Ibid. 
ll Ibid. 
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extraordinary'' , commented Bush. 12 
Although an agreement had been reached, the final communique 
had not yet been drafted. Byrnes asked Bush to make a draft 
of a communique on the results of the conference. Bush 
protested, arguing that he could hardly do this because he 
was not present at the conference. Byrnes insisted that 
Bush was well informed of the facts following the 
Secretary's recitation. Bush queried who was drawing up a 
draft in the State Department? Byrnes told him that nothing 
• along these lines had been done and he desired a draft from 
him. "Somewhat under protest ... [Bush] agreed to draw 
something for his consideration. 11 13 
Why should Byrnes desire assistance from outside his own 
department? Was Cohen not qualified to draw up the 
communique? Bush was most concerned· that the State 
Department would obstruct any agreement that did not have 
their direct participation. It was not enough that Byrnes 
was involved in the negotiations if his involvement did not 
reflect departmental views. Bush asked Cohen to draft a 
communique under his direction. It appears with hindsight 
that Bush had no intention of using Cohen's draft, but 
merely sought to involve the State Department. Bush's mind 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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was filled with the issues of international control and 
within an hour after his meeting with Byrnes had produced a 
draft.14 He then hurried over to the War Department and 
showed it to Harrison and Patterson who made only minor 
changes. Bush then gave it to Byrnes, who as he noted, 
'' 1 iked the draft and had no changes to make . '' 15 The 
American communique draft had been drawn up by a man ~h.o had 
not attended the meetings and who had used second hand 
information with a little imagination to do so. 
~· Tuesday morning Byrnes again called Bush to his office. 
Byrnes had apparently also asked Cohen to draw up a draft 
after Bush had left the day before. Cohen discarded Bush's 
direction on a draft and instead followed that of his boss. 
Bush was most annoyed to discover that Cohen had discarded 
his plans for entirely new ones. Determined not to correct 
scientific language in a report he did not approve, he 
severely criticised Cohen's entire document sentence by 
sentence. 16 At four that afternoon Byrnes called Bush over 
to the State Department once again. This time he wanted him 
to review a draft Cohen had drawn up in the light of Bush's 
earlier criticism. Bush knew exactly what he wanted and 
14 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.462. 
15 OSRD, RG 227, Bush: Memorandum for the File, November 13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #159. 
16 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 463. 
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told Byrnes quite directly that he t~hough his own document 
"covered the same ground and was better. 11 17 An hour later 
at the White House, Byrnes presented Cohen's paper at a 
meeting with the British. Departmental loyalties had won 
the day, although the substantive difference between the two 
documents was almost negligable. 
'Bush, on very short notice, was asked to join the American 
group at the White House. Byrnes no doubt thought that if 
Bush was to be involved in any further drafting he ought to 
be present at the meeting. Presented with such an 
opportunity, Bush made his presence felt. When Admiral 
Leahy presented the American Chiefs of Staff's view that the 
bomb ought to be outlawed, Bush ''spoke forcibly on the 
dangers of any such move." He noted after the meeting, "I 
think I disposed of this and I hope once and for all. 11 18 
Leahy's position had not been adopted upon motivations of 
altruism. Rather the Chiefs of Staff believed that the atom 
bomb would lead to cutbacks in conventional forces and thus 
undermine their bureaucratic power-base. For the Navy the 
atom bomb would result in a loss of prestige, especially 
for their· battleships which might be deemed virtually 
obsolete. Perhaps the Air Force would welcome the bomb, for 
17 OSRD, RG 227, Bush: Memorandum for the File, 
November 14, 1945, Box 19, File 12, AEC #160 .. 
18 Ibid. 
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this would increase their relative status within the 
military triad; however they were not present, and were 
represented by Leahy. It was clear that banning the bomb 
was not included in Bush's~arsenal of approaches to 
international control. Conceivably this was ruled out ~s an 
option because no bomb would mean no scientific 
international organisation. 
On Wednesday at three o'clock in the afternoon talks resumed 
in Truman's office. The Americans that morning had 
fin~lised their draft, which in essence was similar to that 
of Bush's, although it placed greater emphasis on the needs 
for controls and safeguards before information could be 
shared from scientific to industrial applications. In doing 
so, "it necessarily struck a somewhat more negative note. 11 19 
Nevertheless, Bush was quite happy with it. By this time 
the British had also drawn up their own draft, as too had 
the Canadians; although the latter did not tackle all the 
issues. The British draft was phrased more eloquently than 
the American but was substantively similar. Accordingly, 
the conference allocated the drafting responsibilities to 
Anderson, Bush and Pearson, who went into session at once. 
By six o'clock the three of them had a rough draft ready 
19 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p.464. 
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for typing. 20 
After adjourning early from dinner at the British Embassy, 
the drafting committee left for the White House to review 
the freshly typed draft. The conference was due to 
reassemble at 10 a.m. the following morning. At 10:30 p.m. 
D 
that night the drafting committee learned that Attlee, 
Truman and King had brought the meeting forward and wanted 
to meet that night. For the next hour and a half the three 
men worked on the draft, finally reaching completion at 
midnight. Bush left that night after a meeting with the 
main conference body, carrying the only copy of the 
agreement. The following morning it was typed out and 
presented for public signature at 11 a.m., Thursday, 15th 
November. An indication of the haste at which the 
communique was drafted was the fact that one phrase had been 
accidently inserted twice and had to be struck out by hand. 
Senators Connolly, Vandenberg and McMahon, and 
Representatives Bloom and Eaton were present at the 
signing.21 
The Washington Declaration conpentrated upon four major 
20 OSRD, RG 227, Bush: Memorandum for the File, November 15, 1945, Box 19, File 12, AEC #162; also Ibid. 
21 Ibid.; for entire copy of the Washington Declaration (Communique) see Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) Appendix 4, pp. 82-84. 
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points, all related'to the establishment of a special 
commission within the United Nations: 
\) 
1) that all nations should be involved with 
the exchange of basic scientific knowledge 
for peaceful ends; 
2) that atomic energy should be controlled to 
the extent necessary to ensure its use only 
for peaceful purposes; 
3) that all national armaments should 
eliminate atomic weapons and all other 
major weapons of mass destruction; 
4) that safeguards should be set up to protect 
complying states from the hazards of 
violations and evasions.22 
Point three would appear to go against Bush's desire not to 
have the bomb outlawed. However, point one, which would be 
implemented before point three, called for the sharing of 
basic scientific knowledge. Consequently by the time the 
bomb would be banned, an international scientific organ 
within the U.N. would have already been established. In the 
final analysis Bush concluded, "the results [of the 
Declaration] seem to be a movement in a direction that is 
sound. ,,23 
The Conference had produced the desired results over 
international control as far as Bush was concerned, but the 
22 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. cit., p. 465. 
23 OSRD, RG 227, Memorandum for the File, November 
13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #159. 
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foundations upon which the agreement had been made were 
structurally very weak indeed. Bush commented that, "the· 
general impression is certainly that of a conference which 
has been somewhat chaotic due to lack of preparation and 
lack of organisation in carrying it on. •• 24 The speed at 
which the conference was carried out led to a Declaration 
that was born out of hasty compromise rather than genuine 
desire. The press had learned of the conference before the 
British had arrived and had been running stories all week on 
the ''Conference to Internationally Control Atomic Energy. n25 
The public were expecting results. Bush believed Anderson 
to be the man who leaked to the press "whose diplomacy," 
according to him, "was usually over-clever. 11 26 
The Americans throughout the conference had been so 
concerned whether the Soviet Union would accept their 
proposals that they had overlooked whether their own 
bureaucracy would accept them. After the signing of the 
Declaration Bush lamented; "there was evidently one very bad 
slip on this whole affair. I had urged Secretary Byrnes 
very early on to form a definite American advisory group on 
24 Ibid. 
25 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 462. 
26 OSRD, RG 227, Memorandum for the File, November 
13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #159. 
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this matter •.. he did not get together such a group. 11 27 In 
fact Bush was called in alone to see the Secretary and was 
given no specific authorisation to confer with anyone. Bush 
had also urged Byrnes to have discussions with some of the 
Senators but "apparently neither he nor the President did 
this at any time during the conference. 11 28 Tom Connolly, 
the powerful chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and Arthur Vapdenberg, ranking minority member, did not stay { 
,~ 
for the usual press photographs after the signing. This was 
a definite display of their annoyance at being left out of 
the proceedings. Bush noted that Connolly "expressed great 
dissatisfaction with the way in which the matter was 
handled. 112 9 With Senate resentment of the Declaration, its 
chances of success were severely reduced. Bush concluded, 
"this is simply one more illustration of the fact that lack 
of organisation for a conference of this sort is likely to 
be a serious omission. 11 30 Nine months later with the 
f 
passing of the monopolistic Atomic Energy Act (1946) his 
worst fears were unfortunately to be realised. 
27 OSRD, RG 227, Memorandum for the File, November 15, 1945, Box 19, File 12, AEC #162. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 OSRD, RG 227, Memorandum for the File, November 13, 1945, Box 19, file 12, AEC #159. 
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The Anglo-American Partnership 
Bush thought it extraordinary that the British had not 
,, 
·brought up the Quebec Agreement, as he had told Byrnes on 
Monday. Bush believed that if the British did not raise the 
issue then the Americans should. Unless some new 
arrangement were adopted, the Combined Policy Committee and 
the Combined Development Trust would face an uncertain 
future. The British, as Bush had predicted, raised the 
issue on late Tuesday afternoon. Sir John approached Bush 
with the proposal that the two of them should work out a 
basis for future collaboration. Although the British did 
not have an agenda, Anderson no doubt knew the importance of 
raising this issue and had always intended to do so. 
The following day, Wednesday, Truman and Attlee discussed 
the issue of Anglo-American atomic cooperation. They 
delegated the working out of a basis for future 
collaboration to Sir John Anderson and Dr. Bush. The 
latter's energies had been applied to international control 
and had not given this issue ample consideration, other than 
he believed that collaboration should be limited. Bush told 
Truman that ''the Secretary ( of War] ought to carry the 
responsibilityn31 
At ten o'clock Thursday morning this set of negotiations 
31 Hewlett and Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 466. 
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began in Patterson's office. However, the day before their 
advisors had met to informally exchange views on the Quebec 
Agreement.32 On the American side were Groves, Arneson and 
Harrison and on the British side were Rickett and Roger 
Makins. Makins was minister in charge of atomic energy at 
the British Embassy, a member of the Foreign Office, and a 
member of Sir John's ACAE.33 It was agreed at this 
preliminary meeting that whatever level of future 
cooperation was decided upon, the CDT and CPC would continue 
to function. This was a terrible tactical faux pas by the 
British negotiators because the Americans now knew that 
their supplies of raw materials were assured regardless of 
the future state of technical interchange. Collaboration 
over raw material supplies had been very advantageous to 
the Americans and now appeared even more so owing to the 
large uranium deposits in South Africa. Prior to this 
meeting Gowing commented, "the scales were evenly weighed 11 34 
with the Americans requiring raw materials and the British 
information. Before the British had even began proper 
negotiations they had thrown away their ace. 
32 FROS: Memorandum by Captain R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of War (Patterson), 17, April, 1946, vol: 1945, vol. II, (United States Government Printing Office, 1967) p. 65. 
33 Roger Makins was to become Lord Sherfield; see Sherfield, Op. Cit .. 
34 I It Gowing, Op. C1 ., (1974) p. 75. 
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The first issue raised at the Thursday morning meeting was 
Article 4 of the Quebec Agreement, whereby the British had 
expressly disclaimed any interest in the industrial aspects 
of atomic energy beyond what the President of the United 
States considered fair and just. Anderson informed 
Patterson that the United Kingdom wished to build pilot 
plants and wanted to know where they stood on this matter. 
Patterson was receptive to the idea and assured Anderson 
that an agreement would be reached which would enable the 
British to commence construction. The atmosphere was far 
more relaxed after Patterson's assurances. The two groups 
officially agreed upon the decisions made at the preliminary 
meeting the day before. They both agreed that it was 
desirable to terminate the Quebec Agreement in its entirety 
and replace it with a new agreement which would be better 
suited to the postwar situation. 
Amidst fierce discussion the basic principle of all round 
collaboration was established. The next step was drafting, 
but what form should this take? Two choices were available: 
a formal agreement, or a less formal memorandum of agreement 
covered by an exchange of letters between the two sides. A 
formal agreement would have to go before the U.S. Senate, 
which may have disastrous results. It was decided that the 
President and Prime Minister would sign the less formal 
instrument which would provide for a newly worked out 
164 
relationship. Time was running short and it soon became 
apparent that there was no time to do this before the 
conference had ended. Consequently, an even briefer 
document was prepared for the Prime Minister and President. 
Groves, in line with the American policy of keeping the 
issues of materials and information separate, proposed a 
second less formal document to guide the CPC when they met 
to consider future Anglo-American collaboration. Anderson 
sensing that he had been duped, reluctantly agreed. Makins 
and Rickett undertook the drafting of the shorter document, 
whilst both teams would draft the longer memorandum.35 
The following morning at 9 a.m., after a long and trying 
night of drafting and redrafting, the two groups met again 
in Patterson's office. Anderson, with regard to the shorter 
document, insisted upon the wording "full and effective" 
cooperation rather than ''effective" cooperation. Groves, 
suspecting that Anderson had outmaneuvered him, strongly 
objected. Patterson over-ruled the General's protestations 
arguing that the change made no substantive difference. 
Time had almost run out with only a few hours left of the 
conference to work with. It was agreed that since the long 
memorandum was not binding there was no point in having it 
signed by the heads of state. Patterson decided to let 
Groves confer with Sir John on the long memorandum which 
35 b'd I 1 ., p.76. 
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both would sign. With only hours to go before the visiting 
delegations departed for Ottawa, Truman and Attlee signed 
the shorter draft, which Gowing describes as, a "very flimsy 
piece of paper. 11 36 Shortly after, Groves and Anderson 
signed the longer document entitled "Memorandum of 
Intention. 11 3 7 
The shorter document signed on 16th November said: 
1) We desire that there should be full and 
effective cooperation in the field of 
atomic energy between the United States, 
United Kingdom and Canada. 
2) We agree that the Combined Policy Committee 
and the combined Development Trust should 
be continued in a suitable form. 
3) We request the Combined.Policy Committee to 
consider and recomm7nd to us a~~ropriate 
arrangements for this purpose. 
The Memorandum of Intention contained a set of 
recommendations for the CPC to consider when preparing the 
agreement that would supersede all wartime agreements, 
except the 1944 Declaration of Trust. In four respects the 
recommendations differed from the Quebec Agreement. First, 
Canada was included as an actual partner. Second, there 
were no restrictions upon the British commercial and 
3G Ibid. 
37 See Appendix III. 
38 National Archives Microfilms 
code, 10-36-4, Harrison-Bundy Files, 
Gowing, Op. Cit., (1974) p. 76. 
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0 (NAM) series, M 1108, 
Role 3, file 50; also 
industrial atomic program. Third, the obligation of 
''consent'' before the use of atomic weapons had been watered 
down to consultation; this also applied to the disclosure of 
information to third parties. Finally, all raw materials, 
no matter from what source, were to be held by the CDT and 
allocated by the CPC according to the principle of need. 
After the British had departed with the Canadians, Groves 
wrote to Stimson updating him on the latest information. 
The General proudly reported: 
the last minute insertion of the word "full" 
before the words "effective cooperation" has 
to some extent increased the scope of 
cooperation beyond that contemplated in our 
discussions. The amount of the increase will 
depend upon the clarification of the words 
"ful.l and effective'' which to the British mean 
more than they do to me. You will note that 
the fifth paragraph of the memorandum does not 
recommend "full and effective cooperation" 
beyond the field of basic scientific 
research.39 
Grove's interpretation of the shorter document and his 
formulation of point 5 of the Memorandum of Intention had, 
in essence, reproduced the spirit of the Quebec Agreement 
with regard information exchange. The British were to 
receive no more than basic scientific information, yet had 
agreed to a full sharing of their raw materials. The 
Americans had given the British the go ahead on their own 
39 NAM: Series M 1108, code, 10-36-4, 1-Iarrison-Bundy 
Files, Memorandum - Groves to Stimson, November 23, 1945, 
role 3, file 50. 
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industrial plant developments but without all the knowledge 
to carry out such plans. The British had committed 
themselves to hollow promises. Admittedly they had the 
available information to produce their own plants without 
American assistance, but this would require increased time 
and expense. Ultimately, this did become the fate of the 
British plants. 
Sir John, who was a shrewd negotiator, had fallen victim to 
American bureaucratic politics. Patterson was the person 
Sir John had most contact with during the conference. The 
Secretary of War was perhaps one of the strongest proponents 
of a pro- Anglo-American partnership on the American team. 
Anderson must have applied this air of American friendship 
to their entire team. His monolithic perceptions of the 
Americans was a poor, but understandable, error of 
judgement. It is possible that he thought that recognition 
of the principle of cooperation was sufficient for a 
document that was only to act as a guide to future 
negotiations. Should there be any dispute, the three 
leaders had signed the short memorandum which stated that 
there "should be full and effective cooperation. 11 40 
Anderson perceived the shorter officially signed memorandum 
to be of greater importance of the two because the longer 
40 This was implicit in a memo by Sir John Anderson 
to the Gen 75 Committee, CAB 130/3, December 11, 1945. 
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" 
one was non-binding and negotiable. ,. 
Patterson himself had made a blunder. 
:' , r 
He had failed to 
bring the State Department into the negotiations. Without 
the full force of the bureaucracy behind such an agreement, 
implementation may prove difficult. Bush's uninvolvement in 
the Anglo-American negotiations was also a mistake, 
especially since his ties with Byrnes had become quite 
close. On Thursday 15th, Bush went to the Pentagon where he 
''found Mr. Harrison presiding over a conference~ and later 
commented, "I will probably be brought into these 
discussions again today, but feel sure they will be no more 
than preliminary. ,,41 Bush took the attitude that .this set 
of negotiations were nothing more than preliminary informal 
talks. This was also probably the view taken by the State 
Department. 
Washington - An Overview 
A week of negotiations in November 1945 actually produced 
very little in the way of any long term binding agreements. 
The entire week was dominated by chaotic and frantic 
negotiations which were conducted with one eye on the clock. 
The public were expecting results, yet going into the 
conference neither team had any certain preconceptions as to 
what these results should be. Dr. Bush was the :·main impetus 
41 OSRD, RG 227, Bush- Memorandum for the File, 
November 15, 1945, Box 12, File 12, AEC #162. 
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for policy direction, primarily owing to the lack of any 
alternative. Characteristically, however, he told Truman 
that he "had drafted a letter to Mr. Stimson giving him 
credit for developing what became the American plan and what 
finally became substantially embodied in the agreement.42 
Truman thought this a noble gesture, whilst Bush probably 
considered it his pathway back into ''the shadows." The 
American bureaucratic machine was unable to accommodate two 
parallel conferences on virtually the same issue. Confusion 
as to which department supported which agreement was bound 
to erupt, making it difficult for any of the agreements to 
be faithfully executed. 
The very reason behind the entire conference had been lost 
amongst the confusion and disorder of the weeks proceedings. 
The original intention of sharing secrets with the Soviet 
Union was not achieved. This problem had now become 
deflected into the hands of the United Nations. What had 
originally been a move by the British to lay aside 
nationalistic ideals had ended up as a three power agreement 
based on the hopes of a virtual monopoly of raw materials. 
Attlee's comment upon his arrival in Washington best 
summarises the atmosphere of the week's proceedings; 
"sometimes in these negotiations," he reflected, "I make the 
42 Ibid. 
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confession that power politics seems to me to be naked and 
unashamed. '' 4 3 
0 
43 A. Bullock - Ernest Bevin (Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 191. 
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Conclusion 
Prologue 
Several different issues have been considered in an attempt 
to shed light on the complex issue of whether international 
control of atomic energy was ever a genuine possibility. 
The conclusion will serve to amalgamate these issues to give 
an overall picture of the subject under consideration. 
Opportunity versus Possibility 
Upon reflection of the evidence it would appear that there 
was opportunity for the international control of atomic 
energy. The opportunity for a joint Anglo-American approach 
to the Soviet Union for the sharing of atomic information 
was available. However, was there a viable possibility of 
its execution? Opportunity was thwarted during the war 
years by the strong hand of Winston Churchill. Bohr's 
ideas, which Roosevelt was initially warm to, were rejected 
by Churchill's preconceptions of a dangerously 
expansionistic Soviet Union. The Quebec and Hyde Park 
Agreements were both characterised by Anglo-American 
monopolistic tendencies. Together they would police the 
postwar world with the bomb as their sword. Anderson and 
Cherwell, who sympathised with Bohr, were prevented from 
pursuing Bohr's dream by their implacable bulldog-like 
chief. Roosevelt's division between technical and broad 
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advice, left the likes of Bush and Conant in an advisory 
vacuum. Churchill's hold over Roosevelt probably would have 
made Bush's advice redundant had it had reached him anyway. 
Whilst Churchill was in office an approach to the Soviet 
Union was simply not a possibility, in spite of the fact 
th~t this period probably offered the greatest chance of 
success for such a move. 
With Churchill out of the picture by July, 1945, the 
possibility of approaching Stalin had become quite real. 
However, Roosevelt's death three months earlier had given 
rise to a decentralised bureaucratic American governmental 
system. The British were in a position to approach the 
Soviets whilst Anderson was at the helm of an unsure Labour 
government. The decentralisation of the American decision 
making machinery made it difficult for the British to make 
contact with the "correct" people in Washington. This, 
coupled with Sir Edward Bridges' right wing manipulations 
from behind the civil service curtain of neutrality, gave 
rise to suspicions of British intentions from several 
quarters of the American bureaucracy. With the public eye 
on ato~ic dealings after August 6, 1945, the opportunity for 
an approach to the Soviets had been curtailed. The 
Washington Conference had ultimately produced a tripartite 
monopoly, rather than international settlement. Anderson's 
perception of a monolithic American government and the lack 
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of American intra-bureaucratic cooperation, laid to rest any 
genuine possibilities of a successful international 
agreement. 
From July to December, 1945, Britain pursued two diverse and 
incompatible atomic policies. The first was towards 
international control based upon the utopian ideal of the 
abandonment of power politics. The other pushed Britain 
towards the development of atomic energy as an insurance 
policy, should international control fail. As Attlee and 
Bevin waded deeper into their term, the pragmatism of power 
politics became an increasingly ugly reality. An approach 
to the Soviet Union was not as simple as first envisaged. 
On matters of atomic energy these two men, contrary to 
popular opinion, were not the central atomic decision 
makers. ''Attlee and Bevin, " concluded Bullock, "together 
played a greater role than any other ministers in shaping 
British atomic policy after the war. 11 1 Prima facia, by 
studying the signatures of atomic decisions, this does 
appear to be a justified conclusion. However, the work of 
Bridges, and to some extent Anderson, shaped British atomic 
policy during Labour's early months. It is not so strange, 
with this information in mind, that a socialist government 
should pursue a Conservative type policy. 
!, 
1 Bullock, Op. cit., p. 185. 
174 
Ultimately Bush's failure to assure international control 
was not his own. Byrnes' and Truman's neglect to notify the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was probably the largest 
stumbling block in achieving this goal. The lack of 
coordination between the State Department and the War 
Department, and the division between international and 
Anglo-American negotiations, ensured confusion amongst the 
British and a lack of cohesion amongst the Americans. 
Monopolistic sentiments were always present within certain 
ranks of the American bureaucratic machinery. Groves never 
advocated sharing secrets of any description with the Soviet 
Union. In a drawn out domestic battle between Army versus 
civilian control of atomic energy from the August, 1945, to 
June, 1'946, with the passage of the McMahon Act, an American 
monopoly was finally achieved. This Act not only sealed the 
fate of international control of atomic energy but also, in 
effect, nullified all Anglo-American agreements of 
cooperation. The British, incensed by this American action, 
ardently pursued their own atomic program, eventually 
becoming the third nuclear power. 
Opportunity for international control dwindled as time drew 
on. Bohr's belief that the Soviets should be approached 
before the war was over and before the bomb was dropped was 
ignored, even by Bush. After the bomb was dropped Bush 
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advocated. , .. approaching the Soviets before the formation of 
the U.N .• Opportunity slipped further from sight at the 
Washington Conference when it was decided that the Soviets 
should be approached upon the formation of the U.N .. As 
opportunity for international control grew smaller, so too 
did its possibility. Whether involving the Soviet Union in 
the development of atomic energy, as Bohr had suggested, 
would have ultimately avoided an international arms race 
will always be a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, it 
appeared a better path to chose than a monopolistic one, 
which prophesied such an event. 
The Models 
The contemporary international environment during the 1940's 
made the possibility of international control unlikely. 
Churchill's distrust of the Soviet Union coupled with the 
full emergence of the American bureaucratic political system 
did not make it possible to promote international control. 
Wittgenstein demonstrates the necessity to comprehend 
contemporary situations within their contemporary framework. 
An assessment of 1940's atomic policy within a 1980's 
framework would not be very productive. With hindsight it 
is easy to see Churchill's mistakes and identify the 
development of the American bureaucratic system. However, 
these factors were not so evident during that period, and 
' 
contemporary perceptual visions should be considered, rather 
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than ex post facto. Wi ttgensteinian language game theory ,, 
offers,a sound explanation for the communication 
difficulties between the British and Americans, and between , 
Bohr and Churchill. In both these cases different 
''languages" were spoken by the parties in question, 
resulting in poor and confused communication. 
Jervis and Wittgenstein complement each other's theories 
·\ because they both deal with perceptual differences. 
However, Jervis goes beyond Wittgenstein's notions of 
language to include most aspects of psychological 
perceptions. He attempts to explain how particular 
perceptions are arrived at and how they affect decision 
making in the international arena. Jervis helps explain how 
decision makers acquire their world views, and what 
influences them to alter them. This was particularly 
helpful in explaining Churchill's, Roosevelt's and 
Cherwell's psychological milieux, and the alterations of 
those of Attlee and Bevin. 
Allison's bureaucratic politics model offers a very strong 
explanation of the American decision making machinery. 
After Roosevelt's death, the bureaucracy surfaced as the 
primary American decision maker. The United States was in 
no way a monolith from this time onward. Britain's failure 
to recognise this fact was to cost them their precious 
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Anglo-American atomic partnership. 
Wallace's decision making model accurately depicts the 
British atomic decision making structure. It adequately 
explains Churchill's centralised and jealously guarded 
domain of high policy decision making. After Churchill's 
removal from office, high policy was conducted by the highly 
secret and centralised Gen 75 Committee. Sectorial policy 
was made by men like Akers under Churchill and Halifax under 
Attlee. 
Common to all the aforementioned models is their current 
applicability. Wallace and Allison today, accurately 
reflect the workings of the British and American decision 
making structures. If anything, Allison's model is even 
more applicable today then it was when it was concieved of 
in 1969. The current increase in Congressional power has 
left the Presidency often unable to conduct its foreign 
policy. Bureaucratic infighting seems to "create'' foreign 
policy rather than it resulting from some form of 
preconceived plans. Foreign governments dealing with 
America often find it difficult to accomplish their goals, 
because they are unable to locate the key players within the 
bureaucracy. Just as Anderson's dealings were virtually 
futile, so too are current dealings when the ''wrong'' section 
of the bureaucracy is dealt with. 
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Perhaps a greater understanding of how the American system 
works, and indeed the systems of other actors, would allow 
for greater successes in international relations. For if it 
is understood how an international counterparts function, 
perhaps the same ''language" will be spoken in negotiations. 
If an actor is able to understand another's perceptual 
framework or world view, this too may allow for better 
negotiations; Bush demonstrated this skill. Ultimately 
these models offer a common academic framework that are not 
time specific, and in some instances, not culture specific 
(Wittgenstein and Jervis). The true value of utilising such 
models is that they standardise a method of approach within 
an academic discipline and consequently enable any piece of 
work to be objectively criticised and virtually undatable. 
Forty Years Later 
Bohr's pessimistic predictions unfortunately have over the 
last forty years become a disastrous reality. It is to be 
hoped that, with the benefit of hindsight, the same 
mistakes will not be made again. A desire to be more 
cognisant of the contemporary environment, and the desire to 
speak the same "language" with an adversary or counterpart, 
may increase the chances of successful and long lasting 
negotiated agreements. 
A host of issues have been raise throughout this thesis 
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which have not been fully addressed owing to the constraints 
of time and space. Of notable importance is the role of the 
scientist in politics. Should scientists, because of their 
technical knowledge, be allowed to guide governmental 
. . ... __ ) 
"science" policy? Should Cherwell have been allowed to 
advise Churchill on atomic policy? Was Roosevelt correct in 
dividing scientific decisions from ones of broad policy, 
leaving the former to scientists and the latter to 
politicians? As the globe becomes increasingly 
technologically advanced, these questions become ever more 
pressing. A balance must be found between the technical 
adviser and the politician if another tragic comedy of 
errors is to be avoided in the future. 
A sense of Orwellian irony follows in the wake of the 
invention of the atomic bomb. The Truman/Attlee/King 
declaration on November 15, 1945, stated that there was no 
defence to such weapons. Very shortly after this statement 
the U.S. Department of War changed its title to the 
Department of Defen~e, ~nd the British Ministry or War to 
the Ministry of Defence. Nuclear missiles today bear such 
paradoxical names as "Peace-Keeper". 
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A P P E N D I X I 
THE QUEBEC AGREEMENT 
Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the 
Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube 
Alloys 
Whereas it is vital to our common safety in the present War 
to bring the Tube Alloys project to fruition at the earliest 
moment; and whereas this may be more speedily achieved if 
all available British and American brains and resources are 
pooled; and whereas owing to war conditions it would be an 
improvident use of war resources to duplicate plants on a 
large scale on both sides of the Atlantic and therefore a 
far greater expense has fallen upon the United States; 
It is agreed upon us 
First, that we will never use this agency against each 
other. 
Secondly, that we will never use it against third parties 
without each other's consent. 
Thirdly, that we will not either of us communicate any 
information about Tube Alloys to third parties except by 
mutual consent. 
Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production 
falling upon the United States as the result of a wise 
division of war effort, the British Government recognise 
that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial 
character shall be dealt with as between the United States 
and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President 
of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. 
The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these 
industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be 
considered by the President of the United States to be fair 
and just in harmony with the economic welfare of the world. 
And Fifthly, that the following arrangements shall be made 
to ensure full and effective collaboration between the two 
countries in bringing the project to fruition: 
(a) There shall be set up in Washington a Combined 
Policy Committee composed of: 
The Secretary of War 
Dr. Vannevar Bush 
Dr. James B. Conant 
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(United States) 
(United States) 
(United States) 
Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, G.C.B., 
C.M.G., D.s.o. 
Colonel the Right Hon. J.J. Llewellin, 
C.B.E., M.C., M.P. 
The Honourable C.D. Howe 
(United Kingdom) 
(United Kingdom) 
(Canada) 
The functions of this Committee, subject to the control of 
the respective Governments will be: 
(1) To agree from time to time upon the programme of 
work to be carried out in the two countries. 
(2) To keep all sections of the project under constant 
• review. 
(3) To allocate materials, apparatus and plant, in 
limited supply, in accordance with the requirements 
of the programme agreed by the Committee. 
(4) To settle any questions which may arise on the 
interpretation or application of this Agreement. 
(b) There shall be complete inte,rchange of information 
and ideas on all sections of the project between 
members of the Policy Committee and their immediate 
technical advisers. 
(c) In the field of scientific research and development 
there shall be full and effective interchange of 
information and ideas between those in the two 
countries engaged in the same sections of the field. 
(d) In the field of design, construction and operation 
of large-scale plants, interchange of information 
and ideas shall be regulated by such as hoc 
arrangements as may, in each section of the field, 
appear to be necessary or desirable if the project 
is brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such 
ad hoc arrangements shall be subject to the approval 
of the Policy Committee. 
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APPENDIX II 
Aide-memoire of Conversation Between the President and the 
Prime Minister at Hyde Park, 19th September, 1944 
The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding 
tube alloys, with a view to an international agreement 
regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter 
should 'continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but 
when a "bomb" is finally available, it might perhaps, after 
mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who 
should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated 
until they surrender. 
2. Full collaboration between the United States and the 
British Government in developing tube alloys for military 
and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. 
3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is 
responsible for no leakage of information particularly to 
the Russians. 
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APPENDIX III 
Memorandum of Intention 16th November 1945 
MEMORANDUM TO: The Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee 
We recommend that the following points be considered by the 
Combined Policy Committee in the prep~ration of a new 
document to replace the Quebec Agreement, which should be 
superseded in toto, together with all other understandings 
with the exception of the Combined Development Trust 
Agreement which should be revised in conformity with the new 
arrangements. 
1. The three Governments, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and· Canada, will not use atomic weapons against 
other parties without prior consultation with each other; 
2. The three Governments agree not to disclos~ any 
information or enter into negotiations concerning atomic 
energy with other governments or authorities or persons in 
other countries except in accordance with agreed common 
policy or·after due prior consultation with one another; 
3. The three Governments will take measures so far as 
practicable to secure control and possession, by purchase or 
otherwise, of all deposits of uranium and thorium situated 
in areas compromising the United States, its territories of 
possession, the United Kingdom, and Canada. They will also 
use every endeavour with respect to the remaining 
territories of the British Commonwealth and other countries 
to acquire all available supplies of uranium and thorium. 
All supplies acquired under the provisions of this paragraph 
will be placed at the disposition of the Combined 
Development Trust. ,, 
4. The Materials at the disposition of the trust shall be 
allocated to the three Governments in such quantities as may 
be needed, in the common interest, for scientific research, 
military, and humanitarian purposes. Such supplies as are 
not allocated for these purposes shall be held by the 
Combined Development Trust and their disposal shall be 
determined at a later date in the light of then existing 
conditions and on a fair and equitable basis. 
5. There shall be full and effective co-operation in the 
field of basic scientific research among the three 
countries. In the field of development, design, 
construction, and operation of plants such co-operation, 
recognised as desirable in principle, shall be regulated by 
such ad hoc arrangements as may be approved from time to 
time by the Combined Policy Committee as mutually 
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advantageous. 
6. The Combined Policy Committee, already established and 
constituted so as to provide equal representation to the 
United States on the one hand and to the Governments of the 
United Kingdom and Canada on the other, shall carry out the 
policies provided for, subject to the control of the 
respective governments. To this end, the Committee shall: 
1. Review from time to time the general 
program of work being carried out in the 
three countries. 
2. Allocate materials in accordance with the 
principles set forth in the fourth 
paragraph above. 
3. Settle any questions which may arise 
concerning the interpretation and 
application of arrangements regulating co-
operation between the three Governments. 
The above is to be understood as being without prejudice to 
the consideration by the Combined Policy Committee of any 
matters not covered in this memorandum. 
Signed: Sir John Anderson 
L.R. Groves -
• MaJ. Gen. U.S.A. 
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